KITCHENS, Justice, for the Court:
¶ 1. Milton Harper, the managing partner and president of Banks, Finley, White & Company of Mississippi ("Banks"), suffered a severe stroke on August 3, 2000, and died of stroke on August 3, 2000, and died of another stroke on July 10, 2001. His dependents sued Banks for workers'
¶ 2. The relevant facts are adequately stated in the Court of Appeals' opinion:
Harper, 136 So.3d at 464-65.
¶ 3. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the Hinds County Circuit Court's decision. Id. at 465-67. The court found that "[a]s president of Banks, Harper was responsible for making decisions regarding insurance" and that "Harper erroneously determined that Banks did not have the requisite number of employees to legally mandate Banks to purchase workers' compensation insurance." Id. at 465. Ultimately, based on an error in statutory interpretation, Harper chose not to obtain workers' compensation insurance for Banks. Id.
¶ 4. However, the Court of Appeals held that Harper's decision not to obtain workers' compensation insurance did not preclude his dependents from recovering workers' compensation benefits from Banks. Id. at 456. Applying Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code, the court held that "[the statute] clearly states that an `executive officer may reject [the] coverage by giving notice in writing to the carrier of this election not to be covered as an employee.'" Harper, 136 So.3d at 466 (quoting Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-79). Thus, because Harper did not reject workers' compensation insurance coverage in writing, the Court of Appeals found that he had not waived coverage by failing to obtain insurance. Harper, 136 So.3d at 466.
¶ 5. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that evidence in the record supported the Commission's decision that Harper's strokes and subsequent death were caused by his stress at work. Id. at 456-57.
¶ 6. Banks filed with this Court a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. We granted Banks's petition to review two issues: (1) whether Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code applies to the facts of this case and (2) whether the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Harper suffered a compensable injury is supported by substantial evidence.
¶ 7. In reviewing questions of law, this Court applies a de novo standard of review. Natchez Equip. Co., Inc. v. Gibbs, 623 So.2d 270, 273 (Miss.1993). When engaging in statutory interpretation,
Allred, 928 So.2d at 154 (quoting City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss.1992) (citations omitted)).
¶ 8. Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code, provides:
Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-79 (Rev.2011) (emphasis added). Section 71-3-79 is not ambiguous. As such, for this statute to be applicable, there must have been (1) coverage extended by a carrier, (2) which was provided by the employer, and (3) was accepted or denied by employees. In the instant case, none of the prescribed events occurred. There was no policy providing coverage to any Banks employee.
¶ 9. The Workers' Compensation Commission found that "[t]here can be no argument, therefore, that Mr. Harper elected not to be covered as an executive officer because there was no policy from which he could have otherwise excluded himself." However, the Court of Appeals, relying on Section 71-3-79, held that "[a]t no point did Harper reject the coverage by giving notice in writing." Harper, 136 So.3d at 467. The Court of Appeals' reliance on Section 71-3-79 is misplaced, because workers' compensation insurance coverage for Banks did not exist.
¶ 10. Coverage must exist prior to any employee's "reject[ing] said coverage." Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-79 (Rev.2011). During Harper's tenure with the firm, the firm chose not to purchase workers' compensation insurance. Thus, neither Harper nor any eligible employee of Banks could "reject said coverage" by written notice to a carrier, because there was no carrier to whom Harper or any eligible
¶ 11. The record is clear that Banks had not purchased workers' compensation insurance coverage for any of its employees at the time of Harper's strokes and subsequent death. It also must be determined whether Banks was an employer subject to the Act. Section 71-3-5 of the Mississippi Code provides:
Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-5 (Rev.2011) (emphasis added).
¶ 12. The Workers' Compensation Commission found that Banks employed a minimum of five people. The record reflects that Banks Finley employed at least the following people: Milton Harper, Kaiser Brown, David Ewing, Jr., Dian Brown, and Robert Sultan. Because Banks employed five people, it is clear that Banks fell within the provisions of Section 71-3-5 during the time relevant to Harper's claim.
¶ 13. Section 71-3-5 provides a method by which an employer can exempt itself from the provisions of workers' compensation law, by excluding certain employees from the total number of workers. Nothing in the record indicates that Banks provided any written notice that it was electing to exempt Harper from coverage, nor did it provide any evidence that Harper agreed with Banks's exemption of Harper from coverage.
¶ 14. Chief Justice Waller's dissent, relying upon a case from Maryland based upon that state's workers' compensation statutes, avers that Harper waived workers' compensation coverage by failing to obtain workers' compensation insurance. Mississippi law mandates that the state's worker's compensation laws apply to "[e]very person, firm and private corporation, including any public service corporation... that have in service five (5) or more workmen or operatives regularly in the same business." Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-5 (Rev.2011) (emphasis added). Harper unequivocally was covered by Mississippi's workers' compensation laws at the time of his death.
¶ 15. Furthermore, our Legislature provided means by which partners such as Harper can waive, through express writing, the applicability of workers' compensation coverage. Id. ("Any employer may elect, by proper and written action of its own governing authority, to be exempt from the provisions of the Workers' Compensation
¶ 16. Ultimately, nothing in the record supports the conclusion that the accounting firm was exempt from the Act and did not owe benefits to the dependents of one of its partners.
¶ 17. The standard of review utilized by this Court when considering an appeal of a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is well settled: "[t]he findings and order of the Workers' Compensation Commission are binding on this Court so long as they are `supported by substantial evidence.'" Vance v. Twin River Homes, Inc., 641 So.2d 1176, 1180 (Miss.1994) (quoting Fought v. Stuart C. Irby Co., 523 So.2d 314, 317 (Miss.1988)). Substantial evidence requires more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence, Johnson v. Ferguson, 435 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss. 1983), but it does not rise to the level of "a preponderance of the evidence." Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. McClain, 149 So.2d 523, 523-24 (Miss.1963); accord Delta CMI v. Speck, 586 So.2d 768, 773 (Miss.1991).
¶ 18. We are bound to the Workers' Compensation Commission's findings of fact even though the evidence would convince us otherwise if we were the ultimate fact finder. Barnes v. Jones Lumber Co., 637 So.2d 867, 869 (Miss. 1994). "This Court will overturn a [C]ommission decision only for an error of law or an unsupportable finding of fact." Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Taplin, 586 So.2d 823, 826 (Miss.1991) (citations omitted); see also Hedge v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 641 So.2d 9, 12 (Miss.1994). This Court therefore cannot overturn a Commission decision unless it finds that the decision was "arbitrary and capricious." Taplin, 586 So.2d at 826. Moreover, even "[d]oubtful cases should be resolved in favor of compensation, so as to fulfill the beneficial purposes" of statutory law. Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Guthrie, 554 So.2d 917, 918 (Miss.1989).
¶ 19. In workers' compensation cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving by a "fair preponderance of the evidence" the following elements: (1) an accidental injury, (2) arising out of and in the course of employment, and (3) a causal connection between the injury and the death or claimed disability. Hedge, 641 So.2d at 13. Thus, we must review the record for the purpose of deciding whether there is evidence supporting the Commission's decision. We are not to engage in a de novo balancing of the evidence, as the
¶ 20. Dr. Tiwari, an expert for Harper's beneficiaries and a physician who treated Milton Harper on August 3, 2000, after Harper's first stroke, testified that Harper did not have any of the habits or conditions that are likely causes of strokes, including "elevated cholesterol, smoking, obesity, sedentary lifestyle, and high blood pressure." He averred that "he did have high blood pressure, but it wasn't terribly high." He also treated Harper on January 30, 2001, after Harper had complained of uncontrollable laughter, an unusual stroke symptom. Of that visit, Dr. Tiwari opined that, of potential causes for strokes, "we didn't identify anything other than high blood pressure .... The diastolic was a hundred, and many times you can find normal people that go visit a doctor with a bottom number being about a hundred, partly because they're stressed."
¶ 21. Dr. Jeter, an expert for Harper's beneficiaries and Harper's primary care physician who treated his high blood pressure, testified that Harper had "labile hypertension," or blood pressure constantly in flux due to his environment. "This doctor reported that Harper's blood pressure would fluctuate ... from a normal range to be elevated." Dr. Jeter stated that the blood pressure of a person with labile hypertension will change "when they get uptight...." He further testified that there were no obvious contributing causes to Harper's strokes other than high blood pressure.
¶ 22. Dr. Jeter also testified that Harper's personality as a "workaholic" was to blame for the fluctuations of his blood pressure, adding that "[t]he Type A personality... puts themselves under a lot of stress because they have to get everything done." He said that his impression of Harper was that he was a "workaholic" and that he was "continually push, push, push[ing]." Dr. Jeter said that this was "probably contributing to his blood pressure... being elevated."
¶ 23. Dr. Jeter discussed at length the interrelationship among vascular disease, hypertension, and stress. This physician stated that "stress can be an aggravated factor.... [V]ascular changes and stress cause[] increased [blood] pressure, and that can affect the vascular system." He characterized stress as a "contributing factor" to Harper's death.
¶ 24. Dr. Davis, a neurosurgeon who did not treat Harper, testified on behalf of the accounting firm, opining that Harper's strokes were caused by his high blood pressure.
¶ 25. This medical testimony leads to several conclusions. First, Milton Harper had labile hypertension, a condition in which stress causes a person's blood pressure to rise due to stress. Second, other than high blood pressure, there were no medical causes of Milton Harper's stroke. Third, Harper died of a stroke. The only component of a viable worker's compensation claim left lacking was a causal connection between the stress causing Harper's hypertension and Harper's work. See Hedge, 641 So.2d at 13 (requiring proof of an accidental injury arising out of employment and a causal connection between the injury and the death or claimed disability).
¶ 27. Apparently in reliance upon this lone reference to the record, Justice Coleman's dissent summarizes Dr. Jeter's testimony thusly: "Dr. Jeter testified that it was possible that Harper's uncontrolled blood pressure could have caused his fatal stroke. He also testified that stress could have been a factor in Harper's death." Coleman Diss. ¶ 48. This is an inaccurate representation of Dr. Jeter's testimony. He plainly testified that it was a possibility that the stress of Harper's work contributed to Harper's death. Dr. Jeter did not equivocate about the fact that stress causes hypertension and that Harper had no conditions which typically contribute to strokes other than hypertension. Furthermore, the Coleman dissent ignores the testimony of the other medical experts who testified at the workers' compensation hearing. Strictly speaking, the record does not support Justice Coleman's characterization of the expert testimony in this case.
¶ 28. The Coleman dissent further posits that there was no reliable evidence of causation in this case. Relying on Bechtel Corporation v. Phillips, 591 So.2d 814 (Miss.1991), the dissent opines that "medical evidence is required to prove causation." Coleman Diss. ¶ 46. First, as discussed previously, there was expert testimony in this case unequivocally linking Harper's stress to his labile hypertension and to his stroke. The evidence adduced at the hearing proves that the only known cause of Harper's stress was his work for Banks. It is fundamental in our justice system that lay witnesses can testify only with respect to their own experiences and knowledge. See M.R.E. 701 (requiring first-hand knowledge for the admissibility of a lay opinion); M.R.E. 703 ("The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing."). Nowhere in case law from this Court or in Mississippi statutes can be found the principle espoused by the Coleman dissent that the worker's compensation claim must be built upon the testimony of one expert alone. But see R.C. Petroleum, Inc., 555 So.2d at 1021 ("Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish the elements [of a workers' compensation claim]."); L.B. Priester & Son, Inc. v. Bynum's Dependents, 247 Miss. 664, 157 So.2d 399 (1963) (same). Moreover, this evidentiary standard advocated by the Coleman dissent, if adopted widely throughout our jurisprudence, would be unworkable and unrealistic. For example, what murder conviction could stand in the light of this standard? A forensic pathologist can testify that a decedent's cause of death was a shotgun wound to the head. That doctor usually cannot, however, testify about the shooter's identity, because that information is outside his knowledge and expertise. The same is true here. Given that physicians have established that Harper's high blood pressure was caused
¶ 29. Milton Harper's widow, Maggie Harper, testified that Harper was a "workaholic" and that he was "constantly working." She also stated that Harper kept saying that he was getting behind at work and having problems balancing being out of town for audits and trying to manage the office at the same time. Maggie said that her husband was the type of person who liked to perform well and who pushed himself at work to receive bonuses. Over the years, Harper's work stress began to take a toll on him. When his wife would advise him to cut back, he would respond that he had "to go make a dollar." She also testified that he told her that his stress had nothing to do with her or with their family life.
¶ 30. Harper's coworker Kaiser Brown testified that Harper took responsibility for most of the firm's largest and most complicated engagements. He averred that Harper worked from 8:00 a.m. until 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. on week nights and usually worked some on the weekend. Kaiser also testified that, around the time of his death, Harper had been having issues with another partner at Banks about profit sharing and that several heated disagreements between them had occurred.
¶ 31. Dian Parkinson, another coworker of Harper's at the firm, confirmed that Harper would work from about 8 a.m. until 7 p.m. and stated that Harper had more responsibilities than anyone else at Banks because he was the president. She also testified that the firm had started using a new software program in September 2000 and that Harper had been having a difficult time learning to use the new software.
¶ 32. In fact, there is no evidence in the record that Harper's stress was caused by anything other than his professional life.
¶ 33. This is consistent with the findings of the administrative law judge, which were affirmed on appeal by the Workers' Compensation Commission:
¶ 34. Harper's dependents proved that the only source of his stress was his work, that stress was the cause of his high blood pressure, and that high blood pressure caused his stroke. As such, "substantial evidence" in the record clearly supports the Commission's decision, which was affirmed on this basis by the Hinds County Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals. This is especially true in light of the fact that we are to be deferential to the Workers' Compensation Commission's role as the ultimate fact finder in workers' compensation
¶ 35. Section 71-3-79 does not apply to the facts as presented. Because Banks had not obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage, no employee, including Harper, had rejected workers' compensation insurance coverage in writing. Banks, an accounting firm with at least five employees, was subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Banks therefore is obligated to compensate Harper's dependents, regardless of the reason the firm had not obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage. Moreover, substantial evidence in the record supports the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Harper suffered a compensable injury. We therefore affirm in whole the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, which held that Harper's fatal stroke was a compensable injury and that Banks was obligated to provide workers' compensation benefits to Harper's beneficiaries, regardless of whether Harper had erred in failing to procure workers' compensation insurance for Banks. We affirm the Hinds County Circuit Court's holding that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Harper had suffered a compensable injury, but we reverse and render its holding that Harper had waived workers' compensation benefits by failing to obtain workers' compensation insurance for the Banks firm. Finally, we affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Harper's stroke was a compensable injury within the course and scope of his employment at Banks. But we hold that the Court of Appeals erred by applying Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code to this case, because, under that statute, an entity first must have obtained workers' compensation insurance in order for a partner to opt out in writing.
¶ 36.
DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., LAMAR AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. WALLER, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER, PIERCE AND COLEMAN, JJ. COLEMAN, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, C.J., AND CHANDLER, J.
WALLER, Chief Justice, dissenting:
¶ 37. Milton Harper, as president of Banks, Finley, White, & Co., P.C., was responsible for ensuring the firm secured workers' compensation insurance. See Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-83 (Rev.2011). The firm, however, failed to do so. Harper, according to the vice president of Banks at the time, made the decision not to obtain workers' compensation coverage. The vice president and Harper discussed the matter, but, according to the vice president, Harper ultimately made the decision not to obtain coverage. Moreover, as president of the corporation, Harper had a statutory duty to ensure the firm carried workers' compensation coverage. See Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-83 (Rev.2011) (making president of corporation criminally liable for failure to secure compensation).
¶ 39. Banks employed more than five individuals and was subject to Mississippi's workers' compensation statutes. See Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-5 (Rev.2011). Banks, however, failed to secure workers' compensation insurance while Harper was managing partner and president, and there was no such coverage at the time of his injuries. The majority finds that Harper's beneficiaries are entitled to compensation "regardless of the reason the firm had not obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage." In other words, Harper, in the form of his beneficiaries, is not barred from recovering benefits despite Harper's own failure to secure workers's compensation insurance. I disagree.
¶ 40. While there are no Mississippi cases on point, the Maryland Court of Appeals considered a similar issue in a workers' compensation case much like today's. There, a corporate officer was injured while at work. Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Lutter, 342 Md. 334, 337, 676 A.2d 51, 52 (1996). The corporation, which he controlled, failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance or opt out of workers' compensation coverage in writing as required by Maryland law. Lutter, 676 A.2d at 53, 54. Nevertheless, the officer sought workers' compensation benefit's from the corporation. Id.
¶ 41. The officer argued "that despite his decision not to purchase insurance for himself, he did not effectively exempt himself from coverage under the Act because he did not file written notice of his election to be exempt...." Id. at 54. The Maryland court disagreed. Id. The court first noted that there was no coverage for the officer to opt out of, so the Maryland statute allowing officers to exempt themselves from coverage was inapplicable. Id. at 54-55.
¶ 42. The court then found that, by deciding to forego workers' compensation insurance, the officer had waived his right to collect benefits under Maryland's workers' compensation scheme. Id. at 55. The court provided, "As corporate president, [the officer] was ... the person who made the decision not to protect himself...." Id. Therefore, "he cannot be permitted to receive benefits from the [Uninsured Employers'] Fund merely because he neglected or refused to perform his duty...."
¶ 43. I find this rationale persuasive and would apply the same reasoning here.
¶ 44. Accordingly, I would affirm the findings of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County that Harper, through his dependents, was barred from recovering benefits from Banks because of Harper's failure to obtain workers' compensation insurance.
CHANDLER, PIERCE AND COLEMAN, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.
COLEMAN, Justice, dissenting:
¶ 45. I join Chief Justice Waller's dissent. I write separately because, regardless of coverage issues, no competent evidence exists anywhere in the record upon which any tribunal could rely to reach a valid finding that Harper's stroke resulted from his work. Therefore, the Workers' Compensation Commission award was not supported by substantial evidence.
¶ 46. In workers' compensation cases, we limit our review to determining whether the Commission's decision "was supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary and/or capricious, was beyond the Commission's authority to make, or whether a claimant's constitutional or statutory rights were violated." Ladner v. Zachry Constr., 130 So.3d 1085, 1088 (Miss.2014). Harper's dependents bore the burden of proving a causal connection between his stroke and his work. Bracey v. Packard Elec. Div., Gen. Motors Co., 476 So.2d 28, 29 (Miss.1985). See also Miss.Code Ann. §§ 71-3-3 and -7 (Rev.2011); V. Dunn, Mississippi Workers' Compensation § 265 (3d ed.1982); Strickland v. M.H. McMath Gin, Inc., 457 So.2d 925, 928 (Miss.1984).
Hedge v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 641 So.2d 9, 15 (Miss.1994). Although Rule 2.8 of the Rules of the Workers' Compensation Commission states that, for Commission purposes, the general rules of evidence are relaxed, evidence still must be "competent" to be considered. Expert medical evidence is required to prove causation. Bechtel Corp. v. Phillips, 591 So.2d 814, 817 (Miss.1991).
¶ 47. In Sonford Products Corp. v. Freels, 495 So.2d 468 (Miss.1986), overruled on other grounds by Bickham v.
Freels, 495 So.2d at 472-473. The factors that cause a stroke cannot be considered to be within the common knowledge of a layman. While the Rules of Evidence may be relaxed for purposes of workers' compensation hearings, proof still must be competent. As the Freels Court wrote, competent expert medical testimony must be provided to prove causation, and competent expert medical testimony is that which "affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not" that the claimant's work "was a substantial factor in bringing about the result." Id.
¶ 48. In short, the evidence before the Commission is devoid of any expert testimony that affords the necessary reasonable basis for the Commission to have concluded "that it is more likely than not" that Harper's work caused his stroke and death. During the hearing before the administrative judge, Dr. Marvin Jeter, Harper's treating physician, testified that he first began treating Harper in January 1995 for hypertension. Dr. Jeter treated Harper's hypertension with medication, and Harper responded favorably. Dr. Jeter considered his hypertension to be well-controlled when he took the medication as prescribed. However, Harper often was noncompliant. When Harper asked what he could do in lieu of taking medication, Dr. Jeter informed him that changes in his diet and exercise regime also could aid in controlling his hypertension. At no time did Dr. Jeter encourage Harper to alter his job duties. He did testify that Harper reported that he was under stress at his job. Dr. Jeter testified that stress does tend to increase a person's blood pressure. Dr. Jeter admitted that he was not aware of what Harper's blood pressure was at the time of his death because he last saw Harper in 2000 after his first stroke. Dr. Jeter testified that it was possible that Harper's uncontrolled blood pressure could have caused his fatal stroke. He also testified that stress could have been a factor in Harper's death.
¶ 49. On cross-examination, Dr. Jeter testified that he could not state to a reasonable degree of medical probability that Harper was under stress due to his job or that Harper's death was caused by his job.
The Harpers offered no other testimony to establish that Harper's death was a result of his employment. With all respect to the majority, speculative testimony such as exists in the instant case does not amount to an unequivocal causal linking, (Maj. Op. at ¶ 27), and while the majority makes a nonspecific reference to other expert testimony, it identifies none that meets the requisite standard for competence set out above. Because the Harpers' evidence falls well short of the level of competent, they fail to establish a prima facie showing of causation. No reasonable basis exists for the Commission's award. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
WALLER, C.J., AND CHANDLER, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.
Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-79 (Rev.2011) (emphasis added).
Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-5 (Rev.2011).