LEONARD D. WEXLER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Paula Jackson ("Jackson" or "Plaintiff') brings this action claiming that she was discriminated against as a result of her sex and race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e, et seq. ("Title VII"), and the New York State New York Executive Law§§ 296 and 297, ("N.Y. Exec. Law"). Defendants County of Nassau ("County"), Michael J. Sposato, the Nassau County Sheriff ("Sposato"), Sergeant Siatta of the Nassau County Sheriffs Correction Division ("Siatta")
According to the facts alleged in Plaintiffs complaint, she is a 49-year old African-American woman employed as a corrections officer for the Nassau County Sheriffs Department ("Sheriffs Dept.") since October 1999.
In 2008, Plaintiff Jackson filed a sexual harassment complaint with Defendant Siatta claiming another corrections made false sexual statements about Plaintiff Jackson. Plaintiff alleges those complaints were ignored by Defendants Siatta and Golio. AC ¶ 24-31. In retaliation for that complaint, Plaintiff alleges she was stripped of responsibilities, lost weapons privileges, and received less favorable assignments. AC ¶ 31.
At the end of 2008, Plaintiff began a personal relationship with Michael Watson ("Watson"), who was arrested several months later, in May 2009, and housed at Nassau Correctional Facility for one week. AC ¶ 32-34. Following his arrest, Watson made several calls to Jackson. AC ¶ 35-36. In March 2010, a federal search warrant was conducted at Watson's residence. Plaintiff was not named in the warrant, nor believed to be a subject of the warrant. Plaintiff has no criminal record. AC ¶ 38-41.
On May 19, 2010, Plaintiff Jackson, who had never previously been disciplined, was terminated with the Sheriff's Department by the Defendants. AC ¶ 42-43. The stated bases for her termination was for accepting phone calls from Watson and for not safeguarding her uniform. AC ¶ 44. Plaintiff alleges that at least three male Caucasian corrections officers ("COs") have had relationships with female inmates, used cell phones at work, and even been convicted of crimes, but have not been terminated. AC ¶¶ 45-49.
After being terminated, Plaintiff filed a grievance over her terminations and requested arbitration. AC ¶ 50. Plaintiff alleges that in response, on July 1, 2010, the Defendants referred Plaintiff to the Nassau County District Attorney's officer for criminal investigation and prosecution. AC ¶ 51.
Plaintiff further alleges that on January 11, 2011, Plaintiff was arrested for twenty-eight (28) counts of official misconduct, including twenty-six (26) counts for the calls made by Watson to Plaintiff. AC ¶¶ 54-55. Just prior to trial, an information was filed reducing the charges to nine (9). Plaintiff was acquitted after a trial by a jury on April 9, 2012 of al nine (9) charges. AC ¶¶ 56-58.
Since being terminated, Plaintiff alleges she has been fighting unsuccessfully to get her job back, is unable to find work, and has lost salary, benefits and seniority, and been deemed a "risky hire" by law enforcement or private security companies as a result of Defendants' false charges. AC ¶¶ 61-69. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were retaliating against her for filing a complaint against Evans, filing a grievance and seeking arbitration following her termination, and that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex and race, since male Caucasians of similar rank were not subject to the same treatment or discipline. AC ¶¶ 70-77.
Plaintiffs complaint alleges claims for sex and race discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII and the N.Y. Executive Law, and claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process in violation of§ 1983 and under New York law. Plaintiff also claims infliction of emotional distress.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint in its entirety, arguing that Plaintiffs claims under§ 1983 and N.Y. Exec. Law are subject to a three year statute of limitations, that there is no basis to impose liability under the individual defendants under Title VII, that Plaintiff does not state sufficient facts to support any of her discrimination or retaliation claims, that the complaint fails to indicate sufficient involvement of the individual defendants, who are in any event, entitled to qualified immunity, and there is no basis for the claims against the County, or the claim for infliction of emotional distress.
In considering a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the factual allegations in the complaints as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff.
The thrust of Defendants' motion is that Plaintiff's amended complaint fails to sufficiently allege that she suffered any discrimination or retaliation as a result of her sex or race, and therefore her claims under§ 1983, Title VII and the N.Y.Exec. Law should be dismissed. See Defendants' Memorandum in Support ("Def. Mem."), at 6-15. Defendants argue that the complaint fails to allege any discrimination based on her sex or race, other than alleging that white male co-workers also had relationships with inmates, including phone calls, and yet they were treated differently than Plaintiff. Defendants cite Plaintiff's testimony at her§ 50-H hearing, arguing it undermines her discrimination claim.
As noted above, infra note 2, this is a motion to dismiss and the Court's review is limited to the allegations in the complaint.
The Court finds that accepting the factual allegations of Plaintiffs complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff as required under Rule 12(b)(6), the facts alleged in Plaintiffs amended complaint sufficiently substantiate a claim of discrimination and retaliation under§ 1983, Title VII and the N.Y. Exec. Law. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims on this basis is denied.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Defendants Sposato, Siatta and Golio fail because the allegations do not indicate any personal involvement in the alleged discrimination, or that they had no authority or supervisory control over Plaintiffs. Again, Defendants repeatedly cite Plaintiffs § 50-H testimony to bolster this argument, which the Court has not considered in the context of this motion to dismiss.
It is well-settled that to hold a defendant individually liable for a civil rights violation a plaintiff must plausibly allege some personal involvement in the constitutional violation.
According to the complaint, Plaintiff filed a sexual harassment complaint in 2008 against another CO with Defendant Siatta, that Defendant Golio was aware of the complaint, and yet both of those Defendants disregarded it. AC ¶ 24-30. The complaint continues to allege that after Plaintiff was terminated and filed a grievance and a request for arbitration, the Defendants retaliated against her by fabricating department violations and referring her for criminal prosecution.
Plaintiffs allegations against Defendant Sposato are different. He was the Nassau County Sheriff (AC ¶ 14), and Plaintiff alleges he was aware of "systemic, widespread misconduct" by County employees, and that he acted with "deliberate indifference" in failing the change the practices, ignoring court orders, and "defending the pattern and practice of unconstitutional conduct." AC ¶ 135. The complaint also alleges Sposato failed to train or properly supervise causing civil rights violations. AC ¶ 136.
Assuming them to be true, these facts substantiate claims that Defendants Siatta and Golio directly participated in the constitutional violation, and that Defendant Sposato either created the policy or failed to properly manage subordinates causing violations to occur. Therefore, the motions to dismiss the claims as to these Defendants is denied.
The Court also denies Defendants' motion to dismiss claims against these Defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects an official from civil liability if their conduct does not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Like a motion to dismiss, when evaluating whether qualified immunity is available, the Court must "accept as true all well-pled factual allegations, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor."
In order to hold a municipality liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) actions taken under color of law; (2) the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.
Plaintiff alleges that she suffered discrimination and retaliation and unsubstantiated criminal prosecution stemming from "de facto policies, practices customs and usages" of the County. AC ¶ 130, et seq. If true, these allegations sufficiently state a claim against the County and Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim is denied.
Plaintiffs original complaint was filed on December 24, 2011. Plaintiff concedes that the three-year statute of limitations precludes her from making discrimination or retaliation claims based on the sexual harassment complaint she filed in 2008. Plaintiff also concedes that she has no basis to allege Title VII claims stemming from her termination in May 2010 — more than 300 days prior to filing her complaint.
Defendants also seek to dismiss Plaintiffs claim for infliction of emotional distress. To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law, a plaintiff must show: "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause severe emotional distress, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury, and (4) severe emotional distress."
For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby denies Defendants' motion to dismiss in all respects, except dismisses the Title VII claims against Defendants Siatta, Golio and Sposato, part; and narrows Plaintiffs claims as noted above in section D. Trial of this matter is hereby scheduled for June 1, 2015.
SO ORDERED.