MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.

Defendants move to dismiss this the Complaint in this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code §§ 51-53 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 12(b)(6).

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Standing pertains to the court's subject matter jurisdiction under Article III and may be challenged in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).

Article III standing requires that a plaintiff "have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). "The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements." Id. When the "case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element." Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Defendants argue that plaintiff lacks standing on his ADA claim because he has not sufficiently alleged that he suffered an injury-in-fact. However, plaintiff alleges that he personally encountered accessibility barriers when he visited the Garage. (See Comp. ¶¶ 10, 13-9.) When he arrived at the Garage, plaintiff noticed that there were seven parking spaces, but none were marked or reserved for persons with disabilities, as required by the ADA. (Id. ¶¶ 13-16, 27-33.) More specifically, plaintiff alleges the parking lot does not meet the standards outlined in the Americans with Disabilities Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG).1 (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the inaccessible parking lot denied him full and equal access and caused him difficultly, discomfort, and embarrassment. (Id. ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff further alleges that he plans to return once the barriers are removed, and is and has been deterred from returning to the Garage because of the barriers. (See id. ¶¶ 20,24.) These allegations are sufficient under Ninth Circuit law to establish that plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that if a barrier violating ADA accessibility guidelines relates to a plaintiff's disability, it will impair the plaintiff's full and equal access, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement). The court does not read Spokeo to overrule or change the law of this Circuit on that question.

Defendants further argue that plaintiff lacks standing because plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a likelihood of future injury as required to seek injunctive relief under the ADA. However, given the Garage's location and options, plaintiff alleges that he plans to return and patronize the Garage as a customer once the barriers are removed. (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 33.) Thus, plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to establish a "real and immediate threat of repeated injury" in the future. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 953 ("the threat of repeated injury in the future is `real and immediate' so long as the encountered barriers either deter him from returning or continue to exist at a place of public accommodation to which he intends to return").

For the forgoing reasons, the court finds that plaintiff has standing to bring this action will deny defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).2

For the forgoing reasons, the court. Accordingly, the court will deny defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Sonoma K's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Docket No. 7) be, and hereby is, DENIED.3