MEMORANDUM

YVETTE KANE, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Henry Morales, Jr. ("Defendant")'s motion for suppression of physical evidence and statements pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. No. 55.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court will deny Defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 13, 2018, the Court conducted a hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress. (Doc. No. 55.) At that hearing, the Government offered the testimony of Special Agent Ryan Kovach ("Special Agent Kovach"), and Special Agent Jamie Markovchick ("Special Agent Markovchick"), of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF"), as to the events surrounding the search of a residence located at 325 Charles Road in Lancaster, Pennsylvania (the "Home") on January 18, 2018. Defendant offered the testimony of his partner, Natasha Parrish ("Ms. Parrish"); himself; and Special Agent LaToya Stewart ("Special Agent Stewart"), of the ATF.

A. Factual Background1

1. Burglaries on the Night of January 16-17, 2018 and Initial Investigation

On the night of January 16, 2018, into the early morning hours of January 17, 2018, a gun shop in Palmyra, Pennsylvania and a pharmacy in Lebanon, Pennsylvania were burglarized. (Tr. at 20: 4-8; 44: 19-23.) Multiple firearms were taken during the burglary of the gun shop. (Id. at 6: 15-19; 33: 21-23.) As a result, police arrested two individuals, Jorge Santiago ("Santiago") and Fernando Rodriguez ("Rodriguez"), on the night of the burglaries.2 (Id. at 20: 9-18.) Surveillance footage obtained by police indicated that multiple individuals wearing dark sweatshirts, hats, and gloves were present at the scenes of the burglaries. (Id. at 52: 23-25; 53: 1-2.) At the time of their arrests, Santiago and Rodriguez were wearing clothing that officers identified from the surveillance footage. (Id. at 21: 18-21.)

2. ATF Investigation on January 18, 2018

On January 18, 2018, Special Agents Stewart and Kovach were investigating the burglaries, with Special Agent Stewart acting as the lead agent for the investigation. (Id. at 23: 4-6, 12-14; 88: 8-9.) They had spoken to witnesses who identified Defendant as someone involved in the burglaries. (Id. at 22: 11-12.) Special Agent Stewart then used several search methods to identify an address at which to find Defendant. She first used a Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PennDOT") driver's license search. (Id. at 90: 18-25; 91: 1-5.) The results page of the PennDOT search listed Defendant's address as 325 Charles Road in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. (Id. at 88: 10-21; Doc. No. 100 at 6.) Special Agent Stewart also performed a search through Accurint, a program that examines multiple forms of public records to identify addresses associated with a specific name. (Tr. at 97: 5-25.) The Accurint search report indicated several addresses associated with Defendant, the most recent of which was 325 Charles Road in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. (Id. at 92: 1-3; Doc. No. 100 at 3, 7.)

At some point before 8:00 PM, Special Agents Stewart, Kovach, and O'Donnell traveled to the residence of Ronald Grover and interviewed his sister, Ronisha Grover, whose vehicle the agents believed was involved in the burglaries. (Tr. at 23: 19-25; 24: 1, 12-22.) During that interview, Ronisha Grover gave her consent to the ATF agents to search her vehicle by signing ATF Form 3220.11, a consent-to-search form. (Doc. No. 100 at 2.) By the evening of January 18, 2018, the ATF agents had a working list of which firearms taken during the gun shop burglary had been recovered and which firearms remained unaccounted for. (Tr. at 54: 2-7.) Approximately three guns, at least some of which were handguns, remained missing at that point. (Id. at 6: 15-19; 54: 2-7.)

3. 325 Charles Road in Lancaster, Pennsylvania

Ms. Parrish, Defendant's partner, resides at 325 Charles Road in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. The Home is a single-story residence with three bedrooms, a living room area, a kitchen and dining room area, and a basement. (Id. at 8: 13-17; 9: 4-8; 15: 23-25; 16: 1-2; 71: 22-23.) Ms. Parrish's brother owns the Home and rents the Home to their mother. (Id. at 65: 17-25.) At the time of the burglaries and investigation in January 2018, Ms. Parrish's mother and two children also lived at the Home. (Id. at 71: 17-21.)

When Defendant, who was employed at a Taco Bell restaurant at the time of the search, had to work a morning shift, he would stay at the Home the night before, but he mainly lived at the homes of his mother and grandmother. (Id. at 51: 17-20; 66: 5-10; 72: 10-17.) Defendant shared a bedroom with Ms. Parrish on the nights that he stayed at the Home. (Id. at 9: 15-17.) Ms. Parrish allowed Defendant to keep a basket of clothing in the bedroom but did not permit him to have his own dresser drawer. (Id. at 73: 5-16.) As to whether Defendant could store his belongings in the bedroom, Ms. Parrish had told Defendant, "Don't get too comfortable." (Id. at 73: 5-12.) On the night of January 18, 2018, Defendant was at the Home and intended to spend the night there because he was scheduled to work the next morning. (Id. at 72: 10-21.)

4. Interview and Search at the Home on January 18, 2018

On the night of January 18, 2018, Special Agents Stewart, Kovach, Markovchick, and O'Donnell (all four collectively referred to as the "ATF Agents") arrived at the Home at approximately 8:00 PM in plain clothes, but also wearing ATF ballistic vests and carrying firearms, with the purpose of interviewing Defendant. (Id. at 6: 20-22; 45: 1-24.) The ATF Agents did not draw their firearms at any point on the night of the search, but Special Agent Markovchick had an AR-15 rifle slung on his shoulder.3 (Id. at 29: 15-21; 30: 1-3; 45: 21-24; 55: 4-7; 64: 2-6.) Special Agents Stewart and Kovach approached the front door of the Home, while Special Agents Markovchick and O'Donnell went to another door on the side of the Home. (Id. at 26: 19-24; 46: 9-11.) Special Agent Kovach knocked on the door, which Defendant eventually opened.4 (Id. at 6: 25; 7: 1-2.) Special Agents Stewart and Kovach identified themselves, and Defendant told them to come inside.5 (Id. at 7: 11-12; 46: 8-12, 25; 47: 1-3.) Special Agent Kovach motioned to Special Agents Markovchick and O'Donnell to come through the front door, and the ATF Agents then entered the Home and followed Defendant to the living room area, where he sat down on a couch without being prompted to do so by any of the ATF Agents.6 (Id. at 7: 14-25; 8: 1-3; 28: 13-23; 29: 3-11; 47: 5-12.)

In the living room area, the ATF Agents then told Defendant that he was a suspect in the burglaries and advised him that he was not under arrest. (Id. at 8: 5-8; 31: 21-24; 47: 17-20.) Defendant responded by denying any knowledge of or involvement in the burglaries. (Id. at 8: 8-9.) After several minutes, Ms. Parrish entered the living room area from the hallway where the bedrooms were located. (Id. at 8: 10-14; 47: 13-16; 93: 10-16.) Special Agents Stewart and Markovchick went to the kitchen and dining room area to speak with Ms. Parrish, (id. at 8: 14-17), while Special Agents Kovach and O'Donnell remained in the living room area with Defendant (id. at 8: 14-19; 47: 3-9; 94: 3-8).7 After Defendant continued to deny involvement in the burglaries, Special Agent Kovach asked Defendant, "[W]ell, if you're not involved, would you mind if we take a look around your house[?]"8 (Id. at 8: 21-24.) In response, Defendant said, "[N]o."9 (Id. at 9: 1.) Special Agent Kovach then told Defendant that he could walk around with the ATF Agents while they searched the Home, if he wanted to do so. (Id. at 9: 1-2.)

At that point, Defendant led Special Agents Kovach and O'Donnell around the Home, walking a step or two in front of them.10 (Id. at 9: 4; 49: 7-23.) Defendant and Special Agents Kovach and O'Donnell walked to the basement and the hallway where the bedrooms were located, and Defendant indicated which bedroom he shared with Ms. Parrish. (Id. at 9: 4-23.) Eventually, Special Agent Kovach returned with Defendant to the living room area, while Special Agent O'Donnell proceeded to search the bedroom shared by Defendant and Ms. Parrish. (Id. at 10: 7-11.) Upon returning to the living room, Defendant sat back on the couch without being prompted to do so by any of the ATF Agents. (Id. at 32: 16-24.) After Special Agent O'Donnell returned to the living room, Special Agent Markovchick also returned to the living room, and Special Agent Kovach went to the bedroom shared by Defendant and Ms. Parrish.11 (Id. at 10: 9-23; 36: 2-6; 39: 16-22.) Special Agents Markovchick and O'Donnell remained with Defendant (id. at 36: 3-4; 43: 5-7), and discussed where Defendant had been on the night of the burglaries, as well as the benefits of Defendant coming forward early if he was involved with the burglaries (id. at 50: 17-25; 51: 11-20).

In the bedroom, Special Agent Kovach searched an open laundry basket of dirty clothing. (Id. at 11: 12-13; 38: 10-14) He found a dark-colored balled-up sweatshirt, which he removed from the basket. (Id. at 11: 13-17; 52: 18-20.) Inside the balled-up sweatshirt, Special Agent Kovach found a gray hat and a pair of gloves. (Id. at 11: 15-17.) In Special Agent Kovach's opinion, these items were consistent with what someone committing a burglary would wear. (Id. at 14: 20-22.) He then returned to the living room with the sweatshirt, hat, and gloves, and placed them on the floor in front of Defendant. (Id. at 14: 4-6; 51: 1-4 80: 23-25.) At that point, Defendant, who had previously appeared calm, became upset and said, "You're not taking my sweatshirt."12 (Id. at 14: 7-10, 51: 3-5.) In response, Special Agent Kovach told Defendant that the ATF Agents were going to take the clothing because it constituted evidence and Defendant had consented to the search.13 (Id. at 14: 12-13.) Special Agent Kovach also told Defendant that if he was lying as to his involvement in the burglaries, he could be arrested. (Id. at 33: 24-25; 34: 1-8.) At the end of this exchange, Defendant told the ATF Agents to leave the Home.14 (Id. at 53: 13-14.) The ATF Agents left soon after, with the seized sweatshirt, hat, and gloves. (Id. at 51: 5-7; 53: 13-14.) The ATF Agents never arrested Defendant or read him his Miranda rights on the night of January 18, 2018. (Id. at 34: 9-10; 51: 21-23; 52: 7-8; 56: 12-15.)

B. Procedural Background

On February 14, 2018, a federal grand jury returned a five-count indictment charging Defendant with: (1) conspiracy to burglarize a pharmacy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2118(d); (2) burglary of a pharmacy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 2118(b); (3) conspiracy to possess stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (4) possession of stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j); and (5) possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). (Doc. No. 3.) On February 15, 2018, Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to all counts of the indictment. (Doc. No. 32.)

On May 8, 2018, Defendant filed a motion for suppression of physical evidence and statements pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Doc. No. 55), along with a brief in support thereof (Doc. No. 56). On May 22, 2018, the Government filed a brief in opposition to Defendant's motion. (Doc. No. 60.) Because the applicable time period for filing a reply brief has passed, Defendant's motion is ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the public against "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Evidence obtained due to an illegal search or seizure is deemed "fruit of the poisonous tree" and must be excluded. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). Generally, a "warrantless entry into a person's house is unreasonable per se." See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). However, several exceptions to this rule exist. See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). "Consent is an exception to the `requirements of both a warrant and probable cause.'" United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)).

The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court has held that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). These safeguards, often referred to as Miranda warnings, require that prior to questioning a suspect be advised that:

Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1242 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479) (internal quotation marks omitted). Officers are required to provide Miranda warnings only when a suspect is both in custody and subject to interrogation. See United States v. Walker, 529 F. App'x 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Alston, 34 F.3d at 1246-47).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant's Expectation of Privacy at the Home15

An individual lacking a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular place cannot invoke the Fourth Amendment protections as to that place. See United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 337 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)). "A co-resident of a shared dwelling and an overnight guest of a dwelling are typically held to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that dwelling." United States v. King, 364 F. App'x 781, 786 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); United States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 772 (7th Cir. 2007)). In determining whether an individual was an overnight guest entitled to an expectation of privacy, the Court can consider factors such as "whether and how often the person spent the night, whether the person had a key, whether the premises were habitable, and whether the person stored personal belongings or overnight accoutrements in the place." United States v. Coles, 264 F.Supp.3d 667, 678 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (citing United States v. Edwards, No. 11-735, 2013 WL 2256125, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2103); United States v. Henry, No. 11-30, 2012 WL 2886204, at *5-6 (D.V.I. July 15, 2012); United States v. Mitchell, No. 10-CR-11, 2010 WL 3938235, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2010)).

In the instant case, although Defendant did not have his own dresser drawer at the Home, he had his own laundry basket in which he kept his clothing. (Tr. at 73: 5-16.) In addition, Defendant stayed at the Home whenever he was scheduled to work the next morning because of the Home's proximity to his workplace. (Id. at 73: 10-17.) Further, Defendant planned to stay overnight at the Home on the night of the search because he had work the following morning. (Id. at 73: 10-21.) Considering these facts, in light of the applicable legal standard articulated supra, the Court concludes that Defendant was an overnight guest at the Home and had a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes.

B. Defendant's Authority to Consent to a Search of the Home16

The Court next turns to the question of whether Defendant had authority to consent to a search of the Home. "The individual giving consent [to search] must also possess the authority to do so." United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990)). One who has common authority over a residence has the authority to consent to the search of that residence, even when another with whom that authority is shared is absent and has not consented to the search. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1973). Whether an individual possesses common authority "rests not on property rights but `rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control.'" Stabile, 633 F.3d at 230 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170). This determination must be made such that "it is reasonable to recognize that any of the cohabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched."17 Id. at 230-31 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170). Even when a party lacks actual authority to consent to a search, the consent may still be valid under the doctrine of apparent authority. See United States v. Murray, 821 F.3d 386, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179). "The apparent-authority doctrine excuses otherwise impermissible searches where the officers conducting the search `reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has consented' to the search had the authority to do so." United States v. Walker, 529 F. App'x 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186; Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 828 n.29 (3d Cir. 1991)).

Here, because Defendant, rather than a third party, allegedly consented to the search, a challenge to his authority to consent cannot succeed. Assuming arguenedo that a defendant may successfully challenge his own authority to consent to a search, the Court concludes that the search was valid in regard to Defendant's authority to provide such consent. The actual authority of Defendant to consent to a search of the Home is questionable. Here, the testimony given by Ms. Parrish indicates that Defendant did not have common authority over the Home or the bedroom in which he slept. Ms. Parrish did not permit Defendant to have his own drawer of clothing in the bedroom at the Home, although he was allowed to keep a laundry basket with his clothing in the bedroom. (Tr. at 73: 5-16.) She had also told Defendant, "Don't get too comfortable," in the context of storing his belongings in the bedroom. (Id. at 73: 11-12.) Such facts indicate that while Defendant was permitted to stay at the Home on at least some nights, his control over the Home was restricted by Ms. Parrish such that it did not reach the level of common authority.

However, even if Defendant did not have actual authority to consent to a search of the Home, the Court concludes that, under the circumstances of the search, the ATF Agents' belief that Defendant exercised authority and control over the Home was reasonable. Special Agent Stewart inquired about Defendant's address using both a PennDOT driver's license search and an Accurint search, both of which indicated that Defendant's address at the time was that of the Home. (Id. at 91: 1-23.) Additionally, when the ATF Agents arrived at the Home, Defendant answered the door and invited them inside. (Id. at 6: 23-25; 7: 1-2, 11-19; 28: 4-9; 41: 17-25; 47: 1-4.) Defendant later walked with Special Agents Kovach and O'Donnell to the different rooms in the Home and indicated which bedroom he shared with Ms. Parrish. (Id. at 9: 1-23.) Further, in that bedroom, Special Agent Kovach found a laundry basket of men's clothing, and there was no indication that any other adult male resided at the Home. (Id. at 11: 11-17; 38: 10-25; 39: 1.) Under such circumstances, the Court finds that the ATF Agents' belief that Defendant had authority to consent to the search of the Home was reasonable. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the search was valid insofar as it pertains to the authority of Defendant to consent to the search.

C. Validity of Defendant's Consent to Search the Home

The Court now turns to the issue of the validity of Defendant's consent to search. While warrantless searches are generally prohibited, "[i]t is well settled . . . that a search conducted pursuant to consent is one of the specifically established exceptions to the search warrant requirement." United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219). However, for the consent to be valid, the Government must prove that the consent was given freely and voluntarily. See United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)). Whether the consent was given freely and voluntarily is a question of fact determined by considering the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Williams, 893 F.3d 323, 332 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 1991)). The Third Circuit has emphasized that the critical factors to consider in a totality of the circumstances inquiry include: "the age, education, and intelligence of the subject; whether the subject was advised of his or her constitutional rights; the length of the encounter; the repetition or duration of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment." Id. (quoting Price, 558 F.3d at 278) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendant argues that he did not give his voluntary consent to the ATF Agents to enter or search the Home. (Doc. No. 56 at 3-4.) In response, the Government argues that Defendant provided valid consent to the ATF Agents to search the Home. (Doc. No. 60 at 7-8.) It contends that there is no indication that Defendant's consent was "coerced or contrived," and that when considered in the totality of the circumstances, the search was permissible because Defendant voluntarily consented to it. (Id.)

Defendant was an adult at the time of the search (Doc. No. 100 at 3), and based on his testimony, appears to be of at least average intelligence. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, No. 14-cr-46-RGA, 2015 WL 1412697, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2015) (assessing the defendant's apparent intelligence in its analysis of whether the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to a search). Further, the relevant facts demonstrate that Defendant voluntarily allowed the ATF Agents into the Home,18 led them to the living room, and gave his consent to search the Home after speaking to them for only a few minutes. (Tr. at 6: 23-25; 7: 1-2, 11-19; 8: 3-9, 20-25; 9: 1; 28: 4-25; 29: 1-25; 30: 1-24; 41: 17-25; 46: 25; 47: 1-12.) Moreover, Defendant then led the ATF Agents around the home for part of the search. (Id. at 9: 1-23; 49: 7-23; 95: 17-25.) The Court notes that prior to Defendant granting the ATF Agents permission to search the Home, the conversation was not threatening or hostile, and Defendant consented to the search of the Home after Special Agent Kovach asked him for permission to do so only one time. (Id. at 8: 21-25; 9: 1-2; 30: 15-25.) Additionally, it bears noting that none of the ATF agents had their weapons drawn at any point during their interaction with Defendant on the night of the search. (Id. at 29: 15-25; 30: 1-3; 55: 4-7; 64: 2-6.) Although none of the ATF Agents advised Defendant of his right to refuse to consent to a search (id. at 31: 18-20), the Court finds that, despite Defendant's testimony that he was confused as to whether he could tell the ATF Agents that they could not search the Home (id. at 86: 13-14.), the fact that Defendant told the ATF agents that they had to leave and could not take the clothing with them after Special Agent Kovach showed it to him in the living room (id. at 50: 8-10; 86: 3-12), suggests Defendant's understanding that he had the right to refuse a search. Upon careful consideration of the totality of the circumstances, and mindful of the relevant factors the Court must consider, as explained supra, the Court concludes that Defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the search of the Home.

D. Scope of Defendant's Consent to Search the Home

When an individual consents to a search, he "may `delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents.'" See Williams, 898 F.3d at 329 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991)). "A court is to measure the scope of a suspect's consent using an objective standard to determine what a reasonable person would have understood from the exchange between the officer and the defendant." United States v. Walker, 529 F. App'x 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251). Additionally, once an individual has consented to a search, he may withdraw his consent. Williams, 898 F.3d at 329-30. Once a court establishes that a defendant has validly consented to a search, "it is [the defendant's] burden to demonstrate that he has withdrawn that consent by pointing to an act or statement that an objective viewer would understand as an expression of his desire to no longer be searched."19 Id. at 331.

Here, Special Agent Kovach asked Defendant if he minded if the ATF agents looked around the Home, to which Defendant replied, "No." (Id. at 8: 22-25; 9: 1-2; 30: 17-25.) Special Agent Kovach's search request was broad, and Defendant's answer indicated consent without any caveat or limitation as to where the ATF agents could search in the Home. The Court thus concludes that Defendant's initial consent to search the home permitted the ATF Agents to search the entire Home until consent was withdrawn. Up to the point of the seizure of the clothing at issue, none of the relevant testimony suggests that Defendant withdrew his consent. Accordingly, the Court also concludes that up to Special Agent Kovach's seizure of the sweatshirt, hat, and gloves, Defendant did not withdraw his consent to search the Home.

E. Applicability of Miranda20

Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect is both in custody and subject to interrogation. See Walker, 529 F. App'x at 265 (citing Alston, 34 F.3d at 1246-47). To determine whether an individual who has not been arrested is in custody, the Court must determine "whether there is a `restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" See United States v. McNeil, 416 F. App'x 227, 228 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Leese, 176 F.3d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1999)). The Third Circuit has identified five factors to consider when making such a determination:

United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 359-60 (3d Cir. 2006).

Upon consideration of these factors, the Court concludes that Defendant was not in custody at any point on the night of January 18, 2018. Special Agent Kovach told Defendant at the beginning of their interaction that he was not under arrest. (Tr. at 31: 21-24.) Further, that Defendant told the ATF agents to leave the Home after they showed him the seized clothing (Id. at 51: 4-7; 53: 13-14), suggests that Defendant understood that he could have told them to leave at any other point during the interaction that night. In addition, the ATF Agents were at the Home for approximately 30 minutes in total, a relatively short period of time. (Id. at 50: 8-13.) The testimony of the Special Agent Kovach indicates that there were periods of time during those 30 minutes, such as when Defendant was leading Special Agents Kovach and O'Donnell around the Home, that the ATF Agents were not asking Defendant questions. (Id. at 9: 1-23.) Additionally, the ATF Agents did not draw their weapons at any point (id. at 55: 4-7; 63: 24-25; 64: 1-6), and none of the testimony indicates that the tone of the conversation between Defendant and the ATF Agents was intense or heated, apart from when Defendant himself became heated when he told the ATF agents that they could not seize the clothing (id. at 14: 3-13; 51: 1-7). The fact that Defendant invited the ATF Agents into the Home and sat down in the living room to speak with them (id. at 6: 25; 7: 1-2, 11-12; 8: 1-3; 46: 25; 47: 1-12.), indicates that Defendant voluntarily submitted to questioning. Accordingly, as the Court has determined that Defendant was not in custody when he made any statements on January 18, 2018, the Court concludes that Miranda does not apply, and the statements made by Defendant on the night of January 18, 2018 will not be suppressed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court will deny Defendant's motion for suppression of physical evidence and statements. (Doc. No. 55.) An Order consistent with this Memorandum follows.