CHARLES R. SIMPSON, III, Senior District Judge.
This case is before the Court on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. DN 56. Plaintiff responded (DN 63) and Defendants replied (DN 68). Therefore, this matter is ripe for review. Finding that Plaintiff's claims fail on the merits, the Court will grant the motion for summary judgment on all claims remaining in the complaint.
At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff Jesse L. Martin was a pretrial detainee at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections ("LMDC") in Jefferson County, Kentucky. He claims that he was not provided proper medical treatment by Defendants—Dr. Kevin Smith and Nurse Brenda Junk
In response, Defendants have produced Martin's medical records. See DN 54 (sealed). The Defendants summarize the pertinent medical entries chronologically. DN 56 at 3-6. Martin does not object to the accuracy of this recitation or the records themselves. Having reviewed Martin's entire medical record, the Court adopts the Defendants' recitation (with minor edits for clarity) as representing the undisputed history of Martin's medical treatment while at LMDC:
DN 56 at 3-6 (summarizing Martin's pertinent medical history).
On initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court dismissed all claims except "(1) the Fourteenth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendants Dr. Smith in his individual and official capacities and against Defendant Junk in her official capacity; and (2) the state-law negligence claim against Defendant Dr. Smith." DN 9 at 3-4. Defendants move for summary judgment on those claims.
A party moving for summary judgment must show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists when "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. In undertaking this analysis, the Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the nonexistence of any issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). They can meet this burden by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the . . . presence of a genuine dispute." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1). This burden can also be met by demonstrating that the nonmoving party "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment argues that Martin's claims should be dismissed because Martin failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing his § 1983 claim and that the claims fail on the merits. The Court addresses each in turn, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Martin exhausted his administrative remedies but, regardless, that Martin's claims fail on the merits and summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires that prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement exhaust available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion under the PLRA requires "proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which `means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits.)'" Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (citing Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis in original). "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Id. at 90-91.
Defendants assert that "[i]t is the plaintiff's burden to prove exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to each claim
While proving a negative certainly gives pause, it is important to remember the relative positions of the parties in these cases. As the Third Circuit has recognized, "it appears that it is considerably easier for a prison administrator to show a failure to exhaust than it is for a prisoner to demonstrate exhaustion." Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3rd Cir. 2002) (cited with approval in Jones). These officials "are likely to have greater legal expertise and, as important, superior access to prison administrative records in comparison to prisoners." Id. (citation omitted). Further, "[p]rison officials and their attorneys can also readily provide the court with clear, typed explanations, including photocopies of relevant administrative regulations." Id. "Pro se prisoners will often lack even such rudimentary resources." Id.
Defendants consistently argue that Martin did not produce evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies. See DN 56 at 8 ("[t]here is no evidence that Plaintiff ever grieved [the inadequate medical treatment] issue as it relates to Dr. Smith or that the issue was exhausted."); Id. ("Plaintiff submitted no evidence that this issue was grieved as against Nurse Junk or CCS or that it was exhausted per the requirements of the PLRA."). That burden is not his. Rather, it is Defendants who have submitted no evidence to carry their burden. Though not required of him, Martin produced some documents in response indicating he at least attempted to grieve some issues. DN 62-1 at 2-6. At a minimum, a genuine issue of material fact regarding exhaustion exists and summary judgment is improper on that ground.
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids prison officials from "unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain" on a pretrial detainee. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (protections extended to pretrial detainees via Fourteenth Amendment). An official violates this command when they act with "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" of an inmate or detainee. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. As a result, there is an objective component and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
The objective component requires the existence of a "sufficiently serious" medical need. Id.; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. A serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 897 (6th Cir. 2004).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" in denying medical care. Farmer 511 U.S. at 834. "In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of `deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." Id. Deliberate indifference "entails something more than mere negligence," but can be "satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result." Id. at 835. "To satisfy the subjective component, the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk." Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
"Where a prisoner alleges only that the medical care he received was inadequate, `federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments.'" Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976)). Courts will generally only venture there where the medical treatment is "so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all." Id. (quoting Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860 n.5). Where the complaint is of a delay in treatment, rather than complete denial, the detainee "must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment to succeed." Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898 (quoting Napier v. Madison Cty, Ky., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Martin's records indicate that he was seen extensively by healthcare staff during his detention at LMDC. After every Healthcare Request form Martin submitted, he was evaluated by a healthcare professional, often receiving additional follow-up evaluations.
When a § 1983 complaint names employees of a private corporation in their official capacity, the claim is one against the private corporation employer. Griffin v. S. Health Partners, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-P174-M, 2013 WL 530841, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 11, 2013). "[A] private entity which contracts with the state to perform a traditional state function such as providing medical services to prison inmates may be sued under § 1983 as one acting `under color of state law.'" Id. (quoting Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993) (additional citation omitted)). However, "[a] private corporation, . . . `is not liable under § 1983 for torts committed by its employees when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.'" Id. (quoting Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 728 (4th Cir. 1999)). "Rather, a private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights." Id. (citing Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 817-18 (6th Cir. 1996)).
In this case, Martin has failed to plead, argue, or produce any evidence that he was subject to a deprivation of federal rights pursuant to an official policy or custom of CCS. As already discussed, every indication is that Martin received adequate medical treatment. Even assuming arguendo some violation by Smith or Junk, Martin has adduced nothing regarding any policy or custom of CCS which contributed to a violation.
"A plaintiff bringing a medical negligence claim in Kentucky must establish three elements: breach, causation, and injury." Andrew v. Begley, 203 S.W.3d 165, 170 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006). Assuming injury arguendo, Martin's claim fails on the other two prongs. As to breach, for the same reason discussed above, the Court is of the opinion that no reasonable juror could conclude that Smith breached any duty he had toward Martin. Martin was given adequate, prompt, and continuous medical treatment.
Further, Martin cannot prove causation. In this sort of medical negligence case, a plaintiff is required to produce an expert to testify regarding causation "because the nature of the inquiry is such that jurors are not competent to draw their own conclusions from the evidence without the aid of such expert testimony." Baylis v. Lourdes Hosp., Inc., 805 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ky. 1991).
Our Constitution prohibits prison officials from unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain on inmates and pretrial detainees by acting with deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. No reasonable juror could conclude that Dr. Smith and Nurse Junk did so in this case. Instead, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Martin received adequate, prompt, and continuous medical treatment. As a result, Smith and Junk are entitled to summary judgment, which the Court will grant.
A separate order will be entered in accordance with this opinion.