ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CAROLYN K. DELANEY, Magistrate Judge.

Defendant's motion to dismiss came on regularly for hearing on November 4, 2015. Plaintiff, proceeding in propria persona, failed to appear. Michael Youril appeared for defendants. Upon review of the documents in support and opposition, upon hearing the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than "naked assertions," "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b), the court "may generally consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice." Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendant has requested this court take judicial notice of documents. ECF No. 8-2. That request will be granted.

Defendant contends it cannot be held liable under section 1983 because plaintiff fails to identify any legally protected interest invaded by the District. This contention is well taken. The basis of plaintiff's civil rights claim is that defendant allegedly sought illegal late fees, demanded rent that was not due, and threatened plaintiff with losing his home. Plaintiff alleges no federal rights or constitutional deprivation. Plaintiff offers nothing in his opposition which suggests this deficiency can be cured. This cause of action should be dismissed without leave to amend.

Plaintiff's second cause of action alleges a claim under the UCL. Defendant contends that such a claim is not available against a public entity. Plaintiff argues such a claim should lie because the District is not a public entity. This argument is meritless. The defendant water district is a public entity under California law. Cal. Gov't Code § 811.2; Cal. Water Code §118-8 ("public entity" includes California water district); Cal. Water Code §§ 30013, 31013, 31013.5. The definition of a "person" subject to liability under the UCL does not include a public entity. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17201; see Tuchscher Dev. Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1243-44 (2003). This is so even where the public entity is engaged in commerical activities. See California Medical Assn. v. Regents of University of California, 79 Cal.App.4th 542, 551 & fn. 14 (2000) (state university school of medicine and hospital is public entity and thus not a "person" within scope of prohibitions of unfair competition law, even though hospital is involved in commercial activity). Plaintiff's second claim for relief should therefore be dismissed with prejudice.

Defendant is also immune from liability for plaintiff's retaliation claim.1 See Miklosy v. Regents of University of California, 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 (2008) (Cal. Gov't Code § 815 abolishes all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 (1980) (retaliation in violation of public policy). Similarly, an action for malicious prosecution cannot lie against the defendant public entity. See Novoa v. County of Ventura, 133 Cal.App.3d 137, 143 (1982); Cal. Gov't Code §§ 821.2, 821.6. These claims should therefore also be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff's fifth claim for relief is for breach of contract. In conclusory fashion, plaintiff alleges that defendant breached the implied warranty of habitability, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, and the modification of the lease to deduct rent due from his pay. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a claim for breach of contract. See generally Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1367 (2010) (to state claim for breach of contract, plaintiff must allege the contract, plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, defendant's breach and damages). Plaintiff alleges no facts supporting his claim of inhabitability or other breach. The claim should therefore be dismissed. However, because it appears plaintiff may be able to cure this deficiency, leave to amend should be granted.

This action was removed from state court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction predicated upon an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All but one of plaintiff's claims should be dismissed without leave to amend. With the dismissal of the federal claim, only a state law claim remains. In these circumstances, it is appropriate for the court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim and remand the matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's request for judicial notice (ECF No. 8-2) is granted; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) be granted with leave to amend only the contract claim within sixty days of the District Court's resolution of these findings and recommendations; and

2. The action be remanded to the Superior Court of California, County of Mono.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).