TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI, District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Board of County Commissioners for Oklahoma County's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 4], filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover damages allegedly sustained as a result of his detention in the Oklahoma County jail.
"To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. The question to be decided is "whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed." Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted).
Plaintiff was confined in the Oklahoma County jail on July 13, 2013, and during his confinement, "Plaintiff repeatedly complained about swelling in his stomach and testicles related to a herniation." See Am. Pet. [Doc. No. 1-3], ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges that "[o]n multiple occasions, he petitioned for medical OR and was denied" and his "requests to be seen by another medical doctor were also denied." Id. ¶ 7. After Plaintiff was released, "doctors at St. Anthony's hospital discovered that it was his liver that was the cause of his problems," and on August 26, 2013, "St. Anthony's hospital drained approximately 3.5 liters of fluid from Plaintiff's stomach." Id. ¶¶ 9-10. Plaintiff does not state the date of his release from jail or the length of his confinement.
Tenth Circuit law is clear that a pretrial detainee is entitled under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "`to the degree of protection against denial of medical attention which applies to convicted inmates' under the Eighth Amendment." See Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1985)).
"The objective component of the test is met if the `harm suffered rises to a level "sufficiently serious" to be cognizable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause' of the Eighth Amendment." Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 752-53 (10th Cir. 2005)). "[I]t is the harm claimed by the prisoner that must be sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component, and not solely `the symptoms presented at the time the prison employee has contact with the prisoner.'" Id. (quoting Mata, 427 F.3d at 753). "A medical need is sufficiently serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted); see Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010).
Upon consideration of Plaintiff's pleading, the Court finds insufficient factual allegations to suggest that a serious medical need existed during Plaintiff's confinement in the Oklahoma County jail. The complaint does not identify a diagnosed medical need at the time of Plaintiff's detention that mandated treatment, or a medical need so obvious that a lay person would have recognized the necessity for a doctor's attention. Plaintiff simply alleges that he was subsequently diagnosed with a liver condition and he received medical treatment more than a month after his incarceration began.
To establish the subjective component, a plaintiff must show that prison officials "knew he faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk, by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089 (internal quotation omitted). To violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A plaintiff may establish "that a prison official subjectively knew of the substantial risk of harm by circumstantial evidence or `from the very fact that the risk was obvious.'" Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). "Unlike the objective component, the symptoms displayed by the prisoner are relevant to the subjective component of deliberate indifference. The question is: `were the symptoms such that a prison employee knew the risk to the prisoner and chose (recklessly) to disregard it?'" Id. (quoting Mata, 427 F.3d at 753).
Upon consideration of Plaintiff's pleading, the Court also finds insufficient factual allegations from which to infer that jail employees knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that he informed the jail staff of swelling in his stomach and testicles and his requests for medical services and a medical doctor's visit were denied. These alleged facts do not support a reasonable conclusion that jail employees from whom Plaintiff requested medical help knew he faced a substantial risk of harm or disregarded an obvious risk by failing to obtain medical care for his condition. Thus, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim that a constitutional violation occurred.
Assessing the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court finds that Plaintiff presents insufficient factual allegations to state a § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The Court also finds that Plaintiff need not be granted leave to further amend his pleading.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Board of County Commissioners for Oklahoma County's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 4]is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.