ROBERT C. MITCHELL, Magistrate Judge.
Presently before the Court for disposition are cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff's motion (ECF. No.11) will be denied, the defendant's motion (ECF. No.13) will be granted and the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
On July 28, 2014, Ingrid June Macklin, by her counsel, filed a complaint pursuant to Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for review of the Commissioner's final determination disallowing her claim for a period of disability or for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§416(i) and 423 and 1381 cf.
The plaintiff filed an application for disability and supplemental security income benefits on January 11, 2012 (R.126-136). Benefits were denied on March 21, 2012 (R.66-75). On April 9, 2012, the plaintiff requested a hearing (R.78-79), and pursuant to that request a hearing was conducted on June 19, 2013 (R.23-43). In a decision filed on September 11, 2013, an Administrative Law Judge denied benefits (R.12-22). On November 12, 2013, the plaintiff requested reconsideration of this determination (R.9-11), and upon reconsideration, and in a decision dated May 23, 2014, the Appeals Council affirmed the prior decision (R.1-3). The instant complaint was filed on July 28, 2014.
In reviewing an administrative determination of the Commissioner, the question before any court is whether there is substantial evidence in the agency record to support the findings of the Commissioner that the plaintiff failed to sustain his/her burden of demonstrating that he/she was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act..
It is provided in 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g) that:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Presently before the Court for resolution is a determination of whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner that the plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
At the hearing held on June 19, 2013 (R.23-43), the plaintiff appeared with counsel (R. 25), and testified that she was fifty-four years old (R.27); had earned a college degree (R.27); worked as a certified nursing assistant in December 2011 (R.28); that she cannot lift or transfer patients (R.29) and that she was then working ten hours a week at the rate of two hours a day (R.29).
The plaintiff also testified that she attended cardiac rehabilitation (R.30); that she has diabetes and as a result tires easily (R.30); that she experiences shortness of breath from exertion (R.32); that her feet become numb (R.35) that she takes medication for diabetes and neuropathy (R.31, 35) and that she can perform household chores for about thirty to forty-five minutes before resting (R.37).
At the hearing a vocational expert was called upon to testify (R.38-42). She described the plaintiff's prior work as unskilled to semi-skilled at the light to medium exertional levels (R.40). When the witness was asked to assume an individual of the plaintiff's age, education and prior work experience who could lift up to twenty pounds occasionally and frequently lift and carry ten pounds, who had to stand, walk or sit for up to six hours a day, the witness testified that she could no longer perform her past work but could engage in other employ which was plentiful in the national economy (R.40-41). Even if the individual could only stand or walk for about two hours a day, but could sit for about six hours, the witness testified that there were still jobs she could perform (R.41-42). However, the witness also testified that if the individual had to elevate her legs she could not be employed (R.42).
The issue before the Court is whether or not the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.
The term "disability" is defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 423(d) (1)(A) as:
For purposes of the foregoing, the requirements for a disability determination are provided in 42 U.S.C. Section 423(d)(2)(A):
A "physical or mental impairment" is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. Section 423(d)(3). These provisions are also applied for purposes of establishing a period of disability. 42 U.S.C. Section 416(i)(2)(A).
It is provided in 42 U.S.C. Section 1382c(a)(3) that:
It is also provided that:
42 U.S.C. Section 1382c(3)(F).
Pursuant to the authorization contained in 42 U.S.C. Section 1382c(3)(D), the Commissioner has promulgated certain regulations for the implementation of the Supplemental Security Income Program. While these statutory provisions have been regarded as "very harsh," nevertheless, they must be followed by the courts.
For this purpose, certain medical evidence was reviewed by the Commissioner.
The plaintiff was hospitalized at the Monongahela Valley Hospital from March 30, 2011 through March 31, 2011 for chest pain. No unusual findings were made and medication was prescribed (R.200-220).
The plaintiff was hospitalized at the Monongahela Valley Hospital from December 10, 2011 through December 16, 2011 for a myocardial infarction. She was treated with medication. Polysubstance abuse was also noted (R.221-277).
The plaintiff was treated at the Mon Valley Community Health Services between December 22, 2011 and February 14, 2012 for diabetes, coronary artery disease, cardiomyopathy and hypertension. Continued medication and smoking and cocaine use cessation were recommended (R.603-627).
The plaintiff was hospitalized at the Monongahela Valley Hospital from December 29, 2011 through January 1, 2012 for non-cardiac chest pain, acute kidney injury and hyponatremia. On discharge, a low fat diet as well as increased activity and discontinuance of smoking and cocaine use were recommended. Mediation was also prescribed (R.278-313).
The plaintiff was treated by Dr. Richard Seecof on January 10, 2012 and a diagnosis of coronary artery disease, hypertension, hyperlipidemia and diabetes was made. The doctor observed that the plaintiff continued to improve and was to continue on medication (R.314-328).
The plaintiff was treated by Dr. Alexander Tal from December 10, 2011 through January 20, 2012 for type I diabetes. Also diagnosed were hypertension, hyperlipidemia, coronary artery disease, cardiomyopathy and tobacco and alcohol abuse (R.329-360).
The plaintiff was treated for glaucoma on January 27, 2012 (R.361-365).
The plaintiff was treated between December 17, 2011 and February 14, 2012 by AMEDISYS Home Health for diabetes, uncontrolled hypertension, myocardial infarction, polysubstance abuse and arteriosclerotic heart disease. Medication was prescribed (R.366-602).
The plaintiff had a mammogram and colonoscopy performed between June 28, 2011 and March 6, 2012. The mammogram was interpreted as normal and two polyps were removed during the colonoscopy (R.628-659).
The plaintiff attended cardiac rehabilitation between February 20, 2012 and March 14, 2012 (R.660-674).
In a psychiatric review prepared on March 20, 2012, Michelle R. Santilli, Psy.D. concluded that no medically determinable impairment was established (R.675).
In a report of an evaluation on May 29, 2012, Dr. R.M.Seecof noted a 100% occlusion of the left anterior descending coronary artery. He further concluded that the plaintiff did not demonstrate an inability to perform on an exercise test, had no marked limitations of physical activities, did not require rest periods during the day, did not need to elevate her legs and could perform a normal day's work (R.741).
In a medical evaluation completed on June 14, 2012, Dr. Nathaniel E.B.Arcega observed that the plaintiff had done well in cardiac rehabilitation (R.676).
In a medical review analysis prepared on June 14, 2012, Dr. Christine Vu determined that the plaintiff was not medically disabled and could adjust to gainful employment (R.677).
The plaintiff was treated at the Glaucoma-Cataract Consultants between July 17, 2012 and August 29, 2012 (R.758-762).
In a residual physical capacity assessment completed on August 30, 2012 Dr. Abu Ali noted that she could occasionally lift up to twenty pounds, frequently left up to ten pounds and stand, walk or sit for about eight hours (R.678-680).
The plaintiff was treated at the Monongahela Valley Hospital emergency room on January 31, 2013 for a tooth ache and jaw pain (R.717-727).
The plaintiff was treated at Century Cardiac Care between January 10, 2012 and April 12, 2013 for coronary artery disease. Smoking cessation was again urged, and some of her medications were discontinued (R.742-756; 764-792).
The plaintiff was treated at the Mon Valley Community Health Services between May 7, 2012 and April 23, 2013 for hypertension which was medically treated and nicotine addiction (R.681-716).
In a statement dated April 23, 2013 Dr. Diane Fox noted that the plaintiff was taking medication for diabetes, coronary artery disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and glaucoma. It was also noted that the plaintiff experienced shortness of breath upon exertion (R.757).
The plaintiff had diabetic follow-up treatment at the Partners in Nephrology and Endocrinology between May 10, 2012 and May 10, 2013(R.728-740).
In a report dated May 10, 2013, Dr. Alexander Tal diagnosed Type II diabetes with insulin resistance, neuropathy and coronary artery disease with cardiomyopathy (R.763).
The relevant regulations require explicit findings concerning the various vocational factors which the Act requires to be considered in making findings of disability in some cases. These regulations, published at 20 C.F.R. §§404.1501, et seq., set forth an orderly and logical sequential process for evaluating all disability claims. In this sequence, the Administrative Law Judge must first decide whether the plaintiff is engaging in substantial gainful activity. If not, then the severity of the plaintiff's impairment must be considered. If the impairment is severe, then it must be determined whether he/she meets or equals the "Listings of Impairments" in Appendix 1 of the Regulations which the Commissioner has deemed of sufficient severity to establish disability. If the impairment does not meet or equal the Listings, then it must be ascertained whether he/she can do his/her past relevant work. If not, then the residual functional capacity of the plaintiff must be ascertained, considering all the medical evidence in the file. The finding of residual functional capacity is the key to the remainder of findings under the new regulations. If the plaintiff's impairment is exertional only, (i.e. one which limits the strength he/she can exert in engaging in work activity), and if his/her impairment enables him/her to do sustained work of a sedentary, light or medium nature, and the findings of age, education and work experience, made by the Administrative Law Judge coincide precisely with one of the rules set forth in Appendix 2 to the regulations, an appropriate finding is made. If the facts of the specific case do not coincide with the parameters of one of the rules, or if the plaintiff has mixed exertional and non-exertional impairments, then the rules in Appendix 2 are used as guidelines in assisting the Administrative Law Judge to properly weigh all relevant medical and vocational facts.
Based on the evidence presented, the Commissioner concluded:
The record demonstrates that the plaintiff suffers from coronary artery disease, congestive heart failure, diabetes and neuropathy. However, the medical reports which are supported demonstrate that these conditions are well controlled and do not cause any difficulties which would impede the plaintiff's ability to engage in substantial gainful employ. Where the evidence on residual capacity conflicted, the Administrative Law Judge explained that she rejected those submissions which were not supported, and placed little credibility in them. Since the Administrative Law Judge is charged with credibility determinations,
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no material issues of fact in dispute and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
AND NOW, this 6th day of April 2015, for the reasons set forth in the foregoing Memorandum,
IT IS ORDER that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF. No.11) is DENIED, the defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF. No.13) is GRANTED and the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.