Case: 13-15465   Date Filed: 07/18/2014   Page: 1 of 3


                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]



             IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                     FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                       ________________________

                             No. 13-15465
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                       ________________________

                  D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-20678-KMM-1



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                               Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                   versus

ROBERT DAVIS,
a.k.a. Rob,

                                                          Defendant-Appellant.

                       ________________________

                Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Florida
                      ________________________

                              (July 18, 2014)

Before CARNES, Chief Judge, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
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      Robert Davis appeals his sentence of 535 months imprisonment. He asserts

that his prior conviction for fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer, in

violation of Florida Statute § 316.1935(2), is not a “crime of violence” under

United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.2(a). He contends that because that

prior conviction is not a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) the district

court erred in treating him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).

      We review de novo whether a prior conviction constitutes a “crime of

violence” under the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Cortes-Salazar, 

, 954 (11th Cir. 2012).

      Our recent decision in United States v. Smith forecloses Davis’ appeal. See

(11th Cir. 2014). In Smith we concluded that fleeing and eluding a

law enforcement officer under Florida Statute § 316.1935(2) is categorically a

“violent felony” under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We have “repeatedly read the definition

of a ‘violent felony’ under § 924(e) of the Armed Career Criminal Act as ‘virtually

identical’ to the definition of a ‘crime of violence’ under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.”

United States v. Archer, 

, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008); compare 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“violent felony” means any crime punishable by a year of

imprisonment, that involves “burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of


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physical injury to another”) with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (a “crime of violence”

includes a crime punishable by a year of imprisonment that includes “burglary of a

dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”).

Having already concluded that fleeing and eluding a law enforcement under

Florida Statute § 316.1935(2) is categorically a “violent felony” under the ACCA,

we also conclude that it is categorically a “crime of violence” under the virtually

identical definition found in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The district court correctly

found that Davis is a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).

      AFFIRMED.




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