Filed: Sep. 10, 2013
Latest Update: Sep. 10, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 12, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until December 5, 2013 at 9:30 am in Courtroom 2 and to exclude t
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 12, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until December 5, 2013 at 9:30 am in Courtroom 2 and to exclude ti..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 12, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until December 5, 2013 at 9:30 am in Courtroom 2 and to exclude time between September 12, 2013 and December 5, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case and the United States v. Chartaev case, which was found to be related to this case, includes over 4,000 pages. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, and to discuss potential resolutions with his client.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 12, 2013 to December 5, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) and Local Code T4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
