Filed: Mar. 19, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 19, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Lee S. Bickley, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Andranik Martirosyan, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following: 1. This matter is set for status conference on March 24, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, Mr. Martirosyan now moves to continue the status
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Lee S. Bickley, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Andranik Martirosyan, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following: 1. This matter is set for status conference on March 24, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, Mr. Martirosyan now moves to continue the status ..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Lee S. Bickley, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Andranik Martirosyan, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. This matter is set for status conference on March 24, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, Mr. Martirosyan now moves to continue the status conference until April 28, 2014.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Mr. Martisosyan was originally scheduled to be arraigned on July 10, 2012. Due to serious health issues, Mr. Martirosyan was not arraigned until November 28, 2012. The Defense represents Mr. Martirosyan remains in very fragile health.
b. The Government has provided defense Counsel with over 700 pages of discovery.
c. The Defense is seeking a continuance in order to review the material provided by the Government and conduct, as necessary, investigation. (It should be noted, Mr. Martirosyan speaks very limited English and the services of an Armenian language interpreter are necessary to effectively communicate with the defendant.)
d. As indicated herein, Mr. Martirosyan is gravely ill. His health has been spiraling downward for several years. The downward progression began approximately seven years ago when he was in a car accident and suffered a significant head injury. Presently, he suffers from severe cardiac issues (he had heart surgery just prior to charges being filed in this matter), diabetes, and loss of vision (related to his diabetes — he has had eye surgery during the pendency of this case and may need additional surgery but is unlikely to receive such surgery due to his other health issues). He is in significant pain, but because of his cardiac issues and other health concerns, he is limited in what he can take for his pain. Mr. Martirosyan is frequently disoriented and suffers from memory loss and anger issues. In addition to receiving medical treatment for his physical health issues, Mr. Martirosyan is also receiving treatment from the psychiatric staff for his mental and emotion health concerns.
e. The parties were (and are) considering asking the court to order a competency evaluation. As an intermediate step, the parties previously asked to court to continue this matter in order to get additional, specific, information on Mr. Martirosyan's condition(s) and prognosis. Mr. Martirosyan's son (and primary care giver) made several attempts to get a letter detailing Mr. Martirosyan's condition(s) and prognosis from Mr. Martirosyan's treating physician(s) (Kaiser). Unfortunately, he has heretofore been stymied by the hospital bureaucracy. In response, both my investigator and I have contacted Kaiser patient services requesting such information.
f. A letter detailing Mr. Martirosyan's constellation of medical issues was provided by Kaiser patient services and forwarded to the government. After reviewing the information therein, the government and I discussed the need for additional information. As such, I again made contact with Kaiser patient services and requested a follow up letter, hopefully addressing the issues discussed with the government.
g. A subsequent letter from Kaiser detailing Mr. Martirosyan's prognosis was provided to the defense and forwarded to the government. The government needs additional time to evaluate the recently provided information (from/by Kaiser) and determine if additional information is necessary. The government additionally needs time to pursue investigation related to the information already provided by the defense. Based on the information provided by defendant's doctors, the government may be willing to dismiss the matter.
h. Counsel for Mr. Martirosyan believes a continuance in this case is necessary to allow counsel reasonable time to review the discovery, conduct investigation; meet with the defendant; review defendant's medical records; and, afford the defense time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
i. The Government does not object to the continuance.
j. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
k. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of March 24, 2014 to April 28, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B) (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
l. In addition, the parties agree and further stipulate the defendant is currently "physically unable to stand trial." The time period of March 24, 2014, to April 28, 2014, inclusive is also deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(4) and Local Code N.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
