TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE.
Scott L. Heagney ("Plaintiff") filed this action against Lisa A. Wong, in her individual and official capacities, and the City of Fitchburg (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging defamation and violations of M.G.L. c. 151B § 4(9) ("Chapter 151B"). (Docket No. 1-1). The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff's favor and awarded him $750,000 in compensatory damages for his defamation claim and $750,000 in punitive damages for his Chapter 151B claim. (Docket No. 168 at 6, 9-10). The Court entered judgment for Plaintiff on March
On appeal, the First Circuit (1) reversed the Court's judgment of liability as to defamation and (2) affirmed the Court's judgment of liability as to but reversed the award of punitive damages for the Chapter 151B violation. (Docket No. 240 at 1). Plaintiff now moves for attorneys' fees, costs, and post-judgment interest. (Docket No. 242). Plaintiff also moves for costs under Rule 54(d). (Docket No. 242). For the following reasons, the Court
Plaintiff argues that, given the First Circuit's affirmance of liability on his Chapter 151B claim, he is entitled to attorneys' fees, costs, and post-judgment interest as the "prevailing party" under M.G.L. c. 151B § 9. The Court disagrees. Kiely v. Teradyne, Inc., 85 Mass.App.Ct. 431, 13 N.E.3d 615 (2014), precludes recovery of attorneys' fees or costs for a violation of Chapter 151B where a plaintiff does not receive any relief.
Plaintiff contends that Kiely allows an award of attorneys' fees in these circumstances because, unlike the jury in Kiely, which failed to make an independent finding of harm, the jury here found that Plaintiff suffered harm as a result of the Chapter 151B violation. (Docket No. 242 at 3). This argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiff relies on the distinction between a finding of no actual harm and a finding of actual but not quantifiable harm. Yet, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the jury placed his harm into the latter category. Plaintiff never suggested during trial that his harm could not be quantified. (Docket No. 243-1). To the contrary, he offered expert testimony and evidence regarding the amount of compensatory damages to which he was entitled. (Docket No. 243-1). That the jury declined to award him any compensatory damages on this record does not mean that it found his harm unquantifiable. (Docket No. 168 at 8-9). Indeed, Kiely suggests the opposite, i.e., that a jury's award of zero compensatory damages in the wake of a plaintiff's submission of evidence regarding his losses constitutes an "express[ ] reject[ion]" of actual damages. See Kiely, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 447, 13 N.E.3d 615.
Plaintiff also suggests that he received a form of declaratory judgment because the
Because Plaintiff has not received any relief, he cannot recover attorneys' fees or costs.
Plaintiff also moves for taxable costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), which enables a court to award costs, other than attorneys' fees, to a "prevailing party" unless otherwise prohibited under law. (Docket No. 242 at 2). As Defendants have not offered any opposition to this portion of Plaintiff's motion, the Court
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's motion is