Filed: Dec. 13, 2016
Latest Update: Dec. 13, 2016
Summary: OPINION AND ORDER JAMES P. JONES , District Judge . The defendant, Thomas Leroy Watson, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion for a judicial recommendation that he be placed in a halfway house for six months preceding the end of his prison sentence. For the following reasons, the motion will be denied. On February 19, 2016, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eighteen months for his conviction for willfully failing to collect or pay taxes, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7
Summary: OPINION AND ORDER JAMES P. JONES , District Judge . The defendant, Thomas Leroy Watson, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion for a judicial recommendation that he be placed in a halfway house for six months preceding the end of his prison sentence. For the following reasons, the motion will be denied. On February 19, 2016, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eighteen months for his conviction for willfully failing to collect or pay taxes, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 72..
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OPINION AND ORDER
JAMES P. JONES, District Judge.
The defendant, Thomas Leroy Watson, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion for a judicial recommendation that he be placed in a halfway house for six months preceding the end of his prison sentence. For the following reasons, the motion will be denied.
On February 19, 2016, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eighteen months for his conviction for willfully failing to collect or pay taxes, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202.
While I commend the defendant for his efforts to become a productive citizen upon his release from incarceration, this court is without authority to grant the defendant's motion. A district court's authority to amend a defendant's sentence is limited. A district court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed" unless the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") moves for a reduction, the Sentencing Commission amends the applicable guideline range, or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or another statute expressly permits the court to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also United States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 2010). None of these circumstances are present in the instant case.
Further, I decline to recommend that the BOP amend the manner in which the defendant serves his sentence. The BOP has exclusive statutory authority over a prisoner's place of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); see also United States v. Swisher, No. 3:11-CR-67, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40190, at *1 (N.D.W.Va. Mar. 22, 2013). While the Second Chance Act expands the BOP's authority to place prisoners in a halfway house, it does not vest that authority in this court. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1); see also United States v. Squire, No. 3:09-502-JFA, 2012 WL 3848364, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 5, 2012). The BOP has sole discretion in deciding whether to place a prisoner in a halfway house, and if so, for how long. See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 251 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the BOP must analyze the five factors in § 3621(b) and "that the BOP may assign a prisoner to [a halfway house] does not mean that it must").
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendant's motion (ECF No. 42) is DENIED.
