G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court are additional discovery motions in this, the next in a series of farmworker rights cases that in one way or another turn on whether farm owners have underpaid their farmworkers. Docs. 44, 67, 787 85 & 86; see also Ojeda-Sanchez v. Bland Farms, 600 F.Supp.2d 1373, 1378 (S.D. Ga. 2009); Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 2009 WL 3851624 at * 1 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 2009); Morales-Arcadio v. Shannon Produce Farms, Inc., 2006 WL 2578835 at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2006). The now de rigeur discovery disputes spring from the record-keeping that plaintiffs say farmers (and labor contractors) are supposed to maintain so that payment disputes can be efficiently resolved.
The farmworker plaintiffs in this case "are guest workers from Mexico and seasonal agricultural workers from the United States recruited by Defendants, to work in and around Tattnall County, Georgia between 2012 and 2014." Doc. 8 at 1. They raise Fair Labor Standards Act and other claims. Id. The Court granted conditional class action certification, Herrera-Velazquez v. Plantation Sweets, Inc., 2015 WL 4111261 at * 3 (S.D. Ga. July 6, 2015), thus necessitating discovery in quest of unidentified class members. Herrera-Velazquez v. Plantation Sweets, Inc., 2015 WL 5613195 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2015) (Herrera-II).
Unhappy with discovery produced upon their requests, plaintiffs moved to compel defendants Perez and Perez Forestry, LLC (hereafter and for convenience only, "Perez") "to produce a complete list of putative class member names and addresses, as ordered by this Court." Doc. 44 at 1 (emphasis added). They raised substantial doubt about Perez's discovery compliance, specifically his claimed lack of memory about key data. Herrera-II, 2015 WL 5613195 at *3. The Court deferred ruling on the motion to compel and directed him to "submit an affidavit swearing under oath to the above "independent recollection" assertions. He shall also specifically address each and every factual assertion set forth in plaintiffs' brief, doc. 50 at 2-3." Id. at * 4. He has since responded.
Third party Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc., meanwhile, sought a compliance-ruling with respect to plaintiffs' document subpoena, doc. 47. The Court ruled against it and told it to, inter alia, produce the pricing data that plaintiffs sought. Herrera-II, 2015 WL 5613195 at *5-6; doc. 55 at 14. That ruling is now before the district judge upon Plum Creek's Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) Objection. Doc. 61; see also doc. 63 (response).
Plaintiffs are not happy with Perez's response to the Court's compulsion Order. They basically call him a liar
In their second motion to compel, plaintiffs again allege hide-the-ball level deception and intransigence, this time by defendant Ronald Collins. They want this Court to order him to produce his
Doc. 67 at 1.
Plaintiffs explain that "payroll amounts, payroll calculations, and payroll data are increasingly the product of specialty payroll programs. Here, as in much of agriculture, that program is called Famous Software." Id. Citing Ojeda-Sanchez v. Bland Farms, LLC, 2009 WL 2365976 at *3 (S.D. Ga. July 31, 2009), they remind this Court that it and other courts "have emphasized that payroll data productions are to be made complete, with the associated formulas." Id. at 2. In litigation marked by chronic complaints of deception and obscurantism, they remind that "[w]hen only payroll reports, rather than the underlying payroll data are produced, the relationships between the data are obscured, the data is not produced in the manner in which it is stored and Plaintiffs' discovery is significantly hampered." Id. They thus "move to compel because Defendant Collins, while stating he would produce the data, has repeatedly failed to do so." Id.
With new counsel onboard, see supra n. 3 & 4, the parties have worked this motion out but also jointly request leave to postpone Collins' response:
Doc. 78 at 2 (emphasis added).
The Court grants that request. For docket-clearing purposes only, however, it
Acknowledging two prior extensions, plaintiffs move the Court to extend by 45 days the deadlines set forth in its June 8, 2015 scheduling order, doc. 40, as amended, doc. 66. Doc. 85 at 1. Discovery, they point out, is due to expire on February 19, 2016,
In response, defendants Plantation Sweets, Inc., Vidalia Plantation, Inc., and Ronald A. Collins
Doc. 86 at 1. Citing the recent change of counsel and "the unique circumstances of this case," they want a 180 day extension, not the 45 plaintiffs request. Id. at 3, 5. Perez concurs. Doc. 87 at 1. The Court
The Court
Doc. 58 at 1. In his 28 U.S.C. § 1746 Declaration, Perez concedes he was "mistaken"
Rule 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). This new version of the rule "govern[]s in all proceedings in civil cases thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, in all proceedings then pending." Carr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Co., ___ F. Supp. 3d, 2015 WL 8010920 at * 6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2015). It elevates the proportionality factors previously found under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), but in a different order. Bonds v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2015 WL 5522072 at * 3 n. 2 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 16) 2015). One court has concluded that the "burdens to show undue burden or lack of proportionality have not fundamentally changed" compared to the earlier version of the Rule. Carr, 2015 WL 8010920 at * 6; see also id. at *9 (party seeking to resist discovery on ground that proposed discovery is not proportional to needs of case bears burden of making specific objection and showing that discovery fails proportionality calculation by coming forward with specific information to address, insofar as that information is available to it, importance of issues at stake in action, amount in controversy, parties' relative access to relevant information, parties' resources, importance of discovery in resolving issues, and whether burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit).
Finally the new rule adds as a factor "the parties' relative access to relevant information." Rule 26(b)(1). Of course, the "access" consideration in this case is directly affected by statutory record-keeping obligation noted supra n. 1.