CARAWAY, J.
After the two minor children remained two-and-one-half years in state custody, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother. She has appealed the judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
By Instanter Order dated January 28, 2013, one-year-old J.S. (born February 5, 2011) and three-year-old J.C. (born November 4, 2009), were removed from the
The boys were adjudicated children in need of care on April 18, 2013. A case plan was filed by DCFS with a permanent plan of reunification concurrent with adoption. The case plan required S.S. to attend parenting classes, be available for monthly visits by DCFS, allow two visits in her home to assure adequate food, clothing and utilities, and receive mental health and substance abuse assessments.
By June of 2013, S.S. had not maintained a home and did not have a job. Her mental health assessment diagnosed S.S. with Cannabis Dependence and Depressive Disorder, for which S.S. was not taking her prescribed medications. Other than two parenting classes, S.S. did not attend mental health services or domestic violence counseling. While she attended a substance abuse needs assessment on April 26, 2013, she failed to follow up with outpatient substance abuse treatment. S.S. concedes her initial failure in complying with the case plan.
On January 30, 2014, the permanent goal for the boys was changed to adoption. On May 7, 2014, the children were removed from the home of S.S.'s mother after her boyfriend battered her. The children were placed into certified foster care. On May 16, 2014, DCFS learned that S.S. was pregnant with her third child, due in August of 2014.
Nevertheless, on July 30, 2014, DCFS filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights
On October 23, 2014, S.S. tested positive for Amphetamine and Methamphetamine. On November 13, 2014, a hair follicle tested positive for Amphetamine and Opiates; the confirmed drugs in her system were Amphetamine, Hydrocodone, Methamphetamine and Oxycodone. A follow-up drug screen on January 16, 2015, was positive for Amphetamine and Methamphetamine.
On June 4, 2015, the termination hearing began. The hearing was recessed until July 16, 2015, and completed on August 17, 2015. During these proceedings, Stephanie Marshall, a licensed professional counselor, testified. In February of 2015, she conducted a drug addiction assessment of S.S. and recommended outpatient day treatment which S.S. attended. Because of positive drug screen results, however, Marshall recommended intensive outpatient treatment for S.S. in April of 2015. S.S. was moved into another program with Eric Brown.
Brown testified that S.S.'s attendance in his program in April 2015 was "good." However, after three weeks, S.S. got a positive screen. Accordingly, Brown recommended inpatient treatment for S.S. on May 12, 2015. Brown testified that a Methamphetamine addiction can be very difficult to overcome "given its effect on the neurological system and the brain function." According to Brown, the goal of rehabilitation is to establish abstinence long enough to be successful, and ultimately total abstinence is desired. He explained that inpatient treatment programs last up to 24 days. Brown followed up on whether S.S. had entered inpatient treatment and learned that she had not. Although she had been cleared for admission, the facility was not able to reach S.S. Ultimately, although S.S. agreed to continue in Brown's program, she refused to go to what she called "rehab." Brown's last face-to-face contact with S.S. was on May 12, 2015.
S.S. testified that she was honest about her drug screens and admitted up front that she would fail her tests. She acknowledged her positive drug screens in early April and May of 2015, and admitted using "Meth" a "few weeks ago," after the May 6 positive drug screen. S.S. testified that she did not want to go to a recovery facility and stated that "just because you put me away for 21 days," does not mean "that I'm just gonna be cured for the rest of my life."
S.S. testified that she began to use Methamphetamine around Christmas of 2014, through the middle of May 2015. She denied using marijuana at the time of her testimony and had attended four "AA's since February" of 2015, even though it was recommended that she go more frequently. At the time of her testimony in June of 2015, S.S. was living with her boyfriend, who had gotten out of jail in March. She testified that from August 2014 until May 2015, she had established a residence. She was not employed but worked odd jobs and her mother helped to pay her bills. Her last court-ordered child support payment was in March of 2015. She was able to catch up her payment because of her income tax refund.
S.S. had attended two parenting classes, but conceded her lack of plan compliance in 2013. S.S. admitted her drug problem
S.S.'s foster care caseworker, Rosie Owens, testified regarding the requirements of S.S.'s case plan which was reviewed every six months. Owens stated that in May of 2015, she did not know where S.S. was living, although she had since found out that S.S. was living with her mother. S.S. had not maintained consistent employment and was unemployed from March through July 2015. S.S. had not made her child support payments in the two months before Owens' testimony. Before 2014, S.S. had visited with the children only two times, although from July 2014, S.S. had made her required visits.
Regarding drug use, Owens confirmed S.S.'s positive drug screens. When Owens spoke with S.S. about her Methamphetamine usage, she told Owens she "could stop and it wasn't something that she just had to have." By July of 2015, S.S. refused inpatient treatment. When the last drug screen on June 15, 2015, could not be run, S.S. refused to repeat the process.
In Owens' opinion, S.S. had not participated in substance abuse treatment, did not provide an adequate home for the boys or verify that she had income sufficient to take care of the children. Owens recommended that they be freed for adoption. At the time of Owens' testimony, the children were in a foster home since May of 2015. They were four and five years old. The foster parents desired to adopt them. Owens testified that the boys were separated for a while in late 2014. She stated that the children were doing well.
On cross-examination, Owens testified that S.S.'s present living arrangements were physically adequate. She stated that S.S. had consistently visited the boys since 2014 and had worked "off and on." Owens conceded that the boys love their mother and are bonded with her. According to Owens, the older child was concerned about moving again and sensed a need for stability. He was content with staying with his foster parents.
After the three court hearings in June, July and August of 2015, the trial judge received arguments of counsel and issued oral reasons for judgment as follows:
The court terminated the parental rights of S.S. and certified the boys for adoption. This appeal by S.S. followed.
In parental termination proceedings, courts must balance the two private interests of the child and the parents. A parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in establishing and maintaining a meaningful relationship with his or her children. The child has a profound interest, often at odds with those of his parents, in terminating parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing stable, long-term relationships found in a home with proper parental care. La. Ch.C. art. 1001; State in Interest of K.R.M., 47,018 (La.App.2d Cir. 1/25/12), 86 So.3d 51; State ex rel. J.T., 46,174 (La. App.2d Cir.3/02/11), 58 So.3d 1015. In balancing these interests, the courts of this state have consistently found the interest of the child to be paramount over that of the parent. State ex rel. G.J.L., 00-3278 (La. 6/29/01), 791 So.2d 80; State in Interest of K.R.M., supra; State ex rel. A.R.H. v. Hines, 35,800 (La.App.2d Cir. 2/27/02), 810 So.2d 1166. In all proceedings, when a ground justifying termination of parental rights is proven, the primary concern is to secure the best interest of the child. Id. The focus of an involuntary termination proceeding is not whether the parent should be deprived of custody, but whether it would be in the best interest of the child
The State has an obligation to make reasonable efforts to preserve and to unify the family. If such measures fail, the State is mandated to make reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or with a legal guardian. La. Ch.C. art. 682; State ex rel. A.T., 06-0501 (La.7/6/06), 936 So.2d 79; State In Interest of B.J., 48,857 (La.App.2d Cir. 1/15/14), 135 So.3d 777. Reasonable efforts are defined as the exercise of ordinary diligence and care by department caseworkers and supervisors and shall assume the availability of a reasonable program of services to children and their families. La. Ch.C. art. 603; State In Interest of B.J., supra.
Termination of parental rights is a severe and final action, so the state must satisfy an onerous burden of proof, establishing each element of a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. La. Ch.C. art. 1035(A); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); State in Interest of K.R.M., supra; State ex rel. C.M.M. v. T.P.M., 42,238 (La.App.2d Cir.5/9/07), 957 So.2d 330. Although La. Ch.C. art. 1015 provides several grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights, only one ground need be established. State ex rel. S.N.W. v. Mitchell, 01-2128 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 809; State in Interest of K.R.M., supra.
The grounds for termination of the parental rights in this case are contained in La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5) as follows:
The issue of parental compliance with a case plan, the parent's expected success of rehabilitation, and the expectation of significant improvement in the parent's condition and conduct are questions of fact in a proceeding for termination of parental rights. State in Interest of J.M.L., 47,201 (La.App.2d Cir. 4/11/12), 92 So.3d 447; State ex rel. C.M.M. v. T.P.M., supra.
La. Ch.C. art. 1036 states that lack of parental compliance with a case plan may be evidenced by the parent's failure to keep the department apprised of the parent's whereabouts and significant changes affecting the parent's ability to comply with the case plan for services, the parent's repeated failure to comply with the required program of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in the case plan, and the parent's lack of substantial improvement in redressing the problems preventing reunification.
Additionally, La. Ch.C. art. 1036 also provides that the issue of lack of any reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's conduct in the near future may be evidenced by any physical or mental illness, mental deficiency, substance abuse, or chemical dependency that renders the parent unable or incapable of exercising parental responsibilities without exposing the child to a substantial risk of serious harm, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.
Once a ground for termination has been established, the court may terminate
On appeal, S.S. argues that the trial court's determinations that DCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that she did not substantially comply with her case plan and that there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in her condition or conduct in the near future are manifestly erroneous and should be reversed. Specifically, S.S. contends that the evidence shows that she has substantially complied with her case plan and that the only thing she has failed to do is complete inpatient rehabilitation treatment for her admitted substance abuse. However, she argues that she has participated in two separate substance abuse treatment programs, attended AA and is now ready to enter inpatient treatment. S.S. also argues that she has demonstrated "significant, substantial indications of reformation," by fulfilling all but one of the requirements of her case plan. She requests 90 additional days to demonstrate that her substance abuse problems can be "put in remission."
Underlying the trial court's ruling is its determination of S.S.'s continued substance abuse and the circumstances indicating addiction surrounding her use of Methamphetamine that undermined the case plan and reunification. Moreover, the length of time between the children's removal in early 2013 and the trial court's judgment, while allowing for the possibility of S.S.'s treatment and correction of her drug problem, was well beyond the one year of La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5) and therefore had imposed a great detriment to the children's need for stability and a permanent home. We agree with the trial court's ruling as the record demonstrates no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in S.S.'s condition involving illicit drugs.
Accordingly, we find no manifest error regarding the facts underlying the trial court's judgment and adopt its reasoning for termination of the parent's rights.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of appeal are assessed to S.S.