STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on September 24, 2013 at 9:45 a.m.

2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until November 19, 2013, at 9:45 a.m. and to exclude time between September 24, 2013 and November 19, 2013 under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has provided defense counsel with the discovery associated with this case, which includes voluminous records, including mortgage and bank records involving multiple transactions, totaling approximately 1,000 pages. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b. Counsel for defendant has been reviewing previously disclosed discovery, discussing it with his client, and assessing potential trial and sentencing issues.

c. Additionally, government counsel and defense counsel have consulted their schedules, and November 19, 2013, is the first mutually agreeable, available date for a status conference. Government counsel will be in trial for three weeks starting on October 16, 2013, and defense counsel will also be in trial beginning in late October.

d. Based on the foregoing, counsel need additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to review the materials described above, and otherwise effectively prepare for the disposition of this case. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of the parties, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on November 19, 2013, at 9:45 a.m. and that it find excludable time from September 24, 2013 through and including the November 19, 2013 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to November 19, 2013 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case and excluding time as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 24, 2013 to November 19, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.