CHUTICH, Judge.
Appellant Founders Insurance Company challenges the district court's confirmation of a no-fault arbitration award, contending that, because Founders is not licensed to write motor-vehicle insurance in this state, it is not obligated under Minnesota Statutes section 65B.50 to provide basic economic-loss benefits to its insured. Because we conclude that subdivision 2 of this section applies only to insurers that are, consistent with subdivision 1, licensed to write motor-vehicle insurance in Minnesota, we reverse.
Shortly after moving to Minnesota from Illinois in late 2013, and while driving on a snowy Minnesota highway, respondent James Yates's car collided with a car that had lost control on an exit ramp. At the time of the accident, Yates's car was insured under a Founders policy issued to him as an Illinois resident. The parties agree that Founders is an Illinois company that does not write or issue motor-vehicle insurance in Minnesota and that Yates did not notify Founders of his move to Minnesota. They further agree that Founders is licensed to write dramshop-liability insurance in this state and has done so since 2005.
After the accident, Yates sought Minnesota no-fault benefits from Founders for over $17,000 in chiropractic expenses. Yates's policy, written and issued in compliance with the laws of the State of Illinois, caps medical-payments coverage at $1,000. Basic economic-loss benefits under our no-fault act have no counterpart under Illinois law.
Founders denied the no-fault claim. Yates then filed a petition for no-fault arbitration, to which Founders objected. Founders brought a declaratory-judgment action in Minnesota district court, seeking a ruling that it has no duty to provide basic economic-loss benefits under Minnesota's no-fault act. The arbitrator then held a hearing, at which Founders reiterated its legal objection and no one testified. The case was submitted on the record, and the arbitrator awarded Yates $17,207 in chiropractic expenses, $1,004.75 in medical-travel expenses, and $916.92 in interest.
Yates moved the district court to confirm the arbitration award, and Founders moved to vacate it. After a hearing on the motions, the district court determined that Founders was licensed to write and issue motor-vehicle insurance in this state and was therefore required by Minnesota Statutes section 65B.50, subdivision 1, to provide basic economic-loss benefits to its insured. The district court denied the motion to vacate and granted the motion to
Does Minnesota Statutes section 65B.50 require an out-of-state insurer that is not licensed to write motor-vehicle-accident reparation and liability insurance in Minnesota, to provide basic economic-loss benefits to its insured who was injured in a motor-vehicle accident in Minnesota?
"Generally, the extent of an insurer's liability is determined by its insurance contract with its insured." Hanbury v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 865 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn.App.2015), review denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 2015). But if the terms of an insurance policy conflict with or omit coverage required by the no-fault act, those policy terms will be held invalid. Kwong v. Depositors Ins. Co., 627 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn.2001). The parties agree that the policy as written does not provide the coverage that Yates seeks. We therefore turn to the statutory language to determine whether the policy must be reformed.
The goal of statutory interpretation is to "ascertain and to effectuate the intention of the legislature." Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn.2010) (quoting Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2008)). "If the legislature's intent is clear from the unambiguous language of a statute, we apply the statute according to its plain meaning." Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 853 N.W.2d 713, 716-17 (Minn.2014). But if a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the statute is ambiguous and courts may consider other factors to ascertain the legislature's intent. Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Minn.2006). "[J]udicial construction of a statute becomes part of the statute as though written therein." Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn.2012).
Minnesota Statutes section 65B.50 provides
(emphases added). We first consider whether Founders must provide no-fault benefits under subdivision 1.
The district court concluded that Founders is licensed to write motor-vehicle-accident reparation and liability insurance in this state because it is licensed to write dramshop-liability insurance and that, under the plain language of section 65B.50, subdivision 1, it is therefore obligated to provide no-fault benefits to
Under Minnesota Statutes section 60A.07, subdivision 4 (2014), no insurance company shall transact the business of insurance in this state unless it holds a "license therefor" from the commissioner. See also Minn.Stat. § 60A.19, subd. 1(4) ("[An out-of-state insurer] shall . . . obtain from the commissioner a license to transact business."). And Minnesota Statutes section 60A.07, subdivision 5c (2014), provides for specific circumstances under which an insurance company may be authorized to transact business in combinations of the insurance lines defined in section 60A.06, subdivision 1.
We conclude that Founders's license to write dramshop-liability insurance in this state does not authorize Founders, without further licensing, to write motor-vehicle insurance in Minnesota. The record does not otherwise support a conclusion that Founders is licensed to write motor-vehicle insurance in Minnesota. Accordingly, section 65B.50, subdivision 1, does not obligate Founders to provide basic economic-loss benefits to Yates.
The district court did not consider whether Minnesota Statutes section 65B.50, subdivision 2, compels Founders to provide basic economic-loss benefits to Yates. But Yates argues that the plain language of subdivision 2 requires Founders to do so, regardless of licensure. Reading subdivision 2 in isolation, this argument has some appeal. A close analysis of section 65B.50 as a whole, and authorities interpreting it shows, however, that subdivision 2 applies only to insurers licensed to write motor-vehicle insurance in Minnesota.
Subdivision 2 states, "every contract of liability insurance for injury, wherever issued, covering obligations arising from ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle . . . includes basic economic loss benefit coverages and residual liability coverages required by [the no-fault act], while the vehicle is in this state." Minn.Stat. § 65B.50, subd. 2. At first glance, the broad phrasing of subdivision 2 suggests that any motor-vehicle insurance policy issued anywhere by any insurer includes no-fault coverage while the insured vehicle is in Minnesota.
Three decisions of this court have considered the breadth of subdivision 2 and have arrived at different conclusions; as discussed below, however, only one of these decisions is binding authority. In Aguilar v. Texas Farmers Insurance Company, 504 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn.App. 1993), our court interpreted subdivision 2 broadly, stating that it "covers all insurers whose insureds are involved in accidents in Minnesota." It noted that subdivision 2 "requires . . . basic economic loss coverage and residual liability coverage in a policy written by an insurer that is not licensed to do business in Minnesota." Id.
This interpretation of subdivision 2 is consistent with no-fault act provisions that express the statute's guiding principles. "If the accident causing injury occurs in this state, every person suffering loss from injury arising out of maintenance or use of a motor vehicle . . . has a right to basic economic loss benefits." Minn.Stat. § 65B.46, subd. 1. It is also consistent with the stated purposes of the no-fault act, which include "to relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims of automobile accidents within this state," and "to encourage appropriate medical and rehabilitation treatment of the automobile accident victim" by ensuring "prompt payment" of benefits for basic economic loss. Minn.Stat. § 65B.42 (1), (3).
Although the reasoning of Aguilar is sound, its interpretation of subdivision 2 is not binding because it exceeded the holding of the case. In Aguilar, we were asked to resolve an out-of-state insurer's obligations under the no-fault act regarding "add on" underinsured-motorist benefits, not basic economic-loss benefits or residual-liability coverages. Aguilar, 504 N.W.2d at 793. Because subdivision 2 does not apply to underinsured-motorist coverage, we concluded that the claimant was not entitled to the benefits he sought. Id. at 794. We were not asked to resolve the issue presented here: whether an insurer that is not licensed to write motor-vehicle coverage in Minnesota is obligated to provide economic-loss benefits to an insured injured in Minnesota. Accordingly, our interpretation of subdivision 2 in Aguilar is nonbinding dicta. "Regardless of the wording in a judicial opinion . . . a court's expressions that go beyond the facts before the court are dicta and are . . . not binding in subsequent cases." Dahlin v. Kroening, 784 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Minn. App.2010) (quotation omitted), aff'd, 796 N.W.2d 503 (Minn.2011).
After Aguilar, and contrary to its discussion of the breadth of subdivision 2, we observed—again in dicta—that insurers that are not licensed in Minnesota are not bound by the requirements of subdivision 2. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 645 N.W.2d 169, 175 n. 2 (Minn.App.2002) (noting that a Tennessee insurer that is not licensed to
One other case interpreted subdivision 2, and, after careful review of the relevant cases, we conclude that this case is controlling. See Burgie v. League Gen. Ins. Co., 355 N.W.2d 466 (Minn.App.1984), review denied (Minn. Feb. 16, 1985). The holding of Burgie relates to uninsured-motorist coverage under the terms of a policy but depends on whether Minnesota Statutes section 65B.50, subdivision 2, applies to insurers that are not licensed to write motor-vehicle insurance in Minnesota. Id. at 470. Because the interpretation of subdivision 2 was necessary to Burgie's holding, its interpretation governs here.
In Burgie, we held that subdivision 2 applies to the same insurers that are subject to the requirements of subdivision 1. Id. We reasoned that subdivisions 1 and 2 "must be read as a whole and not treated independently of each other." Id. We concluded that "[t]he two [subdivisions] can be harmonized to apply the limitation to insurers licensed in Minnesota to the entire section." Id. Under this construction, insurers that are licensed to write motor-vehicle insurance in this state must confer the full benefits of the no-fault act on Minnesota policyholders but need only provide basic economic-loss and residual-liability coverages for nonresident policyholders when they are injured in an accident in Minnesota. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.50.
Reading Minnesota Statutes section 65B.50 as a whole is consistent with general principles of statutory construction and caselaw addressing construction of the no-fault act. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Great W. Cas. Co., 623 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Minn.2001) ("[P]rovisions of the No-Fault Act should not be construed in isolation from related sections of the Act."); see also Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.2000) (construing Minnesota Statutes section 65B.491 (1998), in conjunction with Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49 (1998), to avoid conflicting interpretations).
The Burgie interpretation of subdivision 2 is also consistent with the principles underlying policy reformation. An insurer's obligation to reform policies to meet the requirements of the no-fault act "arises from the duties imposed upon it for the privilege of doing business in Minnesota." Petty, 290 N.W.2d at 766. Requiring insurers that benefit from writing Minnesota motor-vehicle policies to conform to Minnesota's no-fault act aligns the obligation with the privilege of licensure.
Relying on the supreme court's decision in Petty, Yates contends that reading subdivisions 1 and 2 together is improper. We disagree. A careful reading of Petty shows that the "two portions of [subdivision 1]," not the two subdivisions of section 65B.50, are to be read independently. Id.
Yates also urges us to conclude that, because many cases discussing the reach of the no-fault act simply note that an insurer is "licensed to do business" in Minnesota, licensure to transact any insurance business in the state brings an insurer within the purview of subdivision 2. This argument is not grounded in statutory construction and is unavailing. An equally reasonable inference is that each of the insurers identified as "licensed to do business" in Minnesota was in fact licensed to write motor-vehicle insurance in this state.
In Petty, for example, the insurer "acknowledged its obligation" to provide basic economic-loss benefits to its nonresident
In sum, Minnesota Statutes section 65B.50, subdivision 2, read in isolation, could be interpreted as applying to all insurers regardless of licensure, and the result would be consistent with the purposes of the no-fault act. But we are bound by our decision in Burgie, which construed Minnesota Statutes section 65B.50, subdivision 2, to apply to the same insurers that are subject to subdivision 1: insurers that are "licensed to write motor vehicle accident reparation and liability insurance in this state." We presume "the legislature acts with full knowledge" of existing judicial interpretations of statutes, Rockford Twp. v. City of Rockford, 608 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Minn.App.2000), and the legislature has not amended Minnesota Statutes section 65B.50 since this court decided Burgie. This interpretation is supported by the language of the statute, principles of statutory construction, and the principles underlying policy reformation. The district court therefore erred in denying the motion to vacate the arbitration award and in confirming the award.
The arbitrator exceeded his authority in awarding basic economic-loss benefits under Minnesota Statutes section 65B.50 when the insurer is not licensed to write motor-vehicle-accident reparation and liability insurance in this state. The district court's denial of the motion to vacate the arbitrator's decision is, therefore, reversed.