PAMELA K. CHEN, District Judge.
On September 20, 2019, Defendants Keystone Freight Corp., Keystone Freight Corporation, National Retail Systems, Inc., Keystone Freight (NY), and Tammany Heyes filed a Notice of Removal ("Notice") removing this action from the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Queens County to this Court. (Dkt. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, this case is sua sponte remanded to the state court.
Plaintiff Simone Anderson alleges that on September 27, 2018 she was injured when the motor vehicle she was driving was struck by a motor vehicle owned by Keystone Freight Corp., Keystone Freight (NY), and National Retail Systems, Inc., and operated by Heyes in the course of his employment by Keystone Freight Corp. (See generally Complaint, Dkt. 1-2.) Plaintiff's complaint demands "judgment against the defendant[s] in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the lower Courts" (id. at 14), but does not specify any specific damages amount.
In removing this matter, Defendants invoke diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. (Notice, Dkt. 1, ¶ 8.) The Notice alleges that Plaintiff is a citizen of New York, Defendant Keystone Freight is a citizen of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Defendant National Retail Systems, Inc. is a citizen of Delaware and New Jersey, and Defendant Heyes is a citizen of North Carolina. (Id. ¶¶ 5-7.)
As a threshold matter, the Court first must address whether it may remand this case to the state court sua sponte, absent a motion from Plaintiff. The relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), states in pertinent part:
Id. The Second Circuit has construed this statute as authorizing a district court, at any time, to remand a case sua sponte upon a finding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Mitskovski v. Buffalo & Fort Erie Pub. Bridge Auth., 435 F.3d 127, 131, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)).
Here, as in all cases removed to the federal courts, the removing party has the burden of establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1994). "[I]f the jurisdictional amount is not clearly alleged in the plaintiff's complaint, and the defendant's notice of removal fails to allege facts adequate to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount, federal courts lack diversity jurisdiction as a basis for removing the plaintiff's action from state court." Id. The Second Circuit has cautioned district courts to "construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability." In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06-MD-1789 (JFK), 2013 WL 603187, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2013) (citing Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enters., Inc., 932 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (2d Cir. 1991)).
In this case, Defendants fail to meet their burden to show that the $75,000 jurisdictional amount required for diversity jurisdiction has been satisfied, as they assert only that "[t]he amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000" (Notice, Dkt. 1, ¶ 8) without providing any factual allegations to support this conclusion. Furthermore, here, "Defendant[s] cannot meet [their] burden by relying on inferences drawn from [Plaintiff's complaint], because the [c]omplaint does not allege a damages amount." Herrera v. Terner, No. 16-CV-4610 (DLI) (JO), 2016 WL 4536871, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2016). Plaintiff only alleges that she was damaged "in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the lower Courts." (Complaint, Dkt. 1-2, at 14.) This mention of the "lower Courts" is a reference to the lower civil courts of New York, which may not entertain actions seeking to recover more than $25,000, and not a reference to the federal district courts. See Woodley v. Mass. Mut., No. 08-CV-949 (NRB), 2008 WL 2191767, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2008) (remanding case for failure to satisfy jurisdictional amount where defendants relied solely on ad damnum clause in complaint stating that plaintiff was seeking damages in excess of the "monetary jurisdiction of all lower [c]ourts") (internal citation omitted); see id. at *2 n.3 (collecting cases).
Finally, neither the complaint nor the Notice contains any further information specifying the nature and extent of Plaintiff's injuries that would permit this Court to draw a reasonable inference that the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied. Plaintiff's general allegations that she "was severely injured, bruised and wounded, suffered, still suffers and will continue to suffer for some time physical pain and bodily injuries and became sick, sore, lame and disabled and so remained for a considerable length of time"; that she "was compelled to and did necessarily require medical aid and attention, and did necessarily pay and become liable therefore for medicines"; that she "has been unable to attend to her usual occupation in the manner required"; and that she "sustained serious injuries as defined in Section 5102(d) of the Insurance Law of the State of New York, and has sustained economic loss greater than basic economic loss as defined in Section 5102 of the said Insurance Law
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants' allegations in their Notice are insufficient to support the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, this case is remanded to New York State Supreme Court, Queens County, under Index No. 714588/2019, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.