DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, District Judge.
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case are the following motions: a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Imagine Schools Nonprofit, Inc. ("Imagine Schools")
Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are undisputed and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Racquel Jones ("Plaintiff"), who brings this action on behalf of her minor children. Plaintiff, who has been without a permanent address for nearly two years, enrolled her four children at Imagine Lincoln Public Charter School ("Imagine Lincoln") in Temple Hills, Maryland, a charter school operated by Defendant Imagine Schools. (ECF No. 33-2 ¶¶ 3-6). Imagine Lincoln had a uniform policy for its students, which, as of the 2012-2013 school year, requires that girls in sixth through eighth grade and all boys wear the following:
(ECF No. 33-11, at 3). The uniform policy mandates that girls in kindergarten through fifth grade wear:
(Id.). Pursuant to the uniform policy, "[a]ny student who is partially out of uniform will receive a uniform demerit. Any student that is missing a major component of the school uniform will not be admitted and/or allowed to remain in school." (Id.). If a student receives a uniform demerit, he or she "will face consequences for that particular day the demerit was issued." (Id.).
Imagine Lincoln changed its uniform policy prior to the 2012-2013 school year, requiring students to wear some different components than were previously required. (ECF No. 33-1 ¶¶ 42-43). Imagine Lincoln informed parents about the uniform policy change on July 16, 2012. (ECF No. 33-12). Plaintiff received notice of the uniform change because she used her sister's home address to receive school mailings. (See ECF No. 36, at 17-18). Prior to the start of the 2012-2013 school year, Plaintiff purchased the required khaki pants for her children. She also purchased white shirts, but she was unable to afford the required white shirts with the school logo. (Id. at 22). The children's father purchased shoes for the children. (Id. at 24). Ms. Ellis, Imagine Lincoln's principal, offered Plaintiff at least $100.00 in vouchers to help defray the cost of purchasing the children's uniforms. (ECF Nos. 35, at 15-17; 36, at 30).
During the 2012-2013 and the 2013-2014 school years, Plaintiff's children received several uniform demerits for arriving at school without a complete uniform. (ECF Nos. 33-1 ¶¶ 68-79; 59, at 4). Plaintiff contends that, in punishment for the repeated uniform violations, the children were placed in a kindergarten or first grade classroom for one week each school year despite the fact that the children were all in higher grades at the time. (See ECF Nos. 37, at 13; 38, at 6; 59, at 4). While in the lower-grade classrooms, the children were unable to complete regular school work. (ECF No. 2 ¶ 31). Plaintiff asserts that her children were "ridiculed, bullied, and harassed by their classmates for not having on school uniforms and for being placed in lower grade classrooms." (Id. ¶ 30). According to an affidavit of Janna Parker, a former teacher at Imagine Lincoln, Ms. Ellis "frequently called Plaintiff derogatory names and informed other Imagine Lincoln staff members that she wanted her children out of the school." (ECF No. 67-1 ¶ 10).
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on September 10, 2014. (ECF No. 2). Defendants Imagine Schools, the School Board, and Ms. Ellis (collectively, the "Defendants") removed the action to this court. (ECF No. 1). The complaint asserts the following counts: a violation of Plaintiff and her children's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants (Count I); a violation of the Equal Protection Clause brought under § 1983 against all defendants (Count II); and a state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Ms. Ellis (Count III). Defendants answered the complaint (ECF No. 9), and the parties participated in discovery.
On February 11, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion for a protective order regarding confidentiality of discovery material in order to prevent the release of personally identifiable information of Plaintiff's minor children and School Board employees. (ECF No. 12). The following day, the court issued a paperless order granting the parties' motion for a protective order. (ECF No. 13).
On October 5, Imagine Schools filed its pending motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 33), as did the School Board and Ms. Ellis (ECF No. 34). Plaintiff responded to both motions (ECF Nos. 50; 59), and Defendants replied (ECF Nos. 71; 74). The parties have also filed three pending motions to seal. (ECF Nos. 32; 48; 68).
Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(a) when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is plainly entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986), the Supreme Court of the United States explained that, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the "judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. Thus, "the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented." Id. at 252.
In undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom "in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405 (4
A "party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences." Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation omitted). Indeed, this court has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial. See Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4
The briefs supporting Defendants' motions cover a wider ground than Plaintiff's complaint. As Plaintiff's responses to the motions elucidate, Counts I and II of the complaint assert two clear and distinct § 1983 claims. Count I asserts a substantive due process violation occurred when Plaintiff's children were placed in lower-grade classrooms. (ECF Nos. 2 ¶¶ 37-38; 59, at 2-3). Count II asserts a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, alleging that Plaintiff's children were singled out for more extreme punishment than other students who violated the uniform policy. (ECF Nos. 2 ¶ 47; 59, at 3). Because Plaintiff has failed to put forth evidence establishing a substantive due process or equal protection violation in general, it is not necessary to address several of Defendants' arguments.
The complaint asserts a substantive due process violation on behalf of Plaintiff's children in that Defendants deprived the children of their right to a "continuous and uninterrupted" education. (ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 37, 40). Plaintiff now concedes that there is no constitutionally-protected right to a continuous and uninterrupted education, see Stewart v. Morgan State Univ., 46 F.Supp.3d 590, 602 n.9 (D.Md. 2014) (citing San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)), but instead contends that the substantive due process claims in Count I "are derived from the liberty interest she has in her children's education and that Imagine Lincoln's acquiescence in the harassment, bullying, and intimidation of her children constituted a violation of their substantive due process . . . rights under the U.S. Constitution." (ECF No. 59, at 8-9). Plaintiff asserts a substantive due process claim on her own behalf based on a deprivation of her liberty interest in directing her children's education for the first time in her responses to Defendants' motions. Plaintiff may not use her responses to amend her complaint and assert what amounts to a new claim. See Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Mem'l Inst., 262 F.App'x 556, 563 (4
Plaintiff also argues, again for the first time in her responses, that Defendants violated her children's substantive due process rights when they "intentionally bullied and harassed them in violation of Maryland Education Code § 7-424.1." (ECF No. 59, at 14). A § 1983 claim, however, is only "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes," and Plaintiff may not base her § 1983 claim on a violation of state law. Clear Sky Car Wash, LLC v. City of Chesapeake, Va., 910 F.Supp.2d 861, 889 (E.D.Va. 2012) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, "[c]onstitutional liability is reserved for those rare situations in which the behavior of school officials is not merely disproportionate, but `so disproportionate' as to be `literally shocking to the conscience.'" Savoy v. Charles Cty. Pub. Schs., 798 F.Supp.2d 732, 738 (D.Md. 2011) (quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' treatment of her children violated the Equal Protection Clause because "other students whose school clothes did not conform to the school uniform policy" were treated less harshly. (ECF No. 2 ¶ 47). Although unclear in the complaint, Plaintiff asserts an equal protection claim under a "class-of-one" theory, rather than a theory that Defendants discriminated against a certain class of students. (ECF No. 59, at 20). To succeed on a class-of-one theory, a party must show that "it had been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there was no rational basis to support the different treatment." Sunrise Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 328 (4
Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 603 (2008). Thus, Engquist limits a plaintiff's ability to bring an equal protection claim under a class-of-one theory. See Dyer v. Md. State Bd. of Educ., ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2016 WL 2939740, at *13 (D.Md. May 20, 2016) (noting that Engquist has "curtailed" class-of-one equal protection claims).
Defendants argue that the school officials were exercising their discretion in reprimanding students who violated the uniform policy. As the undersigned noted in a prior case, "[a] number of district court decisions have applied the reasoning used in Engquist to preclude `class of one' equal protection claims in the public education context." Uzoukwu v. Prince George's Cmty. College Bd. of Trustees, No. DKC-12-3228, 2013 WL 4442289, at *9 (D.Md. Aug. 15, 2013) (citing cases).
Smith, 664 F.Supp.2d at 1078. Accordingly, because Plaintiff asserts only a class-of-one equal protection claim, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Count II.
In Count III, Plaintiff asserts a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Ms. Ellis. In order to succeed on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the wrongful conduct is causally connected to the plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. See Hodge, 121 F.Supp.3d at 503 (citation omitted). In Maryland, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is "to be used sparingly and only for opprobrious behavior that includes truly outrageous conduct." Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 231 (4
Here, Plaintiff has put forth evidence that Ms. Ellis spoke negatively about Plaintiff and "frequently called Plaintiff derogatory names and informed other Imagine Lincoln staff members that she wanted her children out of the school." (ECF No. 67-1 ¶ 10). Plaintiff asserts that this conduct, in addition to placing the children in lower-grade classrooms, "was tantamount to directly bullying the children for no other reason other than to penalize them for their mother's inability to purchase appropriate uniforms on their behalf." (ECF No. 50, at 24). Again, speaking negatively about Plaintiff and placing her children in lower-grade classrooms may have been unprofessional, counterproductive, and hurtful to Plaintiff and her children. This conduct, however, falls far short of what is required to succeed on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Accordingly, Ms. Ellis's motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Count III.
Pursuant to the court's protective order, the parties have filed three motions to seal. (ECF Nos. 32; 48; 68). At issue in any request to seal are the principles of common-law access and the more rigorous First Amendment analysis that applies to judicial records. The Fourth Circuit has reminded us that:
Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265-66 (4
In addition, a motion to seal must comply with Local Rule 105.11, which provides that:
This Local Rule endeavors to protect the common-law right to inspect and copy judicial records and documents, Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978), while recognizing that competing interests sometimes outweigh the public's right of access. In re Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4
Here, it is clear that the materials the parties request be sealed contain some information designated as "confidential" in the protective order, including the identities of Plaintiff's minor children. The parties have not, however, explained why redacting such information would not be an effective alternative to the sealing of several documents. Particularly in light of the First Amendment interests that attach to judicial records, more limited redactions are preferable to widespread sealing. Accordingly, the motions to seal will be denied without prejudice. The parties will be given thirty (30) days to file jointly a motion with proposed redactions, until which time the materials currently under seal will remain under seal.
For the foregoing reasons, the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants will be granted. The motions to seal will be denied without prejudice. A separate order will follow.