STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 14, 2015.

2. By this stipulation, defendants Jose Jaime Diaz, Emilio Barba and Gabriel Vargas-Guerrero, by and through their undersigned counsel, now move to take this matter off the Court's calendar because a trial confirmation hearing and trial date have already been scheduled, and time has already been excluded until the trial date under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) At a status conference on February 12, 2015, a trial confirmation hearing was set for January 7, 2016, and a trial date was set for February 1, 2016. At this hearing, the parties jointly agreed to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act from February 12, 2015 to February 1, 2016.

b) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 700 pages of documents and photographs, including investigative reports. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.

c) All of the defendants have requested plea agreements, which the United States has provided to counsel. Counsel will need additional time to review the agreements as well as the discovery in the case with respect to the terms and factual bases of the agreements, and consult with their clients regarding implications for trial.

d) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, conduct investigation and research, review discovery, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients.

e) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

f) The United States does not object to continuing this matter until the trial confirmation hearing on January 7, 2016.

g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 14, 2015 to February 1, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.