STIPULATION AND ORDER REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT STIPULATION

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 19, 2013.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until November 7, 2013, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between September 19, 2013, and November 7, 2013, under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, workers' compensation benefits records, bank records, and other related documents in electronic form constituting approximately 2600 pages of documents. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel. Additionally, defense counsel has produced information to the United States as to the issue of resolution.

b. Defense counsel has requested the United States make a formal plea offer, which the United States anticipates making the week of September 16, 2013.

c. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client and to review discovery for this matter, to engage in discussions with the United States regarding potential resolution, for which he will need to review discovery provided and the information provided to the United States, and to otherwise prepare for a possible trial.

c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 19, 2013 to November 7, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.