U.S. v. KEOUGH, 8:14CR349. (2015)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20150922975
Visitors: 18
Filed: Sep. 21, 2015
Latest Update: Sep. 21, 2015
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on the unopposed motion to continue trial [21] as this case involves complex matters and voluminous reports. Counsel need additional time to review discovery, hire experts, prepare for trial and explore plea negotiations. The defendant shall comply with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for September 29, 2015 is con
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on the unopposed motion to continue trial [21] as this case involves complex matters and voluminous reports. Counsel need additional time to review discovery, hire experts, prepare for trial and explore plea negotiations. The defendant shall comply with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for September 29, 2015 is cont..
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ORDER
F.A. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on the unopposed motion to continue trial [21] as this case involves complex matters and voluminous reports. Counsel need additional time to review discovery, hire experts, prepare for trial and explore plea negotiations. The defendant shall comply with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for September 29, 2015 is continued to January 5, 2016.
2. Defendant is ordered to file a waiver of speedy trial as soon as practicable.
3. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and January 5, 2016 shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel for the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
