STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 30, 2012.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January 18, 2013 and to exclude time between November 30, 2012 and January 18, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes six recordings in Russian, approximately 2780 pages of discovery which includes numerous bank records and mortgage loan documents, as well as witness interviews. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to have the recordings in Russian translated and transcribed. Previously, defense counsel had obtained authorization for the translation of the recordings. The interpreter has these recordings, but has run into several problems with the formatting of the tapes. We are still working on resolving the latest issue, and consequently the interpreter needs more time to finish the project. Counsel for defendant also desires additional time to consult with her client, to review the current charges, to finish the investigation and research related to the charges, to finish ongoing investigation, and to discuss potential resolutions with her client.

c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 30, 2012 to January 18, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.