JEFFERY S. WHITE, District Judge.
This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered Respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. For the reasons set out below, the petition is denied.
In 2008, a jury in Marin County Superior Court convicted Petitioner of making a criminal threat in violation of California Penal Code Section 422. (Ex. 2 at 315.)
The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts underlying the charged offense as follows:
People v. Barrow, No. A121546, slip op. at 2-3 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2009) (attached as Ex. 7).
A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but "unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be "objectively unreasonable" to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision "based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322 at 340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).
When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the petitioner's claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shacklefordv. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000).
As grounds for habeas relief, Petitioner asserts that: (1) inflammatory and improper comments made by two prospective jurors during voir dire tainted the jury in violation of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury; and (2) the trial court erroneously admitted prejudicial evidence in violation of Petitioner's right to due process.
Petitioner claims that improper comments made by two prospective jurors during voir dire tainted the jury in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
The California Court of Appeals summarized the background to the jury bias claim as follows:
(Ex. 7 at 3-4.) Defense counsel did not raise the issue of the two prospective jurors' comments again.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). "Even if only one juror is unduly biased or prejudiced, the defendant is denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury." Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). However, the Constitution "does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that to disqualify a juror for cause requires a showing of actual bias or implied bias, that is "bias in fact, or bias conclusively presumed as a matter of law." United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2000).
Petitioner fails to show actual bias here. The comments made by the two prospective jurors may show their own bias against Petitioner, but they did not ultimately serve on the actual jury. The comments do not establish an actual bias on the part of anyone else, including anyone who became a juror.
Petitioner argues that the comments created an implied bias. He cites Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1997), in which the court presumed that at least one juror was biased by highly inflammatory and prejudicial statements made during voir dire by a prospective juror who did not ultimately serve on the jury. Id. The petitioner in Mach was charged with sexual conduct with a minor and one of the prospective jurors questioned during voir dire was a social worker with the state's child protective services. Id. at 631-32. In the course of voir dire, the juror revealed that she had experience in child psychology, and stated four times that she had never seen a case where a child lied about sexual abuse. Id. at 632-33. Although she was struck for cause, the court described the statements she made as "expert-like" and "[g]iven the nature of [her] statements, the certainty with which they were delivered, the years of experience that led to them and the number of times that they were repeated," the court presumed that "at least one juror was tainted and entered into jury deliberations with the conviction that children simply never lie about being sexually abused" in violation of the petitioner's right to an impartial jury. Id.
The California Court of Appeal found Mach factually distinguishable. (Ex. 7 at 7.) The state appellate court reasoned that unlike the prospective juror in Mach who made four separate statements stating why her experience would cause her to be biased, the prospective jurors here made only brief comments about Petitioner's appearance. (Id.) The prospective jurors also stated they could be impartial, while the juror in Mach stated she could not. (Id.) Lastly, the appellate court reasoned that the jurors' comments here, unlike those in Mach, did not relate to the issues in the case. (Id.)
The state appellate court decision is reasonable. While the statements made by the prospective jurors here may show the two jurors' personal bias, the comments merely related to Petitioner's appearance. Unlike the "expert-like" statements made by the juror inMach, the comments here about Petitioner's appearance do not imply any expertise. They only convey a subjective opinion based on observations available to all jurors, who could each decide for themselves whether Petitioner seemed threatening. The comments here were also not made with the same certainty and repetition as the statements in Mach. Additionally, the prospective jurors' conversation with the court after they made their comments reminded the rest of the venire that jurors may only look to the evidence presented to reach a fair and unbiased conclusion. Under these circumstances, the appellate court was correct in not presuming any juror to be biased as a result of the two prospective jurors' comments.
The California Court of Appeal's denial of Petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.
Petitioner claims that the trial court improperly admitted prejudicial evidence in violation of his right to due process. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion to exclude the testimony of his former roommate, Corativo. The appellate court summarized the relevant facts as follows:
(Ex. 7 at 8-9.)
The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). The due process inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). But only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). Evidence often raises both permissible and impermissible inferences, but it is up to the jury to sort them out with help from the court's instructions. Id.
The state appellate court reasoned that because prosecution needed to prove that Petitioner intended for Gladney to take his actions as a threat, the evidence was relevant in showing that the acts were not accidental or inadvertent. (Ex. 7 at 10-11.) The court thus concluded that Corativo's testimony regarding the alleged, albeit uncharged, battery had high probative value. (Id. at 11.)
The state appellate court's reasoning is sound. The prosecution had to prove that Petitioner intended that Gladney would view Petitioner's actions as a threat. Petitioner's prior threatening behavior in a similar situation—namely a conflict with a female roommate—tends to show such an intent. If the jurors found Corativo's testimony credible, they could make the permissible inference that Petitioner would know that his actions could be viewed by Gladney as a threat.
In addition, the trial court gave limiting instructions to the jury in order to prevent the jury from misusing Corativo's testimony. Juries are presumed to follow a court's limiting instructions with respect to the purposes for which evidence is admitted. Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1997). The court specifically instructed the jury not to consider this evidence in determining Petitioner's character, or disposition for committing crimes, but instead only in determining whether Petitioner satisfied the requisite intent as required by the statute in order to be convicted. Not only does precedent compel this Court to presume that the jury followed the trial court's limiting instructions, but the fact that Petitioner was acquitted of another charge tends to show that the jury indeed followed the court's instructions.
The California Court of Appeal's finding on this claim is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority. Petitioner's petition for habeas relief is therefore denied on this claim.
After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
A certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case in which "reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.