REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

G. R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

Proceeding pro se, Keishya Love, whose father passed away on February 16, 2016, see doc. 1 at 6, claims that American General Life Insurance Co. (AGLI) refuses to fully honor her father's life insurance policy (of which she is the primary beneficiary) because of racial discrimination. Id. at 7. She asks the Court to award her $50,000 (the alleged full value of the policy). Id. at 8. AGLI moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that (1) Love never alleges any discernible cause of action or theory of relief; and (2) no matter what claim she pursues, AGLI already paid out the full value of her father's policy and thus owes her nothing. Doc. 20; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 694 (11th Cir. 2016). "[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Hayes v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 2016 WL 1593415 at * 2 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2016) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Overlaying that standard of review, courts "generally `must look beyond the labels of [filings] by pro se [plaintiffs] to interpret them under whatever statute would provide relief.' See Means v. Alabama, 209 F.3d 1241, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (concerning pro se inmates); cf. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.")." Wilkerson v. Georgia, 618 F. App'x 610, 611-12 (11th Cir. 2015). Simply failing to name the proper cause of action cannot forfeit a pro se litigant's claim when she presents facts sufficient to allow claim identification.

Love's Complaint, though not a model of clarity, allows the Court to discern two possible claims: breach of contract1 (she says her father's policy pays a $50,000 death benefit, yet AGLI allegedly only remitted $1,500, doc. 1 at 5, 10) and race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (she repeatedly notes the many class action lawsuits AGLI faces that accuse it of systematically discriminating against African-Americans by charging higher premiums than those white customers incurred, id. at 7-9; see also doc. 9 at 1; doc. 11 at 4). Both, however, fail.

Love herself included with the Complaint her father's life insurance policy application, which shows a policy face value of $1,500. Doc. 1 at 16. An AGLI response to an inquiry from Love confirms that amount (id. at 20), as does a letter from AGLI sent after Love disputed the $1,500 payout. Id. at 15 ("Policy 0869623805 was issued on the life of Buddessie Love as a Whole Life Plan with a face amount of $1,500. . . ."). Because AGLI paid out the full value of the policy (even Love admits that it paid a funeral home $1,500, see id. at 7), it did not breach its contract with Love's father. See Coastal Logistics, 2016 WL 3842219 at * 2.

Her race discrimination claim likewise fails.2 Love states that she "would like to file a charge of discrimination against" AGLI (doc. 1 at 7), and that she has "evidence and [is] asking for the amount of $50,000 which they advertise." Id. at 8. She never illuminates why an advertisement entitles her to that money rather than the amount included in her father's actual policy, nor does she ever provide the aforementioned evidence (she included with her "response" to AGLI's dismissal motion nothing more than a class action complaint from an unrelated case,3 news articles, and additional conclusory statements, see docs. 9-11).

Love insists that her parents stuck with AGLI "through thick and thin," and "through the good and bad times when they was all over the media," yet AGLI "has not stop[ped] discriminating." Doc. 1 at 8-9. But that just begs the question — how did AGLI discriminate against Love's father? Love never says. Instead, she simply plies conclusory assertions — e.g., "[AGLI] has let my father . . . fall through the cracks, and I Keishya L. Love . . . [am] now seeking justice in this horrific act of racism" (doc. 10 at 2) — that do nothing to edge her claim closer to factual plausibility.

At bottom, Love's allegations boil down to this: (1) AGLI has been sued by many people for discriminating against African Americans; (2) AGLI today advertises $50,000 policies and sent a letter saying that claims for that amount or higher required certified death certificates; (3) Ergo, they discriminated against Love and her father. In this instance, however, one plus two does not equal three. Particularly since Love had the opportunity to respond to the very criticisms that neutralize her discrimination claim (AGLI raised them in its motion to dismiss) yet never has, her construed § 1981 claim should be denied. Because all Love's claims fail, AGLI's motion to dismiss (doc. 8) should be GRANTED, and her Complaint DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Any future motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should be denied, too, since any appeal would not be taken in good faith ( i.e., Love's claims have no factual or legal merit). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(A); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962) (not taken in good faith means frivolous); Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (frivolous means "without arguable merit either in law or fact").

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED.