SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Appellant, Norman Johnson, pro se, appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to his former employer, Just Energy, dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, with the view that "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). Upon such review, we conclude that Johnson's appeal is without merit for the reasons articulated by the district court in its order.

We have considered all of Johnson's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. We grant Just Energy's motion to strike exhibits in Johnson's appendix that were not part of the record before the district court. See Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, federal appellate courts will not consider rulings or evidence which are not part of the trial record."). We deny the motion as moot as to Johnson's argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that he was denied a visa by the Australian consulate because he could not establish how he would pay for the trip, as we do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1976).