Filed: May 13, 2013
Latest Update: May 13, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE SENTENCING ANTHONY ISHII, Senior District Judge. Defendant, JOSEPH NOLAN, by and through his attorney of record, Anthony P. Capozzi and the United States Attorney by and through Karen A. Escobar, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for sentencing on July 8, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the sentencing until July 29, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. and to exclude time between July 8, 2013,
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE SENTENCING ANTHONY ISHII, Senior District Judge. Defendant, JOSEPH NOLAN, by and through his attorney of record, Anthony P. Capozzi and the United States Attorney by and through Karen A. Escobar, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for sentencing on July 8, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the sentencing until July 29, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. and to exclude time between July 8, 2013, ..
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STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE SENTENCING
ANTHONY ISHII, Senior District Judge.
Defendant, JOSEPH NOLAN, by and through his attorney of record, Anthony P. Capozzi and the United States Attorney by and through Karen A. Escobar, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for sentencing on July 8, 2013, at 10:00 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the sentencing until July 29, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. and to exclude time between July 8, 2013, and July 29, 2013, under 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Due to a previously scheduled vacation Defendant is unavailable on Monday, July 8, 2013.
b. The government does not object to the continuance.
c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 8, 2013, to July 29, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
ORDER
For reasons set forth above, the continuance requested by the parties is granted for good cause and time is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act from July 8, 2013, to, and including, July 29, 2013, based upon the Court's finding that the ends of justice outweigh the public's and defendant's interest in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A).
IT IS ORDERED that the Sentencing currently scheduled for July 8, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. is continued to July 29, 2013, at 10:00 a.m.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
