Filed: Jun. 26, 2014
Latest Update: Jun. 26, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 26, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until August 21, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between June 26, 2014, and August 21, 2014, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The g
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 26, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until August 21, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between June 26, 2014, and August 21, 2014, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The go..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 26, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until August 21, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between June 26, 2014, and August 21, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes several hundred pages and computer forensic review materials. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review the discovery, discuss proposed resolutions with their clients, and consider pre-trial motions.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 26, 2014 to August 21, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: June 24, 2014. BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney
/s/MATTHEW G. MORRIS
MATTHEW G. MORRIS
Assistant United States Attorney
Dated: June 24, 2014. /s/KYLE KNAPP (auth. 6/24/14)
KYLE KNAPP
Counsel for Defendant
XAVIER JOHNSON
Dated: June 24, 2014. /s/KELLY BABINEAU (auth. 6/24/14)
KELLY BABINEAU
Counsel for Defendant
KRISTIN CALDWELL
Dated: June 24, 2014. /s/WILLIAM DUBOIS (auth. 6/24/14)
WILLIAM DUBOIS
Counsel for Defendant
WILLIAM BROWN
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
