The sole question presented here is whether or not the chancellor erred in granting an extension of time for taking testimony after the cause had been at issue for some time, and after it had been set down for hearing on bill and answer. Equity Rule 71 in effect provides that three months and no more shall be allowed for taking testimony after the cause is at issue, unless the judge shall upon special cause shown by either party enlarge the time. The extension complained of here was granted...
October 9, 1923, R. G. Zetrouer filed his amended bill in the Circuit Court of Alachua County praying for mandatory injunction to require A. B. Zetrouer to open a certain road which he the said A. B. Zetrouer had caused to be closed by constructing fences across it and depriving R. G. Zetrouer, complainant, of the use thereof. The bill was sworn to. Demurrer thereto was overruled and answer was filed denying the allegations of the bill. A large number of affidavits were filed by complainant in...
This was an action by the plaintiffs in error in the Circuit Court for Dixie County against Dixie County and H. D. Allen, G. J. Ford and E. H. Sauls as trustees of Dixie Highway Special Road and Bridge District of Dixie County upon a contract made and entered into between the plaintiffs and the Board of County Commissioners of Lafayette County "acting for and on behalf *Page 511 of" Dixie Highway Special Road and Bridge District of Lafayette County. Under the contract the plaintiffs were...
Appellee filed a motion to strike the bill of exceptions in this case, upon the ground that it was not tendered or signed during the term at which the trial was had and the verdict and judgment entered, as required by Rule 97 of Circuit Court Practice. It appears from the record that trial was had at the fall term of Polk County Circuit Court, and verdict and judgment entered on October 31st, 1924, in favor of the plaintiff, M. Ellen Ford. Motion for new trial was filed by defendant, Worrell,...
Appellee filed a motion to strike the bill of exceptions in this case, upon the ground that it was not tendered or signed during the term at which the trial was had and the verdict and judgment entered, as required by Rule 97 of Circuit Court Practice. It appears from the record that trial was had at the fall term of Polk County Circuit Court, and verdict and judgment entered on October 31st, 1924, in favor of the plaintiff, M. Ellen Ford. Motion for new trial was filed by defendant, Worrell,...
Appellee filed a motion to strike the bill of exceptions in this case, upon the ground that it was not tendered or signed during the term at which the trial was had and the verdict and judgment entered, as required by Rule 97 of Circuit Court Practice. It appears from the record that trial was had at the fall term of Polk County Circuit Court, and verdict and judgment entered on October 31st, 1924, in favor of the plaintiff, M. Ellen Ford. Motion for new trial was filed by defendant, Worrell,...
Appellee filed a motion to strike the bill of exceptions in this case, upon the ground that it was not tendered or signed during the term at which the trial was had and the verdict and judgment entered, as required by Rule 97 of Circuit Court Practice. It appears from the record that trial was had at the fall term of Polk County Circuit Court, and verdict and judgment entered on October 31st, 1924, in favor of the plaintiff, M. Ellen Ford. Motion for new trial was filed by defendant, Worrell,...
This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the judgment herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there is no error in the said judgment; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the said judgment of the Circuit Court be, and the same is...
In a suit by Rosa C. Duncan, Executrix, as complainant, against Lorenzo A. Wilson and W. M. Mason, Jr., copartners doing business as Wilson-Mason Company, and Lake Butler Bank as defendants, the following final decree was rendered: "Rosa C. Duncan, as executrix of the Will of L. A. Duncan, Deceased, v. Loranzo A. Wilson and W. M. Mason, Jr., Copartners as Wilson-Mason Company, and Lake Butler Bank, a Corporation. — Accounting, etc. FINAL DECREE. "This cause coming on to be heard upon final...
This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the decree herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there is no error in the said decree; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the said decree of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby,...
This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the decree herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there is no error in the said decree; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the said decree of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby,...
The plaintiff in error was indicted for murder in the first degree, the charge being in two counts, *Page 476 one alleging in effect that the accused with a premeditated design to kill one C, shot and killed a child, Bernice McCoy; the other count alleging in effect that the accused, with a premediated design to kill Bernice McCoy, did fatally shoot her. This writ of error was taken to a conviction for manslaughter, the statutory definition of which is: "The killing of a human being by the act,...
This cause having heretofore been submitted to the court upon the transcript of the record of the decree herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the court that there is no error in the said decree; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the court that the said decree of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby...
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 448 This appeal is from an interlocutory order sustaining a general demurrer to the bill of complaint. No supersedeas was obtained. A motion is made to dismiss the appeal on the ground that subsequent to the entry of the interlocutory appeal, the lower court dismissed the bill of complaint and no appeal was taken from such final decree and the time for...
The appellants exhibited their amended bill in the Circuit Court for St. Johns County against the above named defendants. They and Chesleigh H. Briscoe demurred to the bill. The St. Augustine Beach Toll Bridge Company being named in the demurrer as "St. Augustine North Beach Toll Bridge Company." Chesleigh H. Briscoe was not named as a defendant either in the original or amended bill. On July 3, 1924, the Chancellor sustained the demurrer to the amended bill. On July 16, 1924, the complainants...
This writ of error was taken to a judgment awarding damages against the owner of an automobile for an injury done in the operation of the automobile by a bailee for hire of an automobile from its owner who kept automobiles for hire. The owner did not furnish the driver and it is not shown to have been negligent in hiring a defective car (Collette v. Page, _ R.I. _, 114 Atl. Rep. 136, 18 A. L . R. 74), or in hiring the automobile to one he *Page 252 knew or should reasonably have known was not a...
Writ of Error dismissed on motion of the Attorney General.
This appeal is from an order denying a motion and petition for a rehearing on a final decree upon a bill of review. The bill of review does not set out all of the record upon which it is predicated, viz, it does not state a demurrer that was overruled, or the answer of a defendant who was dismissed from the suit or the decree pro confesso entered against another defendant who is the complainant below herein, or the order dismissing one defendant from the suit and continuing the suit as to...
This appeal is from an order denying a motion and petition for a rehearing on a final decree upon a bill of review. The bill of review does not set out all of the record upon which it is predicated, viz, it does not state a demurrer that was overruled, or the answer of a defendant who was dismissed from the suit or the decree pro confesso entered against another defendant who is the complainant below herein, or the order dismissing one defendant from the suit and continuing the suit as to...
This appeal is from an order denying a motion and petition for a rehearing on a final decree upon a bill of review. The bill of review does not set out all of the record upon which it is predicated, viz, it does not state a demurrer that was overruled, or the answer of a defendant who was dismissed from the suit or the decree pro confesso entered against another defendant who is the complainant below herein, or the order dismissing one defendant from the suit and continuing the suit as to...
This appeal is from an order denying a motion and petition for a rehearing on a final decree upon a bill of review. The bill of review does not set out all of the record upon which it is predicated, viz, it does not state a demurrer that was overruled, or the answer of a defendant who was dismissed from the suit or the decree pro confesso entered against another defendant who is the complainant below herein, or the order dismissing one defendant from the suit and continuing the suit as to...
