STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 3, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, defendants now moves to continue the status conference until June 26, 2014 and to exclude time between April 3, 2014 and June 26, 2014 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has provided discovery including investigative reports and related documents in electronic form, audio and videotapes and local law enforcement and other witnesses and photographs. The government has provided a laboratory analysis that the defendant will have his own expert re-test.

b. Counsel for defendants also requires additional time to review audiotapes with their clients and consult with a forensic expert to enhance sound quality.

c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 3, 2014 to June 26, 2014 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

The Court finds that a continuance is necessary for the reasons stated above and that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the Defendant in a speedy trial. The Court finds excludable time through June 26, 2014, based on Local Code T4, giving counsel reasonable time to prepare.

IT IS SO ORDERED.