Filed: Mar. 20, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 20, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Lee Bickley, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Moctezuma Tovar, Thomas A. Johnson, Esq., counsel for defendant Manuel Herrera, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Ruben Rodriguez, Bruce Locke, Esq., counsel for defendant Jaime Mayorga, Ronald J. Peters. Esq., couns
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Lee Bickley, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Moctezuma Tovar, Thomas A. Johnson, Esq., counsel for defendant Manuel Herrera, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Ruben Rodriguez, Bruce Locke, Esq., counsel for defendant Jaime Mayorga, Ronald J. Peters. Esq., counse..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Lee Bickley, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Moctezuma Tovar, Thomas A. Johnson, Esq., counsel for defendant Manuel Herrera, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Ruben Rodriguez, Bruce Locke, Esq., counsel for defendant Jaime Mayorga, Ronald J. Peters. Esq., counsel for defendant Sandra Hermosillo, Erin J. Radekin, Esq., and counsel for defendant Christian Renteria, Christopher R. Cosca, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on March 24, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 28, 2014 and to exclude time between March 24, 2014 and April 28, 2014 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare). It is anticipated one, or more, defendants will be entering change of pleas at the proposed date (if not sooner).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This is voluminous mortgage fraud case involving (allegedly) numerous properties and individuals (including seven co-defendants). Thus far, the Government has produced over 25,000 pages of discovery (plus numerous audio recordings). The conduct alleged in this matter spans several years and, at the time of indictment, was several years old.
b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery and conduct investigation.
c. The government has provided plea agreements, or in the alternative, a framework for a change of plea to the defendants. Additional time is necessary to discuss with the individual defendants the terms, conditions and consequences of the proposed plea agreements (or framework) and discuss sentencing issues and USSG calculation(s) in light of the proposed plea agreements.
d. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The Government does not object to the continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of March 24, 2014 to April 28, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A)) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: March 17, 2014 Benjamin B. Wagner
United States Attorney
by:/s/ Lee Bickley LEE BICKLEY
Assistant U.S. Attorney
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
