STIPULATION REGARDING CONINUATION OF STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERI ODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Robin Dimiceli and Edward Khalfin, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on April 14, 2014;

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 19, 2014, and to exclude time between April 14, 2014 and May 19, 2014, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and files totaling more than 40,000 pages. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. Defense counsel is in the process of reviewing this information and discussing discovery issues with the United States.

b. Counsel for the defendants desire additional time to consult with each of their clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with each of their clients, to discuss their representation with clients, to prepare pretrial motions and otherwise prepare for trial.

c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny each of them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 14, 2014 to May 19, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at each defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

g. This case involves multiple witnesses and multiple defendants and concerns allegations of mortgage fraud in three separate but related cases, 2:12-CR-0327, 2:12-CR-0329 and 2:12-CR-0330.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.