U.S. v. MOHAMAD, 8:14CR105. (2014)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20140917e14
Visitors: 11
Filed: Sep. 16, 2014
Latest Update: Sep. 16, 2014
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the Joint Motion to Continue Jury Trial [29] as both counsel need additional time to conduct plea negotiations and resolve the case prior to trial. The defendant has complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Motion to Continue Jury Trial [29] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for September 30, 2014 is continued to December 9, 2014. 2. In accordance with 18
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the Joint Motion to Continue Jury Trial [29] as both counsel need additional time to conduct plea negotiations and resolve the case prior to trial. The defendant has complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Motion to Continue Jury Trial [29] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for September 30, 2014 is continued to December 9, 2014. 2. In accordance with 18 ..
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ORDER
F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on the Joint Motion to Continue Jury Trial [29] as both counsel need additional time to conduct plea negotiations and resolve the case prior to trial. The defendant has complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Motion to Continue Jury Trial [29] is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for September 30, 2014 is continued to December 9, 2014.
2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and December 9, 2014, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
