REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BRISTOW MARCHANT, Magistrate Judge.

This action has been filed by the Plaintiff asserting civil rights claims against the Defendant Delfin Group USA, LLC. This case is one of nine (9) separate cases filed against this same Defendant, all of which have been assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.

The Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient factual matter to state any plausible claim for relief. Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition to the Defendant's motion, to which the Defendant has filed a reply. Defendant's motion is now before the Court for disposition.1

Allegations of the Amended Complaint

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Defendant, alleges that he is of Armenian nationality, and asserts federal claims in his Amended Complaint pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as a state law contract claim. Plaintiff alleges that on or about December 2011, he and the Defendant "entered into a contract" whereby the Defendant employed him to work for a "an indefinite term". Plaintiff alleges that he worked in the Defendant's shipping department, and was "efficient and effective in his work". Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant had a handbook (attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit A) that "created a contract" between Plaintiff and the Defendant. Plaintiff specifically alleges that the handbook "uses mandatory language creating a contractual agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant for employment", and did not contain a disclaimer that met the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-110. Plaintiff then goes on to set forth specific language from the handbook wherein Defendant states that all employment decisions will be based on job related merit without regard to race or national origin, that harassment based on any prohibited conduct is also prohibited, and that any violation of this policy "will be subject to disciplinary action resulting in immediate termination of employment".

Plaintiff further alleges that the handbook has "mandatory language" setting forth various work rules and prohibitions, and quotes language from the handbook setting forth rules with regard to clothing, absences, solicitations, doctor visits, comp time, use of company property and equipment, and use of company software and computer equipment. Finally, Plaintiff quotes language from the handbook which provides that the Defendant "will not tolerate retaliation against any employee for making a complaint" regarding prohibited conduct. Plaintiff alleges that the "contract indicated he would be paid for working", and that he "performed his contractual obligations and despite the fact he was discriminated against".

Plaintiff then alleges that John Gordon is the Defendant's President and "alter-ego" of the Defendant, and that Gordon "demeaned" him with a number of racial comments and demonstrated a pattern of discriminatory treatment towards Armenians by making disparaging remarks, reassigning Armenians to menial tasks, and laying them off in disproportionate numbers. Plaintiff alleges that Gordon's comments were "severe, pervasive and happened almost daily". Plaintiff further alleges that Gordon "would often yell at the Plaintiff and make demeaning remarks to him in front of others, including the Defendant's supervisor over the Plaintiff". Plaintiff alleges that he complained directly to Gordon about the way he spoke to the Plaintiff, and also complained to Human Resources about the racial comments made by Gordon, and that although Gordon apologized to the Plaintiff, that after confronting Gordon, he [Gordon] "created a hostile work environment for the Plaintiff in retaliation for the Plaintiff's earlier reporting of Mr. Gordon's racial discrimination". Plaintiff alleges that Gordon continued his racial comments towards the Plaintiff, attempted to demote the Plaintiff, and continuously assigned Plaintiff to menial tasks such as cutting the grass, dumping oil, and janitorial duties, even though Plaintiff had been hired for the shipping department. Plaintiff alleges that although he complained to Veronika Babayan, Human Resources employee, and also to Bo Herbert, he was constantly retaliated against and subjected to poor treatment, which created a hostile work environment, and was eventually wrongfully terminated by the Defendant on or about December 6, 2012.

In his First Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against and terminated based on his nationality, race and color in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff further alleges that the unlawful treatment he received was discrimination against him based on his nationality, race or color, and that the Defendant treated non-Armenian employees more favorably than it treated the Plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant's wrongful actions created a hostile work environment.

In his Second Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to discrimination and terminated based on his nationality, race and color in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff further alleges that he was retaliated against and subjected to a hostile work environment.

In his Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim for breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges that he was efficient and effective in his work, and that the Defendant breached his contract of employment by discriminating against him due to his race.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, to include reinstatement of benefits and front pay. See generally, Amended Complaint.

Discussion

When considering a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the Court is required to accept the allegations in the pleading as true, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. The motion can be granted only if the Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient factual matters in the Complaint to state a plausible claim for relief "on its face". Ashcroft v. Iqbal 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "[O]n a motion to dismiss, the Court does not weigh the strength of the evidence, and simply considers whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts which, if true, would permit a reasonable fact finder to find defendants liable." Vogt v. Greenmarine Holding, LLC 318 F.Supp.2d 136, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). For the reasons set forth hereinbelow, the Defendant's motion should be granted, in part, and denied, in part.

Exhaustion. Plaintiff alleges three separate claims under both Title VII and § 1981 in his first two Causes of Action: retaliation, hostile work environment, and disparate treatment.2 To proceed with these claims under Title VII, Plaintiff must first have first exhausted his administrative remedies; Smith v. First Union Nat'l. Bank 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000)["Before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by bringing a charge with the EEOC [or SCHAC]"]; and Defendant asserts in its motion that Plaintiff's Title VII Cause of Action should be dismissed for failure of the Plaintiff to plead satisfaction of all conditions precedent necessary to filing suit.3 However, Plaintiff specifically alleges that he filed a charge of discrimination with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission (SCHAC) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), that he received his right to sue letter on or about June 26, 2013, and thereafter timely filed his Complaint. Amended Complaint ¶ 2. Plaintiff also specifically alleges that the Defendant meets the definition of an "employer" under Title VII. Id. ¶ ¶ 6-8. This argument for dismissal of Plaintiff's Title VII Cause of Action is therefore without merit.4

Disparate Treatment Claim. Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim is based on his allegation that he was subjected to racial and/or national origin discrimination when he was treated disparately by the Defendant based on these characteristics. Title VII makes it unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . ." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. To pursue this claim under § 1981, Plaintiff must prove that the Defendant "intended to discriminate [against the Plaintiff] on the basis of [his] race, and that the discrimination interfered with a contractual interest."5 Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc. 456 F.3d 427, 434 (4th Cir. 2006).6

In order to survive Defendant's motion to dismiss and proceed with these claims, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must set forth sufficient factual matters to state a plausible claim for intentional discrimination based on his race and/or national origin. This claim may be proved either by direct evidence or by the structured procedures set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792 (1973).7 Under the framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Plaintiff can meet this standard (at least for purposes of a motion to dismiss) through allegations sufficient to reasonably infer a prima facie case of discrimination;8 i.e., by showing that 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he was qualified for the job at issue; 3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and 4) that the position was filled ( in the case of termination) by someone who is not a member of his protected class, or there is some other evidence sufficient to give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See generally, Austen v. HCA Health Services of Virginia, Inc. No. 00-2359, 2001 WL 242203 at **1 (4th Cir. Mar. 12, 2001); Hughes v. Bedsole 48 F.3d 1376, 1383 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 870 (1995). See Gilbert v. Penn-Wheeling Closure Corp. 917 F.Supp. 1119 (N.D.W.Va. 1996); see also Ennis v. National Ass'n of Business and Educational Radio, Inc. 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995)[The exact standard to be used in establishing a prima facie case is flexible depending on the factual situation and the claim alleged].

Plaintiff has alleged in his Amended Complaint that he is a member of a protected class (Armenian by race and nationality), that he was qualified for his job and performing his job duties well, and that he was subjected to an adverse employment action when he was terminated. With respect to the fourth prong of his prima facie case; i.e., whether Plaintiff has alleged factual allegations sufficient to give rise to a plausible claim that the Defendant discriminated against him or terminated him because of his race and/or national origin,9 Plaintiff alleges that Gordon had a pattern of discriminatory treatment towards Armenians, including making disparaging remarks, reassigning Armenians to menial tasks, and laying them off in disproportionate numbers; that Gordon also directed a number of racial comments towards the Plaintiff, including doing so in front of Plaintiff's supervisor as well as other employees; and that Gordon attempted to demote the Plaintiff while continuously assigning him to menial tasks such as cutting the grass, dumping oil, and janitorial duties, even though Plaintiff had been hired for the shipping department, before finally terminating the Plaintiff due to his racial animosity towards Armenians. Cf. Awad v. City of New York No. 13-5753, 2014 WL 1814114 at * 3 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2014); but cf. Nichols v. Truscott 424 F.Supp.2d 124, 137 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2006).

Liberally construed, these allegations are sufficient to raise a "reasonable expectation" that discovery will reveal evidence sufficient to give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination to survive a Rule 12 motion to dismiss. See Gladden No. 11-3120, 2012 WL 3009275 [To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff need only set forth allegations that raise a "reasonable expectation" that discovery will reveal evidence of necessary elements of the prima facie case]; see also Slade v. Hampton Roads Regional Jail 407 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2005)["Courts should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim unless `after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the Plaintiff's favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief'"], citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999); Veney v. Wyche 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002)["[W]hen [dismissal for failure to state a claim] involves a civil rights complaint, `we must be especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged' and `must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to a certainty the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged'"], citing Harrison v. United Postal Service 840 F.2d 1149, 1152 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Vogt 318 F.Supp.2d at 146 [Finding that Plaintiffs had asserted sufficient facts to allege improper conduct by the named defendants, and that "[w]hether plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate the truth of those facts after discovery is an entirely different question, but plaintiffs are entitled to make the attempt"].

Therefore, the Defendant is not entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim as set forth in his First and Second Causes of Action at this time.

Retaliation Claim. With respect to Plaintiff's claim of retaliation, in order to survive the Defendant's motion to dismiss his retaliation claim, Plaintiff's allegations must be sufficient to reasonably infer a prima facie case of retaliation;10 i.e., by showing that 1) he engaged in activity protected under Title VII and § 198111; 2) the Defendant took an adverse employment action against him; and 3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Lettieri v. Equest, Inc. 478 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Cerberronics, Inc. 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989); Munday v. Waste Management of North America, Inc. 127 F.3d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1997); see Ennis 53 F.3d at 58 [The exact standard to be used in establishing a prima facie case is flexible depending on the factual situation and the claim alleged].

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's retaliation claim is "vague, ambiguous, [and] confusing." However, after considering the arguments of counsel, accepting the allegations and the pleading is true, and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those allegations in favor of the Plaintiff, the undersigned concludes that, at least at this point in the proceedings, Plaintiff's retaliation claim should be allowed to proceed. See Austen 709 F.Supp.2d at 172 [Iqbal's plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct]]. Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint that he complained directly to Gordon about the way he spoke to the Plaintiff as well as to Human Resources about Gordon's racial comments towards him. Cf. Rodas v. Town of Farmington 918 F.Supp.2d 183, 189 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2013)["`Protected activity' includes opposing employment practices that are prohibited under Title VII (such as discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), or making a charge of discrimination, or participating in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing arising under Title VII."]; Bowman v. Holopack Intern. Corp. No. 06-1648, 2007 WL 4481130 at * 14 (D.S.C. Dec. 19, 2007)["[T]he opposition clause encompasses informal protests, such as voicing complaints to superiors or protests using an employer's grievance procedures."]. Plaintiff alleges that after he engaged in this protected conduct, Gordon apologized to him, but then continued thereafter to make racial comments towards the Plaintiff and in addition attempted to demote the Plaintiff while assigning Plaintiff to perform menial tasks such as cutting the grass, dumping oil, and janitorial duties, even though Plaintiff had been hired to work in the shipping department. Plaintiff alleges that Gordon then wrongfully terminated him from his position on or about December 6, 2012, even though he was efficient and effective in his work.

These allegations are sufficient for a Rule 12 motion to dismiss to create an inference of a causal connection between Plaintiff's protected activity and the adverse actions taken against him. Gladden 2012 WL 3009224 [To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff need only set forth allegations that raise a "reasonable expectation" that discovery will reveal evidence of necessary elements of the prima facie case]; Wolman v. Tose 467 F.2d 29, 33, n. 5 (4th Cir. 1972)["Under the liberal rules of federal pleading, a complaint should survive a motion to dismiss if it sets out facts sufficient for the Court to infer that all of the required elements of the cause of action are present."]; Cf. Awad 2014 WL 1814114 at * 3; but cf. Nichol 424 F.Supp. 2d at 137. Therefore, the Defendant is not entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff's retaliation claim as set forth in his First and Second Causes of Action at this time. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) [A complaint attacked by a Rule 12 motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations; rather, the factual allegations must only be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level]; Veney 293 F.3d at 730 ["[W]hen [dismissal for failure to state a claim] involves a civil rights complaint, `we must be especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged' and `must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to a certainty the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged'"], citing Harrison v. United Postal Service 840 F.2d 1149, 1152 (4th Cir. 1988).

Hostile Work Environment Claim. To avoid dismissal of his hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must have factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim that 1) he was subjected to unwelcome conduct in a work related setting; 2) the conduct complained of was based on his race and/or national origin; 3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter his condition of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and 4) the conduct was imputable on some factual basis to his employer. EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc. 573 F.3d 167, 175 (4th Cir. 2009); Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc. 308 F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 2002), rehearing en banc 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 124 S.Ct. 1406 (2004); Spicer v. Com.of Va. Dep't of Corrections 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995); Brown v. Perry 184 F.3d 388, 393 (4th Cir. 1999); Scott v. Health Net Federal Services, LLC No. 11-1947, 2012 WL 340216 at * 2 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 2012).

Defendant argues that the allegations of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fail to meet the standards for a hostile work environment claim because Plaintiff only asserts "some unspecified and vague comments by Delfin's President were `severe and pervasive'", thereby allegedly creating a hostile work environment. Defendant contends that these allegations are mere "legal conclusions and not entitled to the assumption of truth". Defendant's Brief p. 9, n. 5. The undersigned is constrained to agree. Plaintiff has failed to set forth any factual allegations (as opposed to conclusory allegations) sufficient to give rise to a plausible claim that he was subjected to harassment severe and pervasive enough to effect a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Rather, Plaintiff only alleges in a general and conclusory manner that the Defendant "demonstrated a pattern of discriminatory treatment towards Armenians by making disparaging remarks, reassigning Armenians to menial tasks, and laying them off in disproportionate numbers", that he had been subjected to "a number of [demeaning] racial comments" by Gordon, and that Gordon's comments were "severe, pervasive and happened almost daily", including in front of others. These are all quintessential conclusory allegations lacking any factual support. Cf.Robertson v. Dodaro 767 F.Supp.2d 185, 200 (D.D.C. 2011) [Plaintiff failed to establish hostile work environment claim where his assertion was that "work became emotionally draining, interaction with supervisors became stressful and combative, and efforts were consistently made to demean and belittle the Plaintiff and deride his work product"] [internal citations omitted]; House v. New Castle County 824 F.Supp. 477, 485 (D.Md. 1993) [Conclusory allegations insufficient to maintain claim]; Harper v. United States 423 F.Supp. 192, 196 (D.S.C. 1976) ["[W]here the claims in a complaint are insufficiently supported by factual allegations, these claims may be properly dismissed by summary dismissal"]; Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) [Allegations that are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth].

While Plaintiff does set forth some specific factual allegations that Gordon attempted to demote him and continuously assigned him to menial tasks such as cutting the grass, dumping oil and janitorial duties, a plain reading of these allegations from the Complaint is that Gordon subjected Plaintiff to this treatment out of retaliation for Plaintiff having complained of discriminatory conduct. That of course is a separate claim, already discussed herein, supra. See Bozeman v. Per-Se Technologies, Inc. 456 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1344 n. 149 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 16, 2006)["A hostile work environment claim is a separate and distinct cause of action under Title VII, and requires a different analytical approach than a traditional retaliation claim"]. However, even assuming this treatment (if proved) would be sufficient to establish a retaliation claim, that does not mean it meets the wholly separate standards for a hostile work environment claim. Cf. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)[Plaintiff alleging retaliation need show only that the employer did something that would likely deter a reasonable individual in the Plaintiff's circumstances from protesting what he perceived to be unlawful discrimination]; Wells v. Gates 336 F.Appx. 378, 388 (4th Cir. 2009) [For conduct to be sufficient for a hostile work environment claim, [t]he harassment must be extreme"]. Hence, even if the conduct complained of was in retaliation for protected conduct (instead of based on Plaintiff's race and/or nationality),12 the mere allegation of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint that Gordon required him to perform menial tasks and "attempted" to demote him (Plaintiff does not allege that this event was ever even accomplished) is insufficient to raise a "reasonable expectation" that discovery will reveal evidence of "severe" and "pervasive" conduct so as to meet the standard for an abusive work environment, which is what is required for this Cause of Action. Harris v. Fork Lift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) [Harassment must be severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive work environment]; Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 524 U.S. 742, 768 (1998) (quoting Snell v. Suffolk City 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986) ["To establish a hostile atmosphere, . . . . Plaintiffs must prove more than a few isolated incidents of [inappropriate conduct."]] (Thomas, dissenting); Slate v. Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia ____ F.Supp.2d ___, 2014 WL 1315238 at * 18, n. 14 (D.D.C. 2014); Latham v. Donahue ___ F.Supp. 2d ___, 2014 WL 1876145 at * 5 (N.D.Ill. May 9, 2014) [To establish severity or pervasiveness, Plaintiff must address factors such as the frequency, severity and threatening or humiliating nature of the discriminating conduct and whether it interferes with work performance]; Manley v. Memorial Hosp. of Salem No. 11-2117, 2012 WL 32926 at * (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2012) [Dismissing hostile work environment claim where Plaintiff only generally pled, without much detail, that her employer told her that they would get rid of her because of her race, assigned her to less favorable work shifts and assignments, isolated her from other workers, and used racial slurs]; see also Hampton v. Vilsack 760 F.Supp.2d 38, 56-57 (D.D.C. 2011) ["Plaintiff cannot . . . rely on the discrete acts upon which he bases his discrimination and retaliation claims to support a hostile environment claim."] (citing Franklin v. Potter 600 F.Supp.2d 38, 76 (D.D.C.2009) ["Because plaintiff's allegedly hostile events are the very employment actions he claims are retaliatory, he cannot so easily bootstrap alleged retaliatory incidents into a broader hostile work environment claim."] (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Finally, although Plaintiff also alleges that he was terminated, that discreet act does not save his hostile work environment claim where he has otherwise failed to allege sufficiently severe and pervasive conduct to give rise to a plausible claim for relief under the applicable standards for a hostile work environment claim. Baird v. Gotbaum 662 F.3d 1246, 1252 (D.C.Cir. 2011) ["]A] Plaintiff may not combine discrete acts to form a hostile work environment claim without meeting the required hostile work environment standard"]; Kelly v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 557 Fed.Appx. 896, 900 (11th Cir. 2014)"[D]iscrete acts, such as termination . . ., cannot alone form the basis of a hostile work environment claim"]; Wade v. District of Columbia 780 F.Supp.2d 1, 19 (D.D.C.2011) [rejecting plaintiff's effort to transform amalgamation of disparate treatment claims into cause of action for hostile work environment for lack of connection in pervasive pattern of severe harassment] (citing Lester v. Natsios 290 F.Supp.2d 11, 33 (D.D.C. 2003) ["Discrete acts constituting discrimination or retaliation claims . . . are different in kind from a hostile work environment claim that must be based on severe and pervasive discriminatory intimidation or insult.")].

In sum, while the undersigned has concluded that Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient, at least at this stage of the proceedings, to state a plausible claim for disparate treatment and retaliation; see discussion, supra; they do not meet the requirements to establish the third prong of his hostile work environment claim. Harper 423 F.Supp. at 196 ["[W]here the claims in a complaint are insufficiently supported by factual allegations, these claims may be properly dismissed by summary dismissal"]; Iqbal 129 S.Ct. at 1949 [Claim subject to dismissal where Plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient factual matters to state a plausible claim for relief "on its face"]; House 824 F.Supp. at 485 [Conclusory allegations insufficient to maintain claim]; Dickson 309 F.3d at 213 [Plaintiff has burden of alleging facts sufficient to state all the elements of a claim]. Therefore, the Defendant is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim set forth in his First and Second Causes of Action.

Breach of Contract Claim. In his Third and final Cause of Action, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim for breach of contract. Defendant asserts that this claim is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to set forth factual allegations sufficient to give rise to a plausible claim that he had an employment contract with the Defendant.

The necessary elements of a contract are an offer, acceptance, and valuable consideration. Roberts v. Gaskins 486 S.E.2d 771, 773 (S.C. 1997), citing Carolina Amusement Co., Inc. v. Connecticut Nat'l Life Ins., Co. 437 S.E.2d 122 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993). With respect to employment, however, there is a presumption in South Carolina that employees are at-will, and therefore in order to survive a Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss on a claim for breach of a contract of employment, a Plaintiff must "plead sufficient factual allegations to establish the existence of an employment contract beyond the at-will relationship . . . .". Perrine v. G4S Solutions (USA), Inc. No. 11-1210, 2011 WL 3563110, at * 2 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2011)["[T]here is a presumption in South Carolina that employees are at-will, and in order to survive a Rule 12 motion to dismiss on a claim for breach of a contract of employment, a Plaintiff must `plead sufficient factual allegations to establish the existence of an employment contract beyond the at-will relationship . . . .'"], quoting Amason v. P. K. Management, LLC No. 10-1752, 2011 WL 1100169, at * 6 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2011); see also Prescott v. Farmer's Tel. Co-Op., Inc. 516 S.E.2d 923, 927, n. 8 (S.C. 1999)[In South Carolina, "there is a presumption of at-will employment']. After careful review of the allegations of the Complaint, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim that he had an employment contract with the Defendant.

Plaintiff does not assert that he had an actual employment contract with the Defendant. Rather, he contends that the Defendant's employee handbook contained sufficient "mandatory" language to make its terms an enforceable "contract". Cf. Grant v. Mount Vernon Mills, Ins. 634 S.E.2d 15, 20 (S.C.Ct.App. 2006)[Employer can alter an employee's at-will status through mandatory language in a handbook]. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's employee handbook "uses mandatory language creating a contractual agreement", and did not contain a disclaimer that met the requirements of S.C.Code Ann. § 41-1-10.13 Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant "entered into a contract" whereby the Defendant employed him to work for "an indefinite term". Finally, Plaintiff cites specific language from the handbook setting forth various rules and regulations of the Defendant, such as appropriate clothing for employees and the Defendant's policy on absences and comp time, etc., as well as language setting forth the Defendant's anti-discrimination policy, which Plaintiff alleges constitutes mandatory and enforceable contractual terms of employment. Plaintiff then alleges in his Third Cause of Action that he was efficient and effective in his work, and that the Defendant breached his contract of employment by discriminating against him due to his nationality, race, and color in violation of the handbook's anti-discrimination requirements. A copy of the employee handbook itself has also been provided to the Court, both as an attachment to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and as an exhibit by the Defendant.14

These allegations do not set forth a plausible claim that Plaintiff had a contract of employment with the Defendant. First, Plaintiff himself alleges in his Amended Complaint that he was employed by the Defendant for an indefinite term, and an employee employed for an indefinite period of time, rather than for a stated period of time, is presumptively considered an employee at will. Cape v. Greenville School Dist. 618 S.E.2d 881, 883 (S.C. 2005). Further, the employee handbook not only contains a specific disclaimer advising employees that the handbook is not intended to serve as a contract, create enforceable rights on the part of employees, or alter employees' at-will status, but every page of the handbook specifically states at the bottom of each page: "THIS IS NOT A CONTRACT FOR EMPLOYMENT". Plaintiff also signed an acknowledgment of the disclaimer. See Court Docket No. 7-3, p. 30.

While Plaintiff alleges (and a review of the handbook itself confirms) that the disclaimer was [arguably] not in compliance with § 41-1-10 because it was not on the first page of the handbook (it followed a "welcome" page and the table of contents), even assuming the allegation of the Complaint that the handbook did not contain a disclaimer meeting the requirements of this statute to be true for purposes of Defendant's motion, this fact does not establish a plausible claim that a contract of employment existed. While a clear compliance with the terms of the state disclosure statute would obviously be important, it is not required (and certainly does not establish the existence of a contract) if the employee handbook at issue otherwise does not contain mandatory language sufficient to alter the presumption in South Carolina of an at-will employee relationship. Cf. Grant 634 S.E.2d at 20; Westmoreland v. AB Beverage Co., Inc. No. 05-3475, 2007 WL 274950 at * 13 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2007).

Plaintiff has failed to allege in his complaint language from the employee handbook sufficient to establish a plausible claim that his at-will employment relationship was altered by any such language. See Dickson 309 F.3d at 213 [Plaintiff has burden of alleging facts sufficient to state all the elements of a claim]. Rather, Plaintiff simply alleges that the employee handbook "uses mandatory language" and then cites selected passages from the handbook relating to certain workplace rules and the Defendant's anti-discrimination policy. Indeed, Plaintiff's allegation is that the Defendant breached his contract of employment by breaching the allegedly "mandatory" language of its anti-discrimination policy by discriminating against him due to his nationality, race and color. However, the language cited by the Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint is typical of antidiscrimination language found in most employee handbooks, and has routinely been held by courts not to, by itself, constitute a contract. Cf. Ford v. Musashi S.C. Inc., No. 07-3734, 2008 WL 4414385 (D.S.C. Sept. 23, 2008), adopting in part and denying in part 2008 WL 4414497, at * 3 (D.S.C. July 11, 2008)["[U]nder South Carolina law where an employee handbook provides a general policy statement of nondiscrimination such a `provision does not constitute a promise altering the atwill employment relationship . . .'"]; Fyall v. ATC/Ancom of South Carolina No. 04-23086, 2005 WL 2656962, at * 4 (D.S.C. Oct. 18, 2005] [same]; Hessenthaler v. Tri-County Sister Help, Inc. 616 S.E.2d 694, 698 (S.C. 2005), citing McKenzie v. Lunds, Inc. 63 F.Supp.2d 986, 1003 (D.Minn. 1999) and Cherella v. Phoenix Technologies, Ltd. 586 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Mass. 1992); King v. Marriott Int'l., Inc. 520 F.Supp.2d 748, 756 (D.S.C. 2007)[Finding that the Defendant's promise that "there will be no discrimination or recrimination against an employee who asserts a complaint against [the defendant] does not create an expectation that employment is guaranteed or that a particular process must be complied with before an employee is terminated"] (internal quotations omitted); Frasier v. Verizon Wireless, C.A. No. 08-356, 2008 WL 724037, at * 2 (D.S.C. Mar. 17, 2008).

Rather, to establish that he had a "contract" of employment with the Defendant, Plaintiff needs to show that he and the Defendant entered into mandatory and binding terms for his employment such as a definite term of employment, buyout provisions, right to severance pay, and other such indices of a contract of employment. Cf. Wadford v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. No. 87-2872, 1988 WL 492127 at *5 (D.S.C. 1988) ["A review of the relevant authorities . . . reveals that a policy or representation must limit the duration of employment or the employer's right to terminate employment in order to alter at-will status. Other terms and conditions of employment, including pay, benefits, job duties, or location of performance may be changed prospectively by either party without violating an employment contract with an indefinite term."]. The undersigned has both reviewed the handbook language cited by Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint as well as undertaken an independent review of the employee handbook itself (provided to the Court as an exhibit), and does not find any language sufficient to establish a plausible claim that Plaintiff had a "contract" of employment by virtue of this handbook. Cf. Small v. Springs Industries, Inc. 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (S.C. 1987)[only policy drafted in sufficiently mandatory terms may serve to alter at-will employment status]; Grant 634 S.E.2d at 21-22; Storms v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 775 F.Supp. 862, 867 (D.S.C. 1991) [noting that language cited by the employee was "not couched in mandatory terms and [did] not contain language that specifically [limited] the employer's right to demote or terminate [the Plaintiff] without cause"]; Horton v. Darby Electric Co., Inc. 599 S.E.2d 456, 460-461 (S.C. 2004) [Manual containing progressive disciplinary procedure did not alter employee's at-will status]; see also Frey 44 F.3d at 671 ["Complaint must contain facts which state a claim as a matter of law and must not be conclusory"].

Therefore, the Defendant is entitled to dismissal of this cause of action. Amazon v. PK Management, LLC 2011 WL 1100169, at * 6 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2011); cf. Williams v. Intier Automotive Interiors of America, Inc. No. 09-1144, 2010 WL 5811848 (D.S.C. Nov. 5, 2010); see also Harper 423 F.Supp. at 196 ["[W]here the claims in a complaint are insufficiently supported by factual allegations, these claims may be properly dismissed by summary dismissal"]; Perrine 2011 WL 3563110, at * 2 [In order to survive a Rule 12 motion to dismiss on a claim for breach of a contract of employment, a Plaintiff must "plead sufficient factual allegations to establish the existence of an employment contract beyond the at-will relationship"]; Prescott 516 S.E.2d at 927, n. 8 [In South Carolina, "there is a presumption of at-will employment"].

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's disparate treatment and retaliation claims under Title VII and § 1981 as set forth in his First and Second Causes of Action be denied at this time. However, with respect to all other claims asserted in the Amended Complaint (including not just Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for breach of contract, but also Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims set forth in his First and Second Causes of Action, as well as any possible claims Plaintiff may have intended to assert under SCHAL, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or the "Equal Employment Opportunity Act"), it is recommended that the Defendant's motion be granted, and that those claims be dismissed for the reasons stated.