Filed: Jul. 01, 2014
Latest Update: Jul. 01, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on June 26, 2014. Defendant, who resides in Southern California and receives assistance with travel, has a
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on June 26, 2014. Defendant, who resides in Southern California and receives assistance with travel, has a g..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate and agree as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on June 26, 2014. Defendant, who resides in Southern California and receives assistance with travel, has a general waiver of appearance on file and had not planned or arranged to attend this status conference.
2. Each party has recently provided the other and the Court with a report by its expert concerning defendant's competency and its expert's comments on the other expert's report. The experts differ in their conclusions on the issue of defendant's competency. The parties agree that the Court should have the opportunity, now that it has these reports and comments, to speak with the defendant in person to help the Court assess defendant's competency. Defendant will plan and arrange, with defense counsel's assistance, to attend a hearing on July 31, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. for this purpose.
3. The parties agree and stipulate that a new hearing date should be scheduled on July 31, 2014, at 9:00 a.m., and that time should be excluded between June 26, 2014, and July 31, 2014 under 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T4 to allow defense counsel to assist defendant in planning and arranging for transportation to Sacramento, to prepare defendant for the hearing, and to complete additional preparation in advance of the hearing on that date. The parties further agree and stipulate that the continuance is needed for these purposes and that the ends of justice to be served in granting the continuance and allowing defendant this time to prepare outweighs the best interest of the public and defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective planning, travel arrangement, and preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
b) The government does not object to the continuance.
c) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 26, 2014 to July 31, 2014, at 9:00 a.m., inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
