Filed: Jan. 11, 2016
Latest Update: Jan. 11, 2016
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr. , Senior District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea on January 15, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the hearing date until Febru
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr. , Senior District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea on January 15, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the hearing date until Februa..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea on January 15, 2016.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the hearing date until February 12, 2016, and to exclude time between January 15, 2016, and February 12, 2016, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for defendant desires to change the date for the change of plea hearing because he is unavailable for the currently scheduled hearing date. He will be out of the state on January 15, 2016, and the next available date when counsel is available to appear is February 12, 2016.
b) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant continuity of counsel. Counsel has represented the defendant in this action for years prior to the defendant being charged and is requesting a delay of approximately one month because of a previously planned trip.
c) The government does not object to the continuance.
d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 15, 2016 to February 12, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
