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U.S. v. CAPOS, 2:14-CR-00020-MCE. (2014)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20141215640 Visitors: 7
Filed: Dec. 11, 2014
Latest Update: Dec. 11, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT AND REQUEST FOR BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND HEARING DATE; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 11, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now requests a motions hearing date
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT AND REQUEST FOR BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND HEARING DATE; ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 11, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now requests a motions hearing date of January 15, 2015, and to exclude time between the filing of the motion and the time that defense counsel's motion is decided by the court, under Local Code E.

3. The parties further request the court to exclude time between the last date through which the Court found excludable time under Local Code T4, September 18, 2014, and the proposed hearing date, January 15, 2015, under Local Code T4.

4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes voluminous investigative reports, patient records, and other evidence. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to conduct its own investigation, consult with his client and review discovery. c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d) The government does not object to the continuance. e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 11, 2014 to January 15, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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