MARTIN C. CARLSON, Magistrate Judge.
This pro se civil rights lawsuit comes before us for consideration of a motion to compel discovery filed by the plaintiff, Joseph Pilchesky. (Doc. 67.) This motion to compel seeks further discovery in support of Pilchesky's allegation that the defendants violated the plaintiff's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when they conducted a warrantless search of the plaintiff's home seeking the plaintiff's paramour, who was wanted on a state arrest warrant.
With respect to this legal claim it is alleged that in December 2013, the plaintiff, Joseph Pilchesky, was involved in a romantic relationship with Stephanie Tarapchak. In the course of this relationship, on occasion Tarapchak stayed with Pilchesky at his residence, 819 Sunset Street in Scranton, Pennsylvania. On December 19, 2013, the Court of Common Pleas for Lackawanna County issued a warrant for Tarapchak's arrest. On December 30, 2013, the arresting agency in Tarapchak's case, the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General, requested the assistance of the United States Marshals Service in locating and arresting Tarapchak. After Deputy U.S. Marshals learned that Tarapchak frequented Pilchesky's home, the defendant deputies traveled to Pilchesky's residence to try to apprehend her.
When the defendant deputies arrived at the home, they knocked and announced their presence, but received no response, although they observed lights burning inside the home. The deputies then established a perimeter around the home, and were informed by a neighbor that the neighbor believed that Stephanie Tarapchak and her daughter, Fallon, had been dropped off at Pilchesky's home at approximately 1:00 a.m. Other neighbors also reported that Tarapchak had frequently been seen coming and going from Pilchesky's home.
As the deputies surrounded Pilchesky's home they heard voices inside the residence. After several minutes a woman, who was later identified as Stephanie Tarapchak's daughter, Fallon, came to the rear door of the home, and engaged in a brief and profane exchange with a deputy refusing to allow the deputies access to Pilchesky's home. Fallon Tarapchak also specifically demanded that the deputies produce a search warrant.
At this point the deputies took actions which are undisputed, but may be subject to two very different interpretations. The deputies contacted the United States Attorney's Office and spoke to an Assistant U.S. Attorney seeking a search warrant. In response the deputies were informed that, since the arrest warrant related to a state case, a search warrant should be obtained by the Pennsylvania Attorney General's office. No search warrant was ever obtained by the defendants. Instead, as their stand-off with Fallon Tarapchak continued, Fallon Tarapchak's sister and father arrived at the scene. A series of communications then took place between the deputies and Fallon Tarapchak. The tone, tenor and content of those communications are disputed by the parties. For their part, the defendants assert that Fallon Tarapchak, who they believed had the authority to consent to a search of the home, voluntarily consented to a search after being advised of the possible penalties associated with harboring a fugitive. Pilchesky presents a diametrically different account of these events, alleging that Fallon Tarapchak was an overnight guest in his home who had no authority to consent to a search. Further, Pilchesky asserts that Fallon Tarapchak's consent was coerced through a threat that she would be arrested for harboring a fugitive if she did not permit entry into the home.
The deputies then conducted a search of the home. That search did not locate the fugitive the deputies were seeking, Stephanie Tarapchak, or any other occupants of the home. At the conclusion of this search, according to the defendants they "released Fallon [Tarapchak] from custody because she complied with all directions." (Doc. 34-1, ¶31.)
It is against this factual backdrop, that Pilchesky filed this lawsuit and now seeks discovery. Pilchesky has submitted multiple requests for production of documents, and interrogatories to the defendants. It is apparent that some of these discovery demands have already been fully answered. For example, in response to numerous requests for information regarding the fugitive status of Ms. Tarapchak, the defendants have pointed Pilchesky to the evidence that was in their possession, the warrant for Tarapchak's arrest. Other requests seems to call for defendants to opine on legal issues, or are cast in argumentative terms. Still other requests focus on communications with Tarapchak's estranged husband, matters which may have only limited relevance here. However, as we construe these requests, a series of requests seek factual information from the defendants that directly relates to three central issues in this case; namely: (1) What was the factual basis for the belief that Ms. Tarapchak could be located inside Pilchesky's residence? (2) What was the factual basis for the belief that Ms. Tarapchak resided at the Pilchesky home, a fact which would have obviated the need for a search warrant? (3) What was the factual basis for the conclusion that Fallon Tarapchak, could and did, consent to a search of the Pilchesky residence?
For the reasons set forth below, to the extent that the plaintiff's discovery demands are narrowly construed to seek this factual information, we believe that the motion to compel should be granted, subject to the government taking appropriate steps to protect the identity of any confidential informants.
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to compel discovery, and provides that:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37 is defined, in turn, by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 26(b)(1), which provides that:
Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court's discretion and judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are "committed to the sound discretion of the district court."
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes.
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through discovery reaches nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense. Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict the court's discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all relevant information a concept which is not confined to admissible evidence but is also defined in the following terms: "Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable." Rather, "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense."
A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the relevance of the requested information.
Furthermore, in an investigative setting, requests for information can implicate a legitimate governmental privilege, a governmental privilege which acknowledges the government's need for confidentiality of certain data but recognizes that courts must balance the confidentiality of governmental files against the rights of a civil rights litigant by considering:
Included among these governmental investigative privileges is what is known as the informer's privilege, a legal privilege that allows the government in some circumstances to refrain from identifying confidential informants who have assisted in investigations by providing information to law enforcement. "The purpose of the federal informer's privilege is to `protect "the public interest in effective law enforcement," . . . [b]y ensuring the anonymity of those reporting violations of the law' which "`encourages [citizens] to perform that obligation.'"
Finally, when considering discovery demands, like those propounded in this case which often ask parties to opine on legal questions, it is well-settled that: "Facts are discoverable, the legal conclusions regarding those facts are not."
The threshold determination in any motion to compel involves an analysis of whether the discovery sought by a party is relevant to any party's claim or defense. This inquiry call upon us to consider the legal and factual issues raised in the parties' dispute. In this case, Pilchesky has alleged that the defendants violated the plaintiff's rights when they conducted a warrantless search of the plaintiff's home seeking the plaintiff's paramour, who was wanted on a state arrest warrant. Thus, at bottom, Pilchesky's third amended complaint brings a civil rights claim under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that:
U.S. Const. amend IV.
Several legal tenets govern our consideration of this particular Fourth Amendment claim. First, in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment there typically are two prerequisites to any search: probable cause and a warrant.
In the context of a search for a person or thing, probable cause is typically defined as "a fair probability that contraband [fugitive] or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."
The defendants have justified their warrantless search of Pilchesky's residence by relying upon two of these specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. First, defendants have argued that under the Fourth Amendment they were permitted to enter the residence pursuant to the arrest warrant for Stephanie Tarapchak because they possessed a valid arrest warrant, and had probable cause to believe that Tarapchak both was inside the home, and resided at the home. This narrow exception to the warrant requirement was defined by the
The second exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement which defendants have proffered as a legal defense to this lawsuit is the consent search doctrine. Defendants have argued that the warrantless search of Pilchesky's residence was justified because Fallon Tarapchak voluntarily consented to that search. However, like the narrow exception crafted for a search of the residence of a fugitive this exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement entails a fact-intensive analysis of a body of disputed facts. For a consent search to be valid two requisites must be met: (1) consent must be voluntary, and (2) given by a person with the authority to consent to the search.
In this case, these legal tenets and the factual circumstances surrounding this search appear to define three central issues for the parties: (1) What was the factual basis for the belief that Ms. Tarapchak could be located inside Pilchesky's residence? (2) What was the factual basis for the belief that Ms. Tarapchak resided at the Pilchesky home, a fact which would have obviated the need for a search warrant? (3) What was the factual basis for the conclusion that Fallon Tarapchak, could and did, consent to a search of the Pilchesky residence?
With the central issues in this lawsuit defined in this fashion, we agree that a number of Pilchesky's discovery demands were properly the subject of objections, and will not compel further responses to those discovery demands. For example, a number of these discovery demands seem to have been addressed fully by the defendants. Thus, Pilchesky propounded multiple discovery demands inquiring into the basis for the conclusion that Stephanie Tarapchak was a fugitive, but the defendants have fully responded to this request by directing the plaintiff's attention to the warrant that had issued for Tarapchak's arrest. Similarly, many of Pilchesky's discovery demands are fashioned in an argumentative manner and seem to call upon the defendants to opine on legal questions. To the extent that Pilchesky sought legal opinions in his discovery demands it is clear that: "Facts are discoverable, the legal conclusions regarding those facts are not."
Still other discovery demands appeared to seek detailed disclosures relating to information that Ms. Tarapchak's estranged husband may have shared with law enforcement officials. With respect to these broadly cast discovery demands we note that this information would only be discoverable to the extent that it shed some light upon the questions of probable cause and authority to consent which lie at the heart of this lawsuit. Furthermore, to the extent that any person shared information under a promise of confidentiality the federal informer's privilege may be implicated. Because the expansively framed discovery demands seeking information from Tarapchak's estranged husband are not moored to the legal claims in this case, and do not fully take into account potential privilege claims, we will not compel answers to these questions, as they have been tendered to the defendants.
While we find that all of these objections were well taken by the defendants, our review of Pilchesky's discovery demands discloses to us that Pilchesky appears to also be seeking factual information relating to the basis for the belief that Ms. Tarapchak could be located inside Pilchesky's residence; the basis for the belief that Ms. Tarapchak resided at the Pilchesky home, a fact which would have obviated the need for a search warrant; and the basis for the conclusion that Fallon Taraphcak, could and did, consent to a search of the Pilchesky residence. In our view these are factual matters which are properly the subject of discovery, and the defendants should, therefore, supplement their prior responses by providing a complete disclosure of the factual basis for these three investigative judgments.
We recognize, of course, that this disclosure may potentially implicate the confidential informer's privilege. To the extent that it does, we prescribe the following course for the parties: As we view it, the informer's privilege applies primarily to the identity of the informer and not the substance of the informer's information. Therefore, consistent with the government's practice in other, related contexts, the defendants may comply with this order by providing in response to interrogatories a factual narrative describing the information provided by confidential sources without identifying those sources. Pilchesky may then seek the identity of those sources through a further, more narrowly focused motion to compel, if necessary.
An appropriate order follows.
AND NOW this 7th day of December 2016, the plaintiff's motion to compel, (Doc. 67.), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows: