STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE OF ADMIT OR DENY HEARING; FINDINGS AND ORDER

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

Defendant, HEBER VASQUEZ, by and through his counsel of record, TONI WHITE, and the GOVERNMENT hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for admit or deny hearing on January 6, 2015.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the admit or deny hearing until February 3, 2015, and to exclude time between January 6, 2015 and February 3, 2015 under Local Code T4. The GOVERNMENT does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. A psychological examination of Mr. Vasquez has been requested and we are awaiting the report. Defense counsel believes it would be more beneficial to have the psychological results of the examination before determining which allegations to admit as Mr. Vasquez' psychological issues may have affected the behavior that is the basis of those allegations. Defense counsel needs more time to prepare the case prior to an admit or deny hearing.

b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

c. The GOVERNMENT does not object to the continuance.

d. The GOVERNMENT and counsel for the defendant are working toward resolution of the case.

g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 6, 2015 to February 3, 2015 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.