POLSTON, J.
Appellants (collectively referred to as the State) argue that the trial court erred by ruling that statutes directing portions of civil filing fees to the general revenue fund are unconstitutional.
On June 3, 2010, the trial court granted summary judgment and declared unconstitutional sections of the Florida Statutes that direct portions of civil action filing fees to the general revenue fund. Specifically, the trial court ruled that provisions of sections 28.24(1)(a), 28.241(a)(2)(d), 28.241(2), 34.041(1)(b), and 28.2455, Florida Statutes (2009), are unconstitutional and void.
The trial court concluded that, through these statutes, the Legislature has imposed an unconstitutional tax because litigants' filing fees are sent to the general revenue fund to be spent on unrelated
The trial court ruled that statutes directing portions of civil filing fees to the general revenue fund are an unconstitutional tax denying access to courts. The Appellees argue that the trial court's ruling is correct because the statutes are unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The State asserts that the statutes are facially constitutional because there is a set of circumstances whereby the statutes can be constitutional, namely if the Legislature appropriates more to the costs of the administration of justice than the amount of civil filing fees deposited into the general revenue fund. Moreover, the State argues that the statutes are constitutional as applied because the Legislature has in fact appropriated more to support the administration of justice than the amount of fees deposited into the general revenue fund. We agree with the State. Directing a portion of the filing fees to the general revenue fund for further appropriation is an accounting mechanism reasonably related to the governmental purpose of funding the administration of justice. See Lane v. Chiles, 698 So.2d 260, 262 (Fla.1997) ("Generally, a state statute must be upheld if it meets the rational relationship test; that is, if there is any reasonable relationship between the act and the furtherance of a valid governmental objective." (quoting trial court's order)).
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. See City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So.2d 143, 146 (Fla.2002). "While we review decisions striking state statutes de novo, we are obligated to accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and to construe challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome whenever possible." Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla.2005) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So.2d 640, 642 (Fla.2005)). Further, "in a facial constitutional challenge, we determine only whether there is any set of circumstances under which the challenged enactment might be upheld." Id. at 265. "If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court's power of inquiry ends." State v. Bales, 343 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla.1977).
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution provides that "[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." The statutory provisions at issue transfer a portion
In State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1994) (citing City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25 (Fla.1992)), this Court defined a tax as "an enforced burden imposed by sovereign right for the support of the government, the administration of law, and the exercise of various functions the sovereign is called on to perform." In contrast, we defined user fees as "charges based upon the proprietary right of the governing body permitting the use of the instrumentality involved. Such fees share common traits that distinguish them from taxes:"
Port Orange, 650 So.2d at 3 (citations omitted).
In Flood, we addressed whether a statute establishing a docket fee to be used for a law library and other general county purposes was an invalid tax on litigants. The statute provided that each plaintiff in a circuit court had to pay a docket fee of $10, which was to be deposited into a special fund for establishing and maintaining a law library in the county. Flood, 117 So. at 386. The statute also provided that "any balance remaining thereafter [was] to be used and applied as said board [of county commissioners] may from time to time deem best for general county purposes." Id. (quoting ch. 12004, Laws of Fla. (1927)). We concluded that the fee was a tax repugnant to the right of access to courts contained in Florida's Constitution, reasoning as follows:
Id. at 387.
Thereafter, in Farabee, we addressed a challenge to a statute allocating a portion of a new $10 filing fee to the Lee County Law Library. "Under the statutory formula the Law Library received $3.00 plus 20% of $10.00 or a total allocation of $5.00 out of each filing fee paid to the Clerk." Farabee, 254 So.2d at 3. This Court in Farabee rejected the Clerk's argument, which was based upon Flood, that the portion of the filing fee payable to the law library was an unconstitutional tax on litigants. Id. at 5. We concluded that the law library was "essential to the administration
Id. This Court in Farabee also receded from its prior language in Flood that may have indicated that a law library was not essential to the justice system. Id.
Based upon our decisions in Flood and Farabee, a statutory filing fee is not considered an unconstitutional tax repugnant to court access if the fee is used to fund the costs of the administration of justice. There is no requirement in the Florida Constitution that the very money paid for filing fees be used to fund the administration of justice. Money is fungible. See generally 53A Am.Jur.2d Money § 18 (2006) ("Money is in its nature severable; one coin or note has the same essential qualities and value possessed by any other of like denomination. In other words, money is fungible or interchangeable.") (footnotes omitted); Williams Mgmt. Enters., Inc. v. Buonauro, 489 So.2d 160, 164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) ("[A]s Blackstone noted, normally money is fungible property, like grain, cotton, etc., which, if commingled with other similar money, is incapable of specific identification...."). Once the filing fees are commingled with other state money in the general revenue fund, the filing fees lose their separate character and become interchangeable with the other state money. Therefore, the Legislature would be using the filing fees to fund the administration of justice if it funds the justice system at a level at least equal to the amount of filing fees that is commingled with other state money in the general revenue fund.
Accordingly, the statutes, on their face, do not constitute an unconstitutional tax. See City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d at 256 (explaining that a statute is only facially unconstitutional if "no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid").
The only portion of Appellees' challenge that could be considered an as-applied challenge relates to the trial court's finding that the Legislature in 2008 appropriated over $50 million of the amount generated from the increased civil filing fees to the Department of Corrections for prison operations. However, because the Legislature appropriated more to support the administration of justice than the amount of civil fees deposited into the general revenue fund, the filing fee statutes were applied in a constitutional manner.
According to the trial court's order, the total cumulative filing fees deposited into the general revenue fund for fiscal year 2008-2009 was $186,961,960.23. In contrast, the Legislature appropriated over $1 billion to support the judicial branch and justice administration for fiscal year 2008-2009. Ch. 2008-152, § 4 (justice administration appropriations), § 7 (judicial branch appropriations), Laws of Fla.; Ch. 2009-1, § 4, § 7 (reductions in 2008-2009
The Alabama Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Fox v. Hunt, 619 So.2d 1364 (Ala.1993). Based upon the Texas Supreme Court decision in LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.1986), the plaintiff in Fox argued that a statutory jury fee was actually an unconstitutional tax on the right to a jury trial because a portion of the fee was paid into Alabama's general fund. Fox, 619 So.2d at 1366. However, the Alabama court noted that in 1989-90 the State of Alabama spent over $59 million more on its judicial system than the amount collected from the jury fees. Id. at 1367. As a result, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the jury fee did not constitute an unconstitutional tax, reasoning as follows:
Id.
In LeCroy, the Texas Supreme Court held that a statute, which directed a portion of filing fees to go to state general revenues, was an unconstitutional tax on the right of access. Because a portion of the filing fees was allocated to Texas' general revenue fund, the Texas court concluded that "the money goes to other statewide programs besides the judiciary." 713 S.W.2d at 341. The Texas Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
Id. at 341 n. 9. However, as the dissent in LeCroy pointed out, this logic is quite flawed:
Id. at 345-46 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Like the Alabama Supreme Court, we decline to adopt the contrary reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court in LeCroy. See Fox, 619 So.2d at 1366-67.
The trial court ruled that the filing fee statutes "also deny the citizens of this state the right to have their courts adequately funded in violation of article V, section 14, and the due process, equal protection, [and] right to jury trial guarantees... accorded under the Florida Constitution." The filing fee statutes at issue are not contrary to article V, section 14 of the Florida Constitution.
Section 14 details the following funding requirements for Florida's justice system:
The trial court's ruling that the statutes violated the due process, equal protection, and right to jury trial provisions of the Florida Constitution appears to be premised upon a determination that Florida's courts are inadequately funded. But because the trial court's order does not include any reasoning or additional findings of fact supporting its conclusion, we agree with the State that there is not competent substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's determination that Florida courts are unconstitutionally underfunded. The trial judge simply took judicial notice of underfunding based upon the fact that he had recently received a two-percent reduction in his salary. But this is not evidence that the judicial branch is unconstitutionally underfunded. And while this Court has stated that Florida's court system is operationally underfunded, see e.g., In re Certification of Need for Additional Judges, 29 So.3d 1110 (Fla. 2010), we have not determined that the judiciary is underfunded to the point of it being a violation of the constitution. Moreover, we agree with the State that the trial court's ruling on this claim is based upon the Appellees' erroneous position that the cause of underfunding is the existence of the challenged statutes rather than specific appropriations decisions.
The filing fee statutes, on their face, do not constitute an unconstitutional tax because the Legislature may appropriate more to the administration of justice than the amount of civil fees deposited into the general revenue fund, and because the Legislature has in fact done so, the statutes are not unconstitutional as applied. The statutes do not conflict with section 14 of article V of the Florida Constitution, and the record in this case does not otherwise support the trial court's ruling that the courts are unconstitutionally underfunded. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court, lift the injunction, and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.