Filed: Apr. 03, 2014
Latest Update: Apr. 03, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, DIstrict Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 8, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 13, 2014 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time bet
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, DIstrict Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 8, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 13, 2014 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time betw..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, DIstrict Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 8, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 13, 2014 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between April 8, 2014 and May 13, 2014 under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has produced over 50,000 pages of discovery associated with this case.
b. Counsel for defendant requests additional time to review this discovery, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 8, 2014 to May 13, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
