Filed: Jan. 18, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS - ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JANUARY 18, 2008 No. 07-12505 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK - D.C. Docket No. 06-00046-CR-001-HL-5 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus WILLIAM SHAMONE LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia - (January 18, 2008) Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judg
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS - ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JANUARY 18, 2008 No. 07-12505 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK - D.C. Docket No. 06-00046-CR-001-HL-5 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus WILLIAM SHAMONE LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia - (January 18, 2008) Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judge..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
------------------------------------------- ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 18, 2008
No. 07-12505
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
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D.C. Docket No. 06-00046-CR-001-HL-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM SHAMONE LEWIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(January 18, 2008)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant William Lewis appeals his convictions for possession
with intent to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime. Lewis contends that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his apartment because the
district court improperly concluded that the good faith exception set forth in
United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), applied to cure the defective search
warrant in this case. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
The Leon good faith exception is an exception to the exclusionary rule: the
rule generally provides that “[e]vidence seized as the result of an illegal search
may not be used by the government in a subsequent criminal prosecution.”1
United States v. Martin,
297 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002). We review de
novo whether the Leon good faith exception applies to a search; but “the
underlying facts upon which that determination is based are binding on appeal
unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Norton,
867 F.2d 1354, 1360 (11th
Cir. 1989) (internal quotation omitted).
The Leon good faith exception “stands for the principle that courts generally
should not render inadmissible evidence obtained by police officers acting in
reasonable reliance upon a search warrant that is ultimately found to be
unsupported by probable cause.”
Martin, 297 F.3d at 1313. Therefore, “in the
absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral
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We note that the government does not challenge the district court’s decision that insufficient
probable cause existed to support the search warrant for Lewis’s apartment.
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role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in
preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable
belief in the existence of probable cause.”
Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422. “[W]hen
officers engage in objectively reasonable law enforcement activity and have acted
in good faith when obtaining a search warrant from a judge or magistrate, the Leon
good faith exception applies.”
Martin, 297 F.3d at 1313 (internal quotation
omitted).
Here, Lewis argues that the Leon good faith exception does not apply
because (1) the search warrant was so lacking in probable cause that officers’
belief in the warrant’s validity was unreasonable; and (2) the magistrate
abandoned her judicial role in issuing the warrant. See
id. (explaining the limited
circumstances where the good faith exception will not apply). Lewis contends that
the affidavit supporting the issuance of the warrant lacked an indicia of probable
cause because the affidavit provided only conclusory statements. He also asserts
that, by relying on this affidavit, the magistrate acted as a mere “rubber stamp.”
We are unpersuaded by Lewis’s arguments. The affidavit in this case stated,
among other things, that (1) the attesting officer met with a confidential informant
who told the officer about seeing marijuana sold out of Lewis’s apartment as well
as weapons in the apartment; (2) the informant agreed to conduct a controlled buy
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of marijuana at Lewis’s apartment; (3) the informant did not have drugs on him
before completing the controlled buy; (4) the informant went to Lewis’s apartment
to complete the controlled buy; and (5) the informant later met with the officer at a
predetermined location and gave marijuana to the officer. In addition, the officer’s
affidavit explained that these events occurred no more than 72 hours before
execution of the affidavit.
Although the affidavit does not describe why the informant was reliable, it
is clear that the attesting officer -- who received the tip about drug sales at Lewis’s
apartment during a meeting with the informant -- set up and knew of the controlled
buy of drugs at Lewis’s home. See Illinois v. Gates,
103 S. Ct. 2317, 2330-31
(1983) (recognizing that affidavits “are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the
midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate
specificity once exacted under common law pleading have no proper place in this
area.”); United States v. Heard,
367 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing
that a face-to-face tip allows “officers receiving the information [to] have an
opportunity to observe the demeanor and perceived credibility of the informant”).
Based on the informant’s description of marijuana sales at Lewis’s apartment, the
direction to complete a controlled buy at that location, and the time between the
controlled buy and the issuance of the warrant, it was not objectively unreasonable
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for officers to believe that a fair probability existed of finding contraband at that
location. See
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330 (explaining that an “explicit and detailed
description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was
observed first-hand, entitles [the informant’s] tip to greater weight than might
otherwise be the case”); see also United States v. Brundidge,
170 F.3d 1350, 1352
(11th Cir. 1999) (“Probable cause to support a search warrant exists when the
totality of the circumstances allow a conclusion that there is a fair probability of
finding contraband or evidence at a particular location.”). Therefore, whether or
not actual probable cause existed, the affidavit had an indicia of probable cause to
justify a reasonable belief in the validity of the search warrant.
We also reject Lewis’s contention that the magistrate issuing the warrant in
this case abandoned her judicial role because, according to Lewis, the affidavit
lacked a showing of probable cause. We have explained that the affidavit
contained an indicia of probable cause; and we agree with the district court that
the Leon good faith exception applies in this case.
We affirm the denial of Lewis’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
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