Filed: Mar. 26, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2018
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS; ORDER LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL , Chief District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order at the status conference on March 19, 2018, this matter was set for status on April 9, 2018. Time was inadvertently not excluded between March 19, 2018 and April 9,
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS; ORDER LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL , Chief District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order at the status conference on March 19, 2018, this matter was set for status on April 9, 2018. Time was inadvertently not excluded between March 19, 2018 and April 9, 2..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS; ORDER
LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order at the status conference on March 19, 2018, this matter was set for status on April 9, 2018. Time was inadvertently not excluded between March 19, 2018 and April 9, 2018.
2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, and to discuss potential resolutions with his client.
b) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c) The government does not object to the continuance.
d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 19, 2018 to April 9, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
3. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
