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U.S. v. Eslava-Corral, 1:14-cr-0196 LJO-SKO. (2014)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20140924d30 Visitors: 2
Filed: Sep. 05, 2014
Latest Update: Sep. 05, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER REGARDING CHANGE OF PLEA AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT STIPULATION STANLEY A. BOONE, Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a preliminary hearing on Monday, September 8, 2014, at 1:30 p.m. before U.S. Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone. A grand jury returned an indictmen
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STIPULATION AND ORDER REGARDING CHANGE OF PLEA AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT STIPULATION

STANLEY A. BOONE, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for a preliminary hearing on Monday, September 8, 2014, at 1:30 p.m. before U.S. Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone. A grand jury returned an indictment in this matter on Thursday, September 4.

2. By this stipulation, the parties move to vacate the arraignment and plea on the indictment as to the above-named defendant only, set it for a change of plea before U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on September 22, 2014, at 9:30 p.m. and to exclude time between September 8, 2014, and September 22, 2014.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The defense needs additional time to review and execute the plea agreement. Defense counsel is unavailable for a change of plea on September 15.

b. The parties believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective resolution, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would deny continuity of counsel for the defendant.

d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 8, 2014, to September 22, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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