LISA PUPO LENIHAN, Magistrate Judge.
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Intervene as a defendant by the Pittsburgh Regional Building Trades Council, AFL-CIO (
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Intervene as a defendant by the Pittsburgh Regional Building Trades Council, AFL-CIO (the "Council") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. The Council seeks to intervene as a defendant based on the grounds that it claims an interest relating to the transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may impair or impede its ability to protect its interest.
On May 26, 2016, the County of Westmoreland (the "County") entered into a project labor agreement (the "PLA") with the Council, which applies to all qualifying construction projects for the County costing more than $150,000. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18 (
Plaintiffs are the Associated Builders & Contractors of Western Pennsylvania ("ABC"),S an organization of non-union contractors, contractors belonging to other unions and their employees, and a resident and taxpayer of the County. Id. ¶¶ 24, 32-39. On September 23, 2019, Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the validity of the PLA, claiming that it violates the individual employees' and members' rights to decide whether to associate with a union under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶¶ 40-46. Plaintiffs also claim that the PLA violates 29 U.S.C. § 157 of the National Labor Relations Act, which gives employees the right to decide whether they want union representation. Id. ¶ 47. By compelling contractor employees to become union members, Plaintiffs claim that the PLA violates 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), which abolished compulsory union membership. Id. ¶ 53. Lastly, Plaintiffs claim that by discriminating against non-union contractors and contractors belonging to a non-Council union, the PLA violates Section 512(a) of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Procurement Code, which requires all Commonwealth agency contracts to be awarded by competitive bidding. Id. ¶¶ 58-67. Plaintiffs seek a declarative judgment that the County is violating their constitutional rights, their federal rights under the NLRA, and Pennsylvania's competitive bidding laws, and to enjoin the County from enforcing the PLA. Id. ¶ 69.
The Council filed this Motion to Intervene on October 11, 2019. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion and filed their Brief in Opposition on October 22, 2019. (
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 24:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
Under Rule 24(a)(2), absent an applicable federal statute providing a right to intervene in intervention as of right cases, the applicant bears the burden to satisfy all four requirements of Rule 24(a)(2). Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kleissler v. United States Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1998)). The four-part test requires: (1) timely application, (2) the applicant has a significantly protectable interest in the pending lawsuit, (3) disposition of the lawsuit may impair or impede his ability to protect applicant's interest absent intervention, and (4) the existing parties do not adequately represent applicant's interest. Id.
Under section 24(c), a motion to intervene "must state the grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
ABC does not raise an issue with the Council's timeliness of application, nor whether it has a significantly protectable interest in the pending lawsuit. ABC first opposes the Council's motion because there was no pleading attached to the motion, nor did the Council identify a claim or defense for seeking intervention, per Rule 24(c). Pl.'s Br. in Opp. pp. 1-3 (
The Council counters that it did comply with Rule 24(c). R. Br. pp. 1-2 (
An intervening party must submit a pleading to ensure "that parties have advance notice of the claims that an intervenor plans to make." Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Inv'rs Sec. Leasing Corp., 610 F.2d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1979). But "[d]espite the compulsory language of the rule, some federal circuits have held that whether `to permit a procedurally defective motion to intervene is within the sound discretion of the district court.'" U.S. ex rel. Frank M. Sheesley Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 239 F.R.D. 404, 408 (W.D. Pa. 2006). Sheesley provides a comprehensive overview of the current status of Rule 24(c) among the Circuits.
Id. at 410. The Council's Memorandum of Law in Support of its motion lays out why it has an interest in this matter and why the current defendant may not adequately represent its interests. Memo. In Supp. pp. 3-4 (
Here, the intervenors did file a proper motion, and there is enough notice to the other parties of what their position would be in the litigation. Other circuits have held pleadings in other forms to be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 24(c), as the primary goal is to provide notice to the other parties. See United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2009) (Proposed intervenor's statement of interest satisfied Rule 24(c), where the intervenor's statement of interest provided sufficient notice to the court and the parties of the intervenor's interests); see also Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1992) (Courts, including this one, have approved intervention motions without a pleading when the court was otherwise apprised of the grounds for the motion).
ABC also argues that the Council is not a "proper party to the lawsuit" because as a defendant it has no claim, nor does it have a defense, since it would not need to or refrain from doing anything by the relief that ABC is seeking. Pl.'s Br. in Opp. p. 3 (
No Third Circuit case law prescribes a "proper party to the lawsuit" requirement for intervention. The Fifth Circuit case relied on by ABC involved whether the intervenor properly asserted claims as an intervening plaintiff. See Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448, 1450 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The determination of whether the proposed intervenor's complaint states a cause of action is controlled by the `general rules on testing a pleading'"). The case says nothing about what constitutes a sufficiently pleaded defense under Rule 24(c). It is also significant that the Council's rights as a signatory to the PLA are still at risk, regardless of its lack of obligations should the PLA be invalidated. ABC does not assert whether it would be prejudiced by the Council's intervention, and this Court does not find any reason why ABC would be prejudiced.
For these reasons, the Court recommends that this Motion to Intervene should not be denied based on procedural grounds. The substantive reasons for recommending that this Motion be granted are discussed below.
ABC does not dispute that the Council has a sufficient interest in this lawsuit. Rather, it argues that intervention is not warranted because the County adequately represents its interest. Pl's Br. in Opp. p. 4 (
The Council responds that the County is not acting as a government entity, but a market participant, and the presumption of adequate representation usually granted to a government entity does not apply. R. Br. pp. 4-5 (
Generally, the burden of showing the inadequacy of representation is on the intervenor and "should be treated as minimal." [additional citation and quotation marks omitted]. Benjamin ex rel. Yock v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Pennsylvania, 701 F.3d 938, 958 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. 630, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972)). A general presumption of adequate representation arises when the representative is a governmental body or officer charged by law with representing the interests of the absentee. Com. of Pa. v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1976). "When a government acts as a `market participant with no interest in setting policy,' as opposed to a `regulator,' it does not offend federal law [quotation marks omitted]." Associated Builders & Contractors Inc. New Jersey Chapter v. City of Jersey City, New Jersey, 836 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2016). The Third Circuit recognizes a two-part test to determine whether a governmental body should be treated as a market participant: 1) whether it has a proprietary interests in a project or transaction as an investor, owner or financier; 2) whether the scope of the funding condition is specifically tailored to the proprietary interest; i.e., whether the action is so broad as to be considered regulatory in effect. Id. at 418. The County has not been charged by law to represent the Council's interests in this matter. The Council has alleged that its interests are not identical to those of the County, and thus its interests may not be adequately represented should the Court not allow it to intervene. More significantly, the County's agreement with the Council supports the contention that its role in relation to these construction projects is that of a market participant, rather than a regulatory entity. The County provides financing to these projects and is the owner. A government has a proprietary interest in a project when it "`owns and manages property' subject to the project or it hires, pays, and directs contractors to complete the project." See id.
There are also district court decisions from this Circuit that reject the idea that because two parties may have the same goal, their interests are also identical. See Chester Water Auth. v. Susquehanna River Basin Comm'n, No. 1:14-CV-1076, 2014 WL 3908186, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2014) (rejecting assertion that defendant intervenor and governmental agency share the same ultimate objective to defend an approval for water use, as each party has separate and unique interests); Powell v. Ridge, No. CIV.A. 98-1223, 1998 WL 599387, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1998) (rejecting assertion that movant for intervention and the plaintiffs have a common "ultimate objective," as shown by their divergent interests in the collective bargaining agreement and based on the minimal standard for showing inadequate representation in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers [supra]); Land v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n, No. 3:16-CV-00897, 2016 WL 4771079, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2016) (finding that intervenor and defendant have similar interests, but are not entirely co-extensive, and that it is possible that their interests may conflict). The Court find this instance to be similar in that the Council has sufficiently alleged that its interests may diverge from those of the County enough to warrant intervention.
Finally,
Brody By & Through Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the Council has adequately pleaded that should the Court decide in ABC's favor and void the PLA, it will affect the Council as the other signatory to the PLA. In a labor context, the Eighth Circuit has found that a party to a contract should be allowed to intervene when the validity of that contract would be in jeopardy. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 738 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1984) (reversing District Court's denial of motion to intervene filed by teachers organizations representing teachers of three school districts, in action seeking consolidation of school districts, where if the districts consolidated, then the collective bargaining agreements the proposed intervenors had negotiated with districts may be invalidated).
Based on the timely application by the Council, its significantly protectable interest in the lawsuit, the fact that disposition of the lawsuit may impair or impede its ability to protect its interest absent intervention, and most significantly, that the current defendant does not adequately represent the Council's interest, this Court respectfully recommends that the Council's Motion to Intervene be granted as of right.
For the reasons discussed above, after due consideration of the Motion to Intervene by the Council (
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.