REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARK R. ABEL, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Melissa Scott brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits. This matter is before the Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

Summary of Issues.

Plaintiff Melissa Scotts maintains she became disabled at age 45 by injuries sustained in a bus accident, headaches, new, low back and leg pain, diabetes, hypertension, depression, anxiety and post traumatic stress disorder. The administrative law judge found that Scott retained the ability to perform work having medium exertional demands that involves little or no contact with the public.

Plaintiff argues that the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits should be reversed because:

Procedural History. Plaintiff Melissa Scott filed her application for disability insurance benefits on January 11, 2007, alleging that she became disabled on April 1, 2004, at age 45, by injuries sustained in a bus accident, headaches, back and leg pain and post traumatic stress disorder. (R. 133, 185.) The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge. On November 9, 2009, an administrative law judge held a hearing at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified. (R. 24.) A vocational expert also testified. On April 5, 2010, the administrative law judge issued a decision finding that Scott was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (R. 15.) On April 1, 2011, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review and adopted the administrative law judge's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. (R. 1-3.)

Age, Education, and Work Experience. Melissa Scott was born August 22, 1958. (R. 133.) She has a high school education and completed two years of college. (R. 191.) She has worked as a behavioral health technician, cafeteria worker, cashier, community organizer, home health aide, security officer and teacher's assistant. She became unable to work April 1, 2004. (R. 186-87.)

Plaintiff's Testimony. The administrative law judge fairly summarized Scott's testimony as follows:

(R. 12.) At the November 2009 hearing before the administrative law judge, Scott testified that she had been working for the past year caring for her mother. She worked 26 hours a week and was paid $200 a week by a social services agency. (R. 44.)

Medical Evidence of Record. The administrative law judge's decision fairly sets out the relevant medical evidence of record. This Report and Recommendation will only briefly summarize that evidence.

Physical Impairments.

Wooster Community Hospital. On April 1, 2004, plaintiff was treated in the emergency department following a bus accident. The bus, in which she was a passenger, went off the road and rolled over. Plaintiff was pushed against the side wall of the bus and other passengers landed on top of her. Within 20 minutes of the accident, her left shoulder began to hurt. She was diagnosed with a sprain of the left shoulder and neck. (R. 278-80.)

M.P. Patel, M.D. On May 7, 2004, Dr. Patel, evaluated plaintiff's injuries sustained in the bus accident. Scott reported persistent neck pain, which was described as sharp, burning, and extending into both arms. She had episodes of paresthesia. Looking up or down or turning sideways increased her pain. She reported recurring mid-low back pain. At times, the pain extended to both hips, buttocks, and posterior thighs. Pain was aggravated with bending or lifting. She had difficulty climbing or descending stairs.

On physical examination, plaintiff's cervical spine was tender in the midline over the spinous processes and in the adjacent paraspinous muscles from C3 to C7. There was muscular tightness in the paracervical region, most evident with neck hyperflexion. Flexion was restricted 30 degrees and extension 40 degrees. Right and left lateral flexion were 30 degrees. Right and left lateral rotation was 30 degrees. Deep tendon reflexes were 1+ in both upper extremities. Dr. Patel diagnosed a sprain/strain of the cervical and dorsal-lumbosacral spines.

On June 4, 2004, Dr. Patel re-evaluated plaintiff. Scott reported that she had fair relief from symptoms and that she did not take any medications. Her neck and upper back pain was localized over the based of the neck on both sides and the right upper paradorsal region. She had some difficulty turning her neck fully to the right side. Her low back pain was minimal. On examination, there was spasm and tenderness of the lower paracervical muscles bilaterally. There was tenderness over the right cervical-trapezius junction and right suprascapular region. Her right lateral flexion was 30 degrees. her right lateral rotation was 60 degrees. She had normal mobility of the lumbar spine, but there was pain and discomfort at the extreme range of motion. (R. 289-91.)

On November 11, 2004, Dr. Patel examined plaintiff. Scott reported that she had recurring neck and back pain, at times extending into both shoulders, hips, and buttocks. Examination of the thoracic spine revealed minimum tenderness and a normal range of mobility. There was spasm and tenderness of the lower paracervical and paralumbar muscles bilaterally. Her mobility was restricted and painful. Deep tendon reflexes in the upper and lower extremities were 1+ bilaterally. On November 18, 2004, Scott indicated that she had some relief with medications and Biofreeze. Dr. Patel indicated that his objective findings were consistent with some improvement in her condition with respect to the severity of spasm and tenderness and her improved mobility. (R. 292-93.)

Jeffrey Dunnigan, D.C. On March 15, 2007, Dr. Dunnigan, a chiropractor, completed a form concerning his treatment of plaintiff from April 16 through September 24, 2004. He reported that plaintiff experienced off and on pain and weakness. She had pain on cervical flexion and rotation. (R. 310.)

Franklin D. Krause, M.D. On April 24, 2007, Dr. Krause examined Scott for the Bureau of Disability Determination. He noted that plaintiff had occasional symptoms in her neck and back without evidence of reflex asymmetry, atrophy, or abnormality in gait or station. Plaintiff carried on all activities of daily living. She cooked, cleaned, and shopped. (R. 314-15.)

Jason Collins, M.D. On August 25, 2008, Dr. Collins began treating plaintiff. Plaintiff was recently diagnosed with diabetes. (R. 425-26.)

Suman Sharma, M.D. Dr. Sharma provided treatment notes from December 15, 2008 through November 12, 2009. Plaintiff was treated for diabetes and hypertension. (R. 467-76.) Plaintiff reported that she was having pain and fatigue. (R. 467.) On March, 2009, plaintiff reported that her pain was a 9 on a ten point scale, although she noted that the pain came and went. (R. 468.) On April 24, 2009, plaintiff reported a burning sensation in her feet. Dr. Sharma believed that it was likely early polyneuropathy as a result of diabetes. (R. 470.)

Psychological Impairments.

David V. House, Ph.D. On May 1, 2007, Dr. House, a psychologist, evaluated Scott for the Bureau of Disability Determination. On mental status examination, plaintiff reported 5-6 hours of broken sleep. Her appetite was inconsistent, but she ate a lot if she was depressed. She reported being depressed "off and on." She was hopeful about the future and cared about what happened. She denied any significant feelings of guilt. She reported episodic anxiety attacks. Following the bus accident, she was afraid to drive and she had flashbacks.

Scott was oriented in four spheres. Her concentration and attention were mildly to moderately limited. At times her thinking was somewhat fragmented and she was not focused, which contributed to a somewhat odd functioning. Dr. House concluded that plaintiff's concentration and attention were mildly to moderately limited primarily due to anxiety and obsessive compulsive behavior. Her ability to understand and follow directions was not limited, but she might have some difficulty, due to compulsivity, following directions beyond 4-5 steps. Her ability to withstand stress and pressure appeared moderately limited due to anxiety issues. Her ability to relate to others and deal with the general public was mildly limited due to anxiety issues. Her compulsivity gave her a rather odd quality in terms of her interactions. Her ability to adapt was moderately limited. Dr. House diagnosed obsessive compulsive disorder and dyssomnia. Her deferred diagnosing a mood disorder, not otherwise specified. Dr. House assigned her a Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") score of 60. (R. 341-45.)

Vicki Casterline, Ph.D. On May 31, 2007, Dr. Casterline completed a mental residual functional capacity assessment and a psychiatric review technique. Dr. Casterline opined that plaintiff Scott had moderate limitations in her ability to understand and remember detailed instructions. With respect to sustained concentration and persistence, plaintiff was moderately limited in her abilities to carry out very short and simple instructions, to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, and to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. Plaintiff had no significant limitations with respect to social interaction. Plaintiff was moderately limited in her abilities to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting and to set realistic goals or make plans independently of others. Dr. Casterline noted that plaintiff reported that she was independent in self-care, she drove, cooked, cleaned, worked out, and attended Kent State University. At the consultative examination, plaintiff was dressed appropriately and was neat and clean. There was no evidence of a thought disorder, but she had an odd presentation. Dr. Casterline concluded that plaintiff was able to perform simple repetitive tasks and more complex tasks of a similar nature. She could interact with others on a superficial level. She could live independently. Plaintiff would work best at tasks that were static in nature and had easily explained changes. She could work at a steady pace to sustain simple tasks. (R. 320-37.)

Coleman Professional Services. On August 23, 2007, Scott had an diagnostic assessment at Coleman Professional. Plaintiff reported anxiety, difficulty sleeping, and always feeling as if something bad was going to happen. She had low motivation and poor concentration. She was depressed, moody, and anxious. She had panic attacks and felt overwhelmed. She was raped and sexually molested as a child. Plaintiff was recommended to begin cognitive behavioral therapy sessions every two weeks. (R. 347-54.)

Joseph D. Perry, Ph.D. On December 27, 2007, Dr. Perry, a psychologist, performed a psychological evaluation at the request of the Bureau of Disability Determination. Plaintiff reported experiencing depression and anxiety. Her appetite and sleep was poor. Despite her reported anxiety, plaintiff appeared self-confident and outgoing. With respect to her activities of daily living, plaintiff reported that she went to bed at about 2-3:00 a.m. She had difficulty sleeping due to pain and anxiety. She was frequently fatigued during the day. She attended Kent State University from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Her other activities included housecleaning and studying. She reported that she had some friends and interacted with them. She took walks, watched movies and rode her bicycle. Dr. Perry diagnosed anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified. He assigned a GAF score of 80. He noted that she was able to function at a high level given that she attended school full-time and worked at her church on a part-time basis. (R. 386-90.)

Roseann Umana, Ph.D. On January 19, 2008, Dr. Umana completed a psychiatric review technique. Dr. Umana noted that in a December 2007 examination, Scott reported that she was seeking employment beyond her part-time position. Her ability to relate to others was unimpaired. Her abilities to understand and follow instructions and to perform tasks were unimpaired. Her ability to withstand stress and pressures was mildly limited. Dr. Umana opined that plaintiff's condition had improved rather than worsened. She concluded that her condition was not severe. (R. 392-405.)

Lisa Stines, Ph.D. In a January 21, 2008 letter, Dr. Stines, a psychologist, reported that Scott had been involved in a study concerning treatment and post-traumatic stress disorder. Plaintiff's post-traumatic stress disorder was the result of a Greyhound bus accident. Plaintiff reported experiencing nightmares, recurrent thoughts about the trauma, loss of interest in activities, difficulty sleeping, and other symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. (R. 295.)

Scioto Paint Valley Mental Health Center. On February 3, 2009, Scott underwent a diagnostic assessment. The assessment was not signed. Soctt identified her current problem as severe anxiety. She reported that her short-term memory was impaired. She had poor sleep and a fair appetite. Her attitude was described as cooperative and motivated. Her mood was anxious and depressed. She was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and an anxiety disorder not otherwise specified. She was assigned a GAF score of 54.

A February 18, 2009 psychotherapy progress note indicated that plaintiff was applying for disability, which she viewed as temporary while she got back on her feet, finished school and found a job where she did not have to be around people as much. (R. 453.)

An November 5, 2009 medical statement completed by Pamela Sayre-Butt, L.I.S.W., indicated that plaintiff exhibited the following symptoms: anhedonia, sleep disturbance, decreased energy, difficulty concentrating or thinking, apprehensive expectation, psychomotor agitation or retardation, autonomic hyperactivity, recurrent and intrusive recollections of a traumatic experience, which are a source of marked distress. Ms. Sayre-Butt also indicated that the need to rule out whether plaintiff was experiencing severe panic attacks manifested by a sudden unpredictable onset of intense apprehension, fear, terror and sense of impending doom occurring on the average of at least once a week. Ms. Sayre-Butt opined that Scott had moderate restriction of daily activities and marked difficulty in maintaining social functioning. She exhibited deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace resulting in the frequent failure to complete tasks in a timely manner. She had repeated episodes of deterioration or decompensation. (R. 455-56.)

A September 29, 2009 treatment notes indicates that plaintiff was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. (R. 460.)

Administrative Law Judge's Findings.

(R. 10-15.)

Standard of Review. Under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §405(g), "[t]he findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ." Substantial evidence is "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quoting Consolidated Edison Company v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It is "`more than a mere scintilla.'" Id. LeMaster v. Weinberger, 533 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1976). The Commissioner's findings of fact must be based upon the record as a whole. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985); Houston v. Secretary, 736 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1984); Fraley v. Secretary, 733 F.2d 437, 439-440 (6th Cir. 1984). In determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court must "`take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.'" Beavers v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1978)(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1950)); Wages v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 755 F.2d 495, 497 (6th Cir. 1985).

Plaintiff's Arguments. Plaintiff argues that the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits should be reversed because:

Analysis. A sequential evaluation process is employed to determine whether an individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the Commissioner determines whether the individual is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity; if so, a finding of nondisability is made and the inquiry ends. Second, if the individual is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must determine whether the individual has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; if not, then a finding of nondisability is made and the inquiry ends. Third, if the individual has a severe impairment, the Commissioner must compare it to those in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If the impairment meets or equals any within the Listing, disability is presumed and benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Fourth, if the individual's impairments do not meet or equal those in the Listing, the Commissioner must determine whether the impairments prevent the performance of the individual's regular previous employment. If the individual is unable to perform the relevant past work, then a prima facie case of disability is established and the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is work in the national economy which the individual can perform. Lashley v. Secretary of H.H.S., 708 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir.1983); Kirk v. Secretary of H.H.S., 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir.1981).

Here, the administrative law judge failed to make any finding at step two with respect to whether plaintiff's back and neck pain and post-traumatic stress disorder constituted a severe impairment. This failing does not constitute reversible error. In Maziarz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 837 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1987), the Sixth Circuit concluded that there was no reversible error when the Secretary failed to find that a claimant's cervical condition constituted a severe impairment when he continued with the remaining steps to determine the claimant's residual functional capacity. Id. at 244. Fisk v. Astrue, 253 Fed. Appx. 580, 583, 2007 WL 3325869, at *4 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[W]hen an ALJ considers all of a claimant's impairments in the remaining steps of the disability determination, an ALJ's failure to find additional severe impairments at step two `[does] not constitute reversible error.'")(quoting Maziarz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir.1987)).

With respect to step three of the sequential evaluation, the administrative law judge failed to consider whether plaintiff's physical impairments singly or in combination with her other impairments met or equaled a Listing. The administrative law judge found that plaintiff's hypertension and diabetes constituted severe impairments. The decision, however, contains no discussion as to whether these impairments met or equaled a listed impairment. Although plaintiff has failed to put forth any argument that she met or equaled the relevant listings for diabetes or hypertension, the administrative law judge erred by skipping a step of the analysis required by the Commissioner's regulations. On remand, the administrative law judge must actually evaluate the evidence, compare it to the Listings and provide a rationale for his decision to allow for meaningful judicial review. Reynolds v. Commissioner of Social Security, 424 Fed. Appx. 411, 416 (6th Cir. 2011).

The administrative law judge rejected the opinion of Ms. Sayre-Butt on the basis that she was not an acceptable medical source:

(R. 13). This statement reflects a misunderstanding of the regulations. Section 404.1513 of title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations states:

20 CFR § 404.1513(d)(1). Only "acceptable medical sources" can be considered a treating source whose opinion may be entitled to controlling weight. SSR 06-03p; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) & 416. 927(d). Evidence from other sources, however, may be used to demonstrate the severity of an impairment or how it impacts that individual's ability to function. Social Security Ruling 06-03p states:

SSR 06-03p at *5-6. Here, the administrative law judge was under the mistaken belief that Ms. Sayre-Butt's opinion could be given no weight because she was not an acceptable medical source. As a result, he failed to evaluate her opinion and consider all the evidence in the record.

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an administrative law judge makes a residual functional capacity determination. That finding is an "assessment of the claimant's remaining capacity for work" once his or her limitations have been taken into account. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945. It is "a more complete assessment of her physical and mental state and should include an `accurate[] portray[al] [of her] individual physical and mental impairment[s].' Varley, 820 F.2d at 779; Myers v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir.1975) (per curiam)." Howard v. Commissioner of Social Security, 276 F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2002).

When a vocational expert testifies, the administrative law judge asks the expert to assume certain facts about the claimant's work abilities. The facts in this hypothetical are the administrative law judge's residual functional capacity findings. The administrative law judge must accurately state each limitation that affects the claimant's ability to work. If there is not substantial evidence supporting the limitations the administrative law judge includes in the hypothetical to the vocational expert, then the expert's testimony is not substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision denying benefits. Howard, 276 F.3d at 240-42. If a limitation that substantially affects the claimant's ability to work is established by uncontroverted medical evidence, it is error for the administrative law judge to omit this limitation from the hypothetical given the administrative law judge. 276 F.3d at 242.

Here, the administrative law judge concluded that plaintiff had moderate difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence or pace. In his hypothetical posed to the vocational expert, the administrative law judge asked him to consider an individual "mentally limited to a simple, routine work environment, having little or no contact with the public." (R. 47.) Plaintiff maintains that the hypothetical fails to account for her moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace.

In Ealy v. Commissioner of Social Security, 594 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2010) cited a district court decision that held that a hypothetical limiting claimants to jobs entailing no more than simple routine, unskilled work is not adequate to convey a moderate limitation in ability to concentrate, persist and keep pace. Id. at 516-17 (quoting Edwards v. Barnhart, 383 F.Supp.2d 920, 930-31 (E.D. Mich. 2005). On remand, the administrative law judge's hypothetical to the vocational expert should reflect plaintiff's limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace.

From a review of the record as a whole, I conclude that this case should be REMANDED. On remand, the administrative law judge must evaluate the evidence with respect to plaintiff's physical impairments, compare it to the Listings and provide a rationale for his decision to allow for meaningful judicial review; evaluate Ms. Sayre-Butt's opinion in accordance with Social Security Ruling 06-03p; and present the vocational expert with a hypothetical that represents all of plaintiff's limitations.

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties a motion for reconsideration by the Court, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B); Rule 72(b), Fed. R. Civ. P.

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-52 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). See also, Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989).