Filed: Apr. 24, 2015
Latest Update: Apr. 24, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING THE CURRENTLY SET STATUS CONFERENCE DATE OF APRIL 23, 2015 AS TO DEFENDANT HAMIRA CHECHI ONLY RESETTING THAT DATE TO JUNE 18, 2015 MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , Chief District Judge . STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 23, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendant Hamira Chechi now moves to continue the status conference set for her alone until June 18, 2015, and to exclude time between April 23, 2015 and June 18, 201
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING THE CURRENTLY SET STATUS CONFERENCE DATE OF APRIL 23, 2015 AS TO DEFENDANT HAMIRA CHECHI ONLY RESETTING THAT DATE TO JUNE 18, 2015 MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , Chief District Judge . STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 23, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendant Hamira Chechi now moves to continue the status conference set for her alone until June 18, 2015, and to exclude time between April 23, 2015 and June 18, 2015..
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STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING THE CURRENTLY SET STATUS CONFERENCE DATE OF APRIL 23, 2015 AS TO DEFENDANT HAMIRA CHECHI ONLY RESETTING THAT DATE TO JUNE 18, 2015
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 23, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant Hamira Chechi now moves to continue the status conference set for her alone until June 18, 2015, and to exclude time between April 23, 2015 and June 18, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes business records from the California Employment Development, reports of witness interviews, and Grand Jury records. In addition, the related case includes a voluminous amount of business records and seized search warrant evidence that is relevant to this case. Discovery has been either produced directly to counsel or made available for inspection and copying. In addition, most of the persons involved in this case either as defendants or as potential witnesses are likely be in need the assistance of an interpreter in discussing there items with counsel. In order to allow the attorneys to appropriately identify and interview witnesses, as well as discuss the ramifications of different pieces of evidence as they may relate to the client's particular case. This process has a natural tendency to limit direct communication and requires extra care that the rights of such persons are scrupulously safeguarded while at the same time providing each lawyer with an opportunity adequately investigate the matter such witnesses may bring to the case and through all of this careful process thread a careful line between disclosure to help the client and possible over reaching in the area where the witness himself could has the possibility of making incriminating statements.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time review the discovery, discuss possible settlement of this case and conduct additional investigation.
c) Counsel for defendant Hamira Chechi believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant's in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 23, 2015 to June 18, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Dated: April 19, 2015 BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney
JARED C. DOLAN
Assistant United States Attorney
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
