STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 30, 2015

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 20, 2015, and to exclude time between July 30, 2015 and August 20, 2015, under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and documents obtained through the criminal investigation in electronic form that exceed 12,000 pages. This discovery has been produced directly to counsel.

b) Additionally, in over the past several months, the defense investigator and expert have inspected and copied numerous x-rays and other documents in the custody of the investigating agents that were made available to the defense.

c) In July 2015, the United States provided a draft plea agreement to counsel for the defense, and the parties have met and conferred with respect to the agreement. The defense has requested additional information or consideration with respect to the terms of the plea agreement, including with respect to the advisory Guidelines calculations, which the United States has agreed to review and respond.

d) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to conduct an investigation and research relating to the charges, review discovery, consult with his client, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

e) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

f) The government does not object to the continuance.

g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 30, 2015 to August 20, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.