SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.
The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 2, 2016 at 1:00 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 52,000 pages of discovery, including investigative reports and related documents. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendant FERNANDO ALANIS desires additional time in preparation of this case. Defense counsel needs additional time to conduct investigation, review the extensive and voluminous discovery, communicate with his client (who resides out of state), and have settlement negotiations with the government. Thus, the requested continuance will conserve time and resources for the parties and the court.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to, and agrees with, the requested continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to July 5, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
The time period of the date of this order to July 5, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.