Filed: Jul. 18, 2017
Latest Update: Jul. 18, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties hereto through their respective counsel, Andre Espinosa, Assistant United States Attorney, attorney for Plaintiff, and Steven B. Plesser, attorney for defendant Sysengrat, that the status conference currently set for July 20, 2017 should be continued until August 31, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between July
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties hereto through their respective counsel, Andre Espinosa, Assistant United States Attorney, attorney for Plaintiff, and Steven B. Plesser, attorney for defendant Sysengrat, that the status conference currently set for July 20, 2017 should be continued until August 31, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between July 2..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties hereto through their respective counsel, Andre Espinosa, Assistant United States Attorney, attorney for Plaintiff, and Steven B. Plesser, attorney for defendant Sysengrat, that the status conference currently set for July 20, 2017 should be continued until August 31, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between July 20, 2017 and August 31, 2017, under Local Code T4.
The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
1. The government is working diligently to provide discovery associated with this case, which is voluminous, to defense counsel and needs additional time to do so;
2. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to obtain and review the discovery in this matter, to consult with client and conduct any necessary investigation and research related to the charges, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
3. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
4. The government joins in the request for the continuance.
5. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
6. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 20, 2017 to August 31, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv)[Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at counsel's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action
7. outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
8. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
